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SUMMARY
Background and objectives
Over the past two decades, international and German 
development cooperation (DC) has launched wide-reaching 
approaches to step up proactive cooperation and partnerships 
with the private sector in order to finance and implement 
development projects. While its advocates see cooperation 
with the private sector as a driver of sustainable economic 
development, its critics point to the fact that the promotion  
of private sector companies oversteps the core tasks of 
development cooperation, and question the implications  
of such growth-oriented approaches that are based on  
the competition principle.
Development partnerships with the private sector were designed 
by German DC back in the 1990s as public-private partnerships 
(PPPs). In 1999, the develoPPP.de programme was set up as  
the PPP Facility and expanded to become the largest German 
programme to promote development partnerships with  
the private sector. Through the develoPPP.de programme,  
the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (BMZ) provides financial and, if required,  
sector-specific support to European companies interested in 
investing in developing countries and emerging economies. 
The aim is to implement innovative projects in these countries 
that offer long-term benefit to the local population and also 
provide added value to the companies involved. The company 
is responsible for covering at least half of the overall costs,  
and cooperates with one of the three official implementing 
organisations that carry out the programme on behalf of BMZ: 
the Deutsche Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft mbH 
(DEG), the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusamme-
narbeit (GIZ) GmbH and sequa gGmbH.
This evaluation of the develoPPP.de programme examines both 
the implementation of the programme as such and its results 
and sustainability (in the period from 2009 to 2015). The 
findings are to be used 
1. to further develop the programme. They will inform the 
overarching strategic and conceptual policy level at BMZ 
and be used at implementation level by the individual 
implementing organisations;
2. to enable BMZ to comply with its accountability obligations. 
1 The answers to the first three evaluation questions already contain recommendations on how to enhance the effectiveness and sustainability of the develoPPP.de programme. No separate 
recommendations are therefore made in the answers to the last two evaluation questions.
Methodology
The evaluation pursues a theory-based approach. This centres 
on the programme theory as an explicit model of how 
develoPPP.de projects contribute to the achievement of 
specific impacts via a series of intermediate outcomes. Given 
the heterogeneous nature of the individual projects, the 
programme theory served to determine and delimit the areas 
of the programme to be evaluated, and to identify key 
assumptions that transcend individual projects and give the 
promotional approach its programmatic character. A 
combination of methods was used to collect data: analysis of 
documents and literature, semi-structured qualitative expert 
interviews, a quantitative portfolio analysis, a typology-based 
case study approach (12 projects in four countries) and a semi-
structured company survey.
Key findings, conclusions and recommendations
The prominent position of develoPPP.de as BMZ’s major 
programme for promoting development partnerships with the 
private sector makes it possible to enlist support from private 
companies in achieving sustainable development goals, in 
addition to the classical stakeholders at state and civil-society 
level. Via its projects, the programme contributes to 
knowledge and technology transfer in developing countries 
and emerging economies. The project results endure beyond 
the end of the project term, but rarely extend beyond the 
project level. The develoPPP.de programme promotes a large 
number of stand-alone projects, despite its original intention 
of providing impetus to enhance performance across entire 
systems. In its current form, the programme has difficulty 
meeting the high demands for development effectiveness.
The evaluation recommends continuing the develoPPP.de 
programme under the condition that fundamental adjustments 
be made in terms of its objectives, design and implementation. 
This will become clear further down in the section containing 
answers to the key evaluation questions and the identification 
of recommendations.1
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How appropriate is the develoPPP.de programme for 
achieving relevant development objectives?
The develoPPP.de programme, and its basic approach of 
enlisting greater support from private sector partners to 
achieve development objectives, is rated as relevant. This can 
be seen not just from the global role that the private sector is 
considered to play in achieving sustainable economic growth, 
but also from the growing enshrinement of corporate social 
responsibility in companies’ business models. One outstanding 
feature of the develoPPP.de programme is that it goes beyond 
a dialogue between DC and the private sector and focuses on 
direct cooperation between partners to tackle specific 
development issues. The evaluation basically confirms the role 
of the private sector as an initiator and driver of development. 
However, there are a few aspects that restrict the 
appropriateness of the programme for achieving development 
objectives: 
1. Although the develoPPP.de programme addresses BMZ’s 
overarching objective related to cooperation with the 
private sector, the objectives and strategic orientation of 
the programme itself remain unclear. It is not clear whether 
the added value of the programme consists exclusively in 
achieving development objectives in developing countries 
and emerging economies, or whether the programme’s 
accompanying function of sensitising the participating 
companies to development-policy issues and enabling 
them to learn in this respect constitutes an added value 
per se. 
2. At the conceptual level, the programme operates in a 
continuum between its orientation towards the interests of 
the private sector and its requirements related to 
development effectiveness in the partner countries. So far 
the programme has not adequately succeeded in 
reconciling the tensions between the two. As a result, the 
synergy effects arising from cooperation are overestimated, 
while the programme’s existing potential for achieving 
development objectives is not sufficiently harnessed.
3. The programme’s implementation by three organisations 
offers an opportunity to utilise the specific skills and 
structures of each organisation for the benefit of the 
programme. However, to date, the existing added value of 
this division of labour and of the different forms of 
cooperation is neither transparently communicated in 
public relations activities, nor is it leveraged during project 
implementation. 
Key recommendations 
 • BMZ is advised to continue the programme. This should 
be done under the proviso that it takes a clear position 
vis-à-vis the programme’s objectives and that the 
programme be consolidated and given a corresponding 
strategic orientation. In this context, it should be made 
clear whether cooperation with the private sector and 
the related function of maintaining a dialogue with 
companies and sensitising them to development issues 
represents added value in itself (which must be more 
precisely defined), or whether the added value of the 
programme should be attained exclusively by achieving 
development results in the partner countries. 
 • BMZ should make clear the extent to which there is a 
division of labour with bilateral DC programmes and 
other BMZ programmes on cooperation with the private 
sector, and the extent to which these programmes can 
be linked up. It should draw up a policy paper on this 
subject that explicitly defines and regulates cooperation 
with the private sector. 
 • BMZ should adjust the programme design based  
on a consolidated set of objectives. Existing conflicts 
between private sector and development-policy 
interests should be spelled out to make clear whether 
synergies can be leveraged, and where there are limits 
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as regards orientation towards the intended objectives. 
This should be supported via a dialogue between BMZ 
and the private sector.
 • The programme design needs to be adjusted with regard 
to two core aspects:  
(1) Strengthening the programme’s function of sensitising 
the private sector to development issues and engaging 
in a corresponding dialogue;  
(2) Strengthening orientation towards development 
priorities and impacts in the partner countries.  
The possible adjustments proposed here are not mutually 
exclusive: some of them can be made in parallel. 
 • To make full use of existing potentials, it is 
recommended that project implementation and the 
acquisition of partner companies be systematically 
aligned with the core competencies of the implementing 
organisations. Within the implementing organisations, 
every effort should therefore be made to dovetail 
activities more closely with key business segments. 
 • The existing forms of cooperation should be retained, 
but a greater distinction should be made between them, 
and they should be aligned with the expertise of the 
individual implementing organisations. 
What strategic, conceptual and procedural changes at programme 
level might help to increase BMZ’s steering capacity?
Steering of the develoPPP.de programme is based on a number 
of appropriate policy frameworks and steering instruments 
that have been introduced over the roughly 17-year 
implementation period. The evaluation has identified four 
areas in which BMZ’s steering capacity can be improved: 
1. Existing BMZ steering instruments, such as specific 
programme guidelines, commissions and grant 
notifications, are not sufficiently applied. The programme’s 
loosely defined objectives and policy framework leave 
room for interpretation, which limits BMZ’s scope for 
steering the programme.  
2. The M&E systems at programme, portfolio and project  
level do not adequately map the achievement of objectives 
or the effectiveness of the develoPPP.de programme.  
This means that BMZ and the implementing organisations 
cannot use the M&E systems as effective tools for monitoring 
and steering. 
3. Limitations in financial reporting and financial monitoring 
systems at BMZ and implementing organisation level 
strongly restrict the scope for assessing the programme’s 
efficiency. The data basis makes it impossible to compare 
the efficiency of the implementing organisations or forms 
of cooperation. 
4. Laborious coordination processes in the project selection 
phase increase the resources required by BMZ and the 
implementing organisations. They entail high transaction 
costs and delay the implementation of individual projects.
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Key recommendations 
 • BMZ and the implementing organisations should 
specify the project criteria of complementarity, 
subsidiarity as well as further criteria for strategic 
development partnerships with the private sector and 
document compliance with these criteria in a verifiable 
manner. This would reduce leeway for interpretation  
on the part of the implementing organisations and 
make their activities more verifiable for BMZ.
 • BMZ and the implementing organisations should 
optimise commissions and grant notifications 
(standardised wording, standard set of SMART 
indicators, indicators specific to the implementing 
organisations, explanation of how M&E systems are 
used for monitoring and learning within the 
organisation). 
 • BMZ should develop an overarching M&E system  
for the programme as a whole. The implementing 
organisations should use this as a basis for designing 
M&E systems for their respective portfolio, including 
data on the acquisition of private sector partners,  
and the design and implementation phase. The first 
positive developments in this area, such as the 
recruitment of an M&E officer and the creation of a 
database (develoPPP.de-Cloud), have already been 
introduced. 
 • BMZ should examine the existing financial reporting 
systems and adjust them, particularly so as to enable 
adequate assessment of programme efficiency.  
The introduction of project-based cost allocation  
by the implementing organisations should be 
examined, for instance. 
 • A clearer distinction should be made between BMZ’s 
steering function and the implementing organisations’ 
implementation tasks when it comes to selecting 
projects. 
 • BMZ should streamline the coordination process  
for selecting projects, while retaining the option of 
randomly checking whether projects meet criteria. 
What conceptual and procedural changes could be used to adjust 
the processes for implementing the develoPPP.de portfolio of DEG, 
GIZ and sequa?
During the long programme term, it was possible to  
introduce adequate regulations and processes for the various 
implementation phases. There is room for improvement  
in the following areas: 
1. Partner acquisition and PR activities have so far not 
transparently positioned the programme on the market. 
The programme is not widely known in some sectors, and 
many companies are not familiar with the fact that it is 
operated by three different organisations. At the same time, 
demand for the programme appears somewhat limited, and 
the ideas competition, which is basically a useful means  
of selecting projects, does nothing to change this fact. 
2. The expectations to be met by develoPPP.de projects, 
which are outlined in the project proposals, are considered 
too ambitious in relation to the existing time constraints 
and financial conditions. This is shown by the fact that the 
postulated causal links between results are often not 
verifiable, assumptions are too optimistic for the given 
contexts, and packages of measures are too ambitious. 
These aspects are due in part to the failure to disclose 
conflicts between business interests and development 
policy. While potential synergies are highlighted, potential 
conflicts of interest are not sufficiently taken into account. 
3. When designing the projects, the implementing 
organisation and the company involved often fail to reach a 
shared understanding of the project purpose. As a result, 
development objectives often take a back seat to corporate 
objectives during project implementation or after the 
project has ended. 
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Key recommendations  
 • Based on a study on target group segmentation  
and market potentials, BMZ and the programme’s PR 
department should adjust their PR strategies and 
devise an overarching strategy for acquiring business 
partners. Both strategies should apply across all 
implementing organisations and clearly present the 
different profiles of the organisations. 
 • The implementing organisations should use this 
overarching BMZ strategy to drive forward and expand 
their own PR activities. The partner acquisition measures 
should be tailored to the targeted companies. 
 • A central portal for companies that is shared by all three 
implementing organisations might reduce the obstacles 
that companies face when accessing the programme. 
BMZ should examine whether this task can be assumed 
by the recently established BMZ Agency for Business 
and Economic Development. 
 • The implementing organisations should do more to 
ensure that the development interests of development 
partnerships with the private sector can be more 
realistically asserted. The foundations for this are laid 
in the design phase, when dialogue with the company 
is at its most intense, and assumptions are formulated 
regarding the context, causal links between results and 
the project’s general level of ambition in terms of 
objectives. 
 • To better reflect the importance of local project 
partners for the projects’ success, these partners should 
be given greater consideration when designing the 
project, and if possible they should be involved in the 
design process between the implementing organisation 
and the company.
To what extent and under which circumstances is the develoPPP.de 
programme effective in terms of promoting develoPPP.de projects 
at the level of the directly involved local companies, public 
institutions and target groups, and at the level of European 
partner companies?
As a support mechanism, develoPPP.de facilitates projects that 
make a significant contribution to transferring knowledge and 
technology to the partner countries. The programme helps 
mobilise private capital for development purposes, especially 
where there are overlaps between corporate and development 
cooperation objectives. Where there is less overlap between 
these interests, the achievement of development objectives 
takes a back seat to corporate interests. This reduces the 
added value of the development partnerships. The binding 
subsidiarity (i.e. additionality) criterion is only partially 
verifiable. There is no way of knowing whether or not 
companies would have mobilised resources at some projects 
anyway even without the programme, based on their own 
corporate interests. 
Limited success has been made in translating the knowledge 
and technology transfer facilitated by develoPPP.de projects 
into income-generating and employment effects for the local 
population. Often, the projects only cover small target groups 
among the overall population, which means that further-
reaching changes cannot really be expected. It also remains 
unclear how develoPPP.de intends to reconcile tensions 
between the target groups of development interventions and 
those of companies at programmatic level. While development 
cooperation is geared towards marginalised and vulnerable 
sections of the population, these are usually of little interest as 
corporate target groups (i.e. as consumers or producers). 
Against this backdrop, it cannot be presumed that develoPPP.de 
projects as such will contribute to inclusive economic growth 
in the partner countries and have poverty-reducing effects. 
Through its access to a large number of companies, develoPPP.de 
also has the potential to mainstream development cooperation 
in a wider section of society. To date, this function of 
sensitising companies to development issues and enabling 
them to learn in this respect is only implicitly embedded in  
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the programme’s objectives. As a result, the programme has so 
far sensitised only a few companies with regard to these issues, 
and little impetus has been given for organisational change. 
To what extent can the results achieved by the develoPPP.de 
programme’s promotion of projects be considered durable and 
broad-based?
The develoPPP.de programme is rather successful at safeguarding 
the project impetus it has provided beyond the support period. 
In many cases, the target groups use the innovations introduced 
by the projects, e.g. knowledge and technologies, after the 
project ends. The partner companies also often continue their 
engagement in the partner country after the end of the project. 
This said, the components that are relevant to development,  
or collaboration arrangements with project partners who are 
relevant to development, are often considerably reduced once 
the project comes to an end. This substantially restricts the 
possibility of disseminating innovations beyond the original 
target groups.
In most cases, the develoPPP.de programme does not  
succeed in disseminating project impetus beyond the project 
partners. Only a few of the evaluated projects explicitly 
envisage transferring innovations to other companies and 
public institutions. Even if the project design specifies that 
innovations should be transferred, they are usually only taken 
up by the project partners themselves and not disseminated 
beyond the projects. Moreover, since the introduced 
innovations are often only available in a very limited number, 
with limited content and in a limited number of regions after 
the end of the project, it is rarely possible to disseminate these 
innovations beyond the target groups that are directly involved 
in the project. Objectives related to broader income-generating 
and employment effects, or the strengthening of private sector 
structures at meso and macro level, have not been achieved. 
Altogether, the programme in its present form is not suitable 
for generating projects with broad impacts and structure-
building results. 
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1.1
Background and objectives of the evaluation
Over the past two decades, cooperation between development 
cooperation (DC) actors and the private sector has gained 
importance at international level. As global policy changed  
in the 1990s and the debate concerning the social state and 
neoliberalism became less ideological (Schedler & Proeller, 
2000), development cooperation also underwent a paradigm 
shift. The private sector was increasingly accepted and used  
as a driver of development and for assuming tasks previously 
performed by the state. In international development 
cooperation too, the private sector played a growing role  
in achieving sustainable economic growth and other 
development objectives (MDGs, SDGs). The private sector  
has the potential to provide additional financial resources, 
which is of special interest given the slow growth in official 
development assistance (ODA). Entrepreneurial creativity  
and the power to innovate are considered a key prerequisite 
for successfully implementing global development objectives 
(GRI, n.d.; UN Global Compact, 2015). The growing importance 
of corporate responsibility as a factor for companies’ economic 
success (Minor & Morgan, 2011; PwC, 2011; Global Compact, 
2015) creates a further essential precondition for successful 
cooperation between DC and private sector actors. 
Cooperation with the private sector also has a long tradition 
within German development cooperation. Development 
partnerships with the private sector were designed back in the 
1990s as public-private partnerships (PPPs), as a means of 
involving companies in development cooperation (BMZ, 1997). 
The aim was to tap into private sector experience and leverage 
comparative advantages as a contribution to economic and 
social development in partner countries (BMZ, 1997). While 
advocates of cooperation with the private sector see it as a  
key tool for sustainable economic development, its critics in 
the political sphere and civil society point to the fact that  
the promotion of large private sector corporations oversteps 
the core tasks of development cooperation; they question  
the implications of such growth-oriented approaches that are 
based on the competition principle (Martens, 2010; VENRO, 
2 The only evaluation of the develoPPP.de programme to date was carried out in 2002. It consists of a basic study (Gleich & Holthus, 2002) and field studies in seven countries, which were 
complemented by a synthesis report (Altenburg & Chahoud, 2002). From 2009 to 2012, various ex post appraisals of a total of 89 develoPPP.de projects were performed in 33 countries (Doc 17; see 
footnote 2), and selected strategic development partnerships with the private sector were appraised (Doc 20; see footnote 2). However, these evaluations did not contain any detailed surveys at 
target group level, and were also meant to provide best practice examples and material for BMZ’s public relations work.
2010; Wiggerthale & Hachfeld, 2014). Little proof has been 
offered so far concerning the real contribution that development 
partnerships with the private sector make to the stated 
development objectives, or whether they may even generate 
negative effects. 2
Among a growing number of instruments, development 
partnerships with the private sector are now considered both 
in German and in international DC as a key instrument for 
involving the private sector in cooperation with emerging 
economies and developing countries (BMZ, 2011a, 2013b).  
The develoPPP.de programme was established in 1999 as the 
PPP Facility and is now BMZ’s largest and most important 
instrument for supporting development partnerships with  
the private sector. Twelve years after the last and so far sole 
evaluation of the programme, the DEval evaluation of the 
develoPPP.de programme examines and assesses both its 
implementation and potential effectiveness.
Objectives of the evaluation and evaluation questions
The evaluation aims to generate empirically based findings  
and recommendations regarding the implementation and 
effectiveness of develoPPP.de and of the factors that influenced 
these aspects. These findings and recommendations are to be 
used to further develop the programme both at the overarching 
strategic and conceptual policy level (the German Federal 
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)) 
and at implementation level (the individual implementing 
organisations). Beyond this, the findings on the development 
results of the develoPPP.de programme will support BMZ in 
complying with its accountability obligations. 
The evaluation goals were operationalised by means of 
overarching evaluation questions and further differentiated 
using a series of sub-questions. These questions were  
largely identified by users (i.e. BMZ and the implementing 
organisations) to ensure they met user needs. Apart from 
questions of relevance, effectiveness and sustainability,  
the evaluation questions address specific aspects of the 
overarching strategy and operational implementation of  
the programme. 
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Evaluation question 1:  
How appropriate is the develoPPP.de programme for  
achieving its development objectives?
Evaluation question 2:  
What strategic, conceptual and procedural changes  
at programme level might help to increase BMZ’s  
steering capacity?
Evaluation question 3:  
What conceptual and procedural changes could be used  
to adjust the processes (partner acquisition, selection, 
implementation) for implementing the develoPPP.de  
portfolio of DEG, GIZ and sequa? 
Evaluation question 4:  
To what extent and under which circumstances is the 
develoPPP.de programme effective in terms of promoting 
develoPPP.de projects?
Evaluation question 5:  
To what extent can the results achieved by the develoPPP.de 
programme’s promotion of projects be considered durable  
and broad-based?
The detailed evaluation questions are presented in the 
evaluation matrix (see Annex 5.1). They were operationalised 
by means of judgement criteria and underpinned in each  
case by statements on indicators, data sources and data 
collection methods.
1.2
Structure of the evaluation report
Section 1 describes the object of this evaluation –  
the develoPPP.de programme – and illustrates trends and 
discussions in cooperation between the private sector and  
DC. It serves to position the develoPPP.de programme within 
the international and national context and present the set  
of objectives and the assumptions related to the programme –  
the programme theory – and the resulting implications for  
the evaluation. Finally, it explains the evaluation approach, the 
data collection tools used and their methodological limitations.
Section 2 presents the evaluation findings. It starts  
by addressing strategic aspects (strategic orientation,  
basic conceptual assumptions, policy frameworks)  
and the organisational structure and procedures (steering  
by BMZ, implementation by the implementing organisations) 
used by the programme. Findings on the results and 
sustainability of the develoPPP.de programme are then 
presented. Key findings are summarised at the end of  
each sub-section. The key evaluation criteria of the 
Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation  
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD-DAC)  
are also assessed.
Section 3 is structured in line with the five overarching evaluation 
questions. It summarises the key conclusions on each question 
and identifies recommendations for the further development 
of the develoPPP.de programme. 
1.3
develoPPP.de: the object of the evaluation
1.3.1 Description of the object and delimitation
The object of this evaluation is the develoPPP.de programme. 
Through develoPPP.de, BMZ provides financial and, if required, 
sector-specific support to European companies interested  
in investing in developing countries and emerging economies. 
The aim is to implement innovative projects in these countries 
that offer long-term benefit to the local population and also 
provide added value to the companies involved. The company 
is responsible for covering at least half of the overall costs,  
and cooperates with one of the three official implementing 
organisations that carry out the programme on behalf of BMZ: 
the Deutsche Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft mbH 
(DEG), the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusam-
menarbeit (GIZ) GmbH and sequa gGmbH.
The initiation of contact with partners, their acquisition and 
the implementation of the develoPPP.de programme were 
continuously developed over the past 15 years. A key 
innovation in the programme design was the introduction of 
ideas competitions in 2009. To maximise learning potential 
and for reasons of feasibility, the evaluation focuses on 
development partnerships with the private sector supported 
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by develoPPP.de that have been implemented since the ideas 
competitions were introduced in 2009.
Forms of project within the develoPPP.de programme
The guidelines for the develoPPP.de programme (Doc 11)3  
specify two different forms of project: on the one hand a 
traditional development partnership with the private sector, 
carried out by DEG, GIZ and sequa, with a public contribution 
of up to EUR 200,000, and on the other, strategic development 
partnerships with the private sector with overall project  
funding of at least EUR 750,000. The latter must meet additional 
quality criteria. Strategic development partnerships are 
subdivided into Strategic Projects, which are carried out  
by DEG, and Strategic Alliances, which are carried out by GIZ. 
sequa does not carry out any strategic development 
partnerships with the private sector. Both in traditional and 
strategic development partnerships with the private sector, 
the public contribution must not exceed half of the overall 
project funding. Besides these two overarching forms of 
3 DEval gives unpublished documents the acronym ‘Doc’ and a serial number if the relevant documents come from BMZ or implementing organisations, or if complete quotation would infringe the 
author’s data protection rights.
4 Service contracts subsume DEG service contracts, sequa’s transfer agreements and GIZ’s consulting contracts (as of recently also GIZ’s implementation agreements).
5 Since the evaluation already focused on cooperation agreements in connection with the Strategic Alliances, it refrained from conducting a case-study-based appraisal of traditional development 
partnerships with the private sector based on cooperation agreements.
project, projects also differ in terms of the type of contract 
they involve. For projects based on service contracts,4 
responsibility for implementation lies solely with the 
companies. GIZ is the only implementing organisation that 
concludes cooperation agreements as a basis for projects.  
In these, GIZ is both the advisory and the implementing body, 
and provides human and non-material resources in addition  
to materials and equipment. Strategic Alliances handled  
by GIZ are always carried out on the basis of a cooperation 
agreement.
Taking into account the different implementing organisations, 
the distinction between strategic and traditional projects and 
the different contract types, six distinct forms of development 
partnerships with the private sector can be identified (see Fig. 1). 
Annex 5.6 provides a detailed comparison. The evaluation 
examined all six forms of development partnerships with the 
private sector5.
Figure 1: Project forms of the develoPPP.de programme by implementing organisation
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Strategic development partnership 
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Responsibilities and programme procedure
BMZ’s Division 114 (Cooperation with the private sector; 
sustainable economic policy) is responsible at working level  
for setting the framework for develoPPP.de and designing  
the programme. This responsibility is spelled out in a guideline 
document (BMZ, 2013b; Doc 11). The programme is publicised 
via cross-programme public relations work and the partner 
acquisition measures of the implementing organisations. 
Companies apply to DEG, GIZ or sequa for traditional 
development partnerships with the private sector via the ideas 
competitions. For strategic development partnerships with the 
private sector, they apply individually to DEG and GIZ. The 
respective implementing organisation selects promising projects 
based on defined criteria. This selection is agreed with BMZ 
before the final decision is taken to support a partnership. 
Companies and implementing organisations devise the strategy 
together during the project design phase. This procedure applies 
to all forms of development partnerships with the private sector. 
The projects are generally carried out by the companies.  
GIZ’s development partnerships with the private sector based 
on cooperation agreements are the exception. In this case,  
GIZ is also directly involved in implementation. The companies 
often carry out the projects with local partner companies or 
subsidiaries. Third parties such as public education institutions 
are also involved in implementation. The implementing 
organisations use a coordinated reporting process to keep 
up-to-date on project progress. Once the project is completed, 
the implementing organisations report to BMZ about the 
success of the project. Figure 2 provides an overview of the 
responsibilities of the actors involved. 
1.3.2 Portfolio overview – the programme in figures 
The portfolio overview is oriented to the different phases of 
the programme. First of all, it sheds light on the application 
and selection phase, then the implementation phase of the 
programme. The develoPPP.de Cloud is the basis for the following 
assessments. This is an online database developed in 2013  
that provides project data on all develoPPP.de projects since 
the programme’s inception. The develoPPP.de programme is 
first analysed in the context of the overarching BMZ divisional 
budget item ‘Development partnerships with the private sector’. 
The findings of the previously published portfolio analysis  
of the programme were used for the portfolio overview 
(Lücking & Roggemann, 2016). 
A total of EUR 91.8 million was available for the above-mentioned 
divisional budget item in 2015. EUR 35 million (roughly 38 % of 
these funds) was actually spent on the develoPPP.de programme. 
Figure 2: Overview of responsibilities for develoPPP.de
BMZ
Implementing organisations (DEG, GIZ, sequa)
Target group(s) in developing country or emerging economy
Local partner(s) Third party/parties
commissions
delegate(s)
carry/carries out project activities carry/carries out project activities
report(s)
cooperate(s)
examine and commission
carries out 
project activities
proposes project ideas
cooperate(s)
optionalStandard
European company (contractual partner of implementing organisation for development partnership)
Source: authors’ own
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As regards funding levels, this is therefore Germany’s largest 
(and oldest) programme for implementing development 
partnerships with the private sector. 
Application and selection phase
While traditional development partnerships with the private 
sector must officially apply to take part in the develoPPP.de 
programme via the ideas competitions, strategic development 
partnerships with the private sector are frequently initiated 
directly. The following statements on rejection and acceptance 
rates therefore only apply to traditional development 
partnerships with the private sector. From 2009 to mid-2015, 
2,285 project applications were submitted for traditional 
development partnerships with the private sector. Almost half 
of applications (47 %) were made to DEG, over a third (38 %) to 
GIZ and 15 % to sequa. As we can see, the implementing 
organisations have different degrees of access to interested 
companies. The implementing organisations accepted roughly 
40 % of all applications. The approval rate of submitted project 
applications is higher at DEG (45 %) than at sequa (39 %) and 
GIZ (32 %) (see Fig. 3). Possible explanations include greater 
support for projects that are close to the company’s core 
business, and differences in the quality of applications. 
However, the evaluation was not able to conclusively clarify 
reasons for differences in the approval rates. The evaluation 
did not establish that the approval rate had any effect on the 
achievement of objectives for develoPPP.de projects (see 
Section 2.5.1).
Implementation phase
Since 2009, 357 projects have been completed via the 
develoPPP.de programme; 328 projects were ongoing at the 
start of the evaluation, 171 were being prepared, and 75 
projects were discontinued. The overall volume (public, private 
and third-party contributions) implemented since 2009 
amounts to EUR 408.9 million. Table 1 provides precise 
statements on the number of projects and funding level by 
form of development partnership. 
Figure 3: Rejection and approval rate of project applications by form of development partnership from 2009 to mid-2015
Source: authors’ own based on 
the develoPPP.de Cloud as at 29 June 2015
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Table 1: Number and overall funding level of develoPPP.de projects that have been completed,  
are ongoing or discontinued, by form of partnership (2009–2015) 67
Status
Form of development 
partnership
Completed Ongoing
Total completed/being 
implemented
Being 
prepared
Discon-
tinued
Number
Funding 
(in EUR m) Number
Funding 
(in EUR m) Number
Funding 
(in EUR m) Number Number6
1 DEG traditional
(Service contract)
197 86.7 160 70 357 (52 %) 156.7 (38 %) 71 40 (10 %)
2 GIZ traditional
(Service contract)
52 18.4 77 32.6 129 (19 %) 51.0 (12 %) 1 13 (9 %)
3 sequa traditional
(Service contract)
55 25.1 32 14.6 87 (13 %) 39.7 (10 %) 33 8 (8 %)
4 GIZ traditional
(Coop. agreement)
27 10.3 28 14.2 55 (8 %) 24.5 (6 %) – 5 (8 %)
5 DEG strategic
(Service contract)
9 32.5 12 22.9 21 (3 %) 55.3 (14 %) 8 0
6 GIZ strategic
(Coop. agreement)
17 33 18 47.5 35 (5 %) 80.5 (20 %) 16 7 (16 %)
2 /4 GIZ traditional
(Serv. contract or 
coop. agreement)7
0  – 1  – 1  – 42 2
Total 357 205.9 328 202.4 685 408.9 171 75 (10 %)
Source: authors’ own based on the develoPPP.de Cloud as at 29 June 2015
6 Discontinuation rate as percentage of projects completed, ongoing and discontinued.
7 The data basis was insufficient for distinguishing between service contracts and cooperation agreements for these projects.
Summing up, it can be said that over half of all projects are 
implemented by DEG, the majority of them in the form of 
traditional development partnerships with the private sector. 
GIZ implements only half as many traditional development 
partnerships with the private sector as DEG. Roughly 30 %  
of the traditional development partnerships implemented  
by GIZ are based on cooperation agreements. However,  
GIZ implements almost twice as many strategic development 
partnerships with the private sector as DEG. Measured by  
the number of projects, sequa’s project portfolio accounts for 
about 13 % of the overall develoPPP.de portfolio. sequa only 
carries out traditional development partnerships with the 
private sector. The differences between the implementing 
organisations can be explained by their size-related 
implementation capacities, differences in how well they are 
known, and access to companies via other business-related 
offerings. Very few differences are noted as regards the 
discontinuation rates between the different project types in 
traditional development partnerships with the private sector. 
As we can see in Table 1, the discontinuation rates of the 
traditional forms of development partnerships with the private 
sector lie between roughly 8 % at sequa, 9 % at GIZ and 10 %  
at DEG. No Strategic Projects have been discontinued so far at 
DEG. Strategic Alliances at GIZ have the highest discontinuation 
rate, at around 16 %. A comprehensive portfolio analysis by 
DEval (Lücking & Roggemann, 2016) examined which country-
specific contextual factors have an influence on applications  
by companies, selection by the implementing organisations 
and the implementation of develoPPP.de projects. The findings 
are laid out in Box 1.
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Box 1: Influence of country-specific contextual factors on the application, selection and implementation phase
8 The median of a list of numerical values is the middle value that separates the higher half from the lower half of a distribution.
During the DEval portfolio analysis, it was also examined 
what country-specific contextual factors influence 
applications by companies, i.e. make a country especially 
attractive or unattractive for businesses. It was also 
analysed whether specific contextual factors increase the 
probability of develoPPP.de applications being approved. 
Thirdly, it was examined to what extent the context in  
a specific country increases the probability of a project 
being discontinued. 
The analysis showed that when applying for develoPPP.de 
projects, companies give preference to politically stable 
and democratic countries with a large domestic market 
and better infrastructure, i.e. countries where there are 
better prospects of business success. It is conceivable that 
companies want to minimise the business risk involved in 
direct investments in developing countries and emerging 
economies. At the same time, when applying for projects, 
companies prefer poorer countries and those that are of 
outstanding importance for German DC due to their status 
as a BMZ partner country. It is assumed that this is an 
implicit selection mechanism inherent to the programme, 
i.e. the programme attracts companies that want to carry 
out projects in countries preferred by German DC.
Moreover, the portfolio analysis highlights at least  
implicit steering effects by the cooperating implementing 
organisations when it comes to approving develoPPP.de 
applications. The implementing organisations tend to 
select applications for develoPPP.de in poorer countries, 
to a greater extent than can be seen at the application 
level itself. The selection of countries is thus in keeping 
with the development objectives of the develoPPP.de 
programme and the underlying participation criteria (see 
Section 1.1) (BMZ, 2013b, 2015; Doc 11). At the same time, 
we can see that in line with the nature of the develoPPP.de 
programme, implementing organisations’ approvals take 
into consideration the cost-efficiency of projects and the 
commercial interest of companies. The countries approved 
for support tend to be democratic and politically stable 
countries, countries with large domestic markets and 
sound infrastructure, and BMZ partner countries. 
In contrast to the application and approval phases, 
country-specific factors have no significant influence on 
the discontinuation of develoPPP.de projects, which 
appears to be due more to project-specific factors. Given 
the underlying data, it is not possible to aggregate project-
specific factors because no company-specific data have 
been systematically collected so far at programme level.
Strategic development partnerships with the private sector are 
designed as large-volume projects, whereas the contribution 
the public sector makes to traditional development partnerships 
with the private sector may not exceed EUR 200,000. 
Correspondingly, the Strategic Projects of DEG and Strategic 
Alliances of GIZ have median overall funding levels8 of EUR 2.3 
and 2.1 million respectively, several times those of traditional 
development partnerships with the private sector, which have 
median funding levels of around EUR 400,000 per project  
(see Fig 4). The distributions of the overall funding levels of 
traditional development partnerships with the private sector 
are much the same at the three implementing organisations. 
The same is true of the distributions of overall funding  
levels of Strategic Alliances and Strategic Projects, although 
the range here is naturally much wider than for traditional 
development partnerships with the private sector.
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Across the three implementing organisations, 40 % of the 
project costs are borne by the public sector. Fifty-six per cent of 
the project costs of the develoPPP.de programme are assumed 
by private partners, i.e. the companies. Third parties such as 
associations or academic institutions finance an additional 4 %. 
Figure 5 shows that the relative proportion of public funds as  
a share of the overall project costs is somewhat higher at GIZ 
than at DEG and sequa. It also becomes clear that any costs  
in excess of this at DEG projects are almost completely borne 
by the partner companies, while GIZ and sequa draw on  
third parties to a greater extent for project funding. Viewed  
as a whole, these figures highlight a key unique feature of 
development partnerships with the private sector. Via the 
develoPPP.de programme, private capital can be mobilised  
for development purposes. However, the extent to which this 
mobilisation generates the intended development results 
depends on several factors that are discussed in Sections 2 and 
3. Additionality should at least be mentioned here as a limiting 
factor. The evaluation shows that some project measures would 
have been carried out without public contributions. Whether 
and to what extent a project has really mobilised private capital 
to achieve development objectives cannot therefore be judged 
by an overall leverage rate for the develoPPP.de programme, 
but must take into account other factors such as additionality 
and complementarity.
Figure 4: Distribution of overall funding by form of development partnership from 2009 to mid-2015
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Regional distribution9
Even though develoPPP.de projects can be found in almost  
all developing countries and emerging economies, there are 
regional priority areas especially in East Asia (around 29 %  
of all projects, sub-Saharan Africa (around 21 %) and South 
America (about 19 %). 
Most projects are carried out in lower-middle-income countries, 
followed by upper-middle-income and low-income countries. 
China is the country with the most projects (105), followed by 
India (68), Brazil (46), Vietnam (43) and the Philippines (32). 
9 All statements on the overall funding level are based solely on projects completed and ongoing since 2009. Owing to incomplete data,  
no reliable statements can be made on the funding level of projects that have been discontinued or are being prepared.
About 15 % of all develoPPP.de projects are carried out in least 
developed countries (LDCs). The LDCs with the most 
develoPPP.de projects are Bangladesh (14 projects), Tanzania 
(13), Uganda (11) and Ethiopia (8) (see Fig. 6). GIZ is most 
strongly involved in LDCs (roughly 20 % of all projects), 
followed by DEG (a little over 15 %). sequa implements the 
lowest number of projects in LDCs (about 12 %). In LDCs, GIZ 
works particularly frequently within the scope of traditional 
development partnerships with the private sector (cooperation 
agreements), especially in sub-Saharan Africa.
Figure 5: Origin of funds by form of development partnership from 2009 to mid-20159
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Key findings 
 • Looking at the develoPPP.de portfolio of DEG, GIZ  
and sequa, significant differences are apparent between  
the three implementing organisations. Measured by  
the number of applications, DEG has the greatest access  
to potential partner companies, followed by GIZ and,  
a long way behind, by sequa. 
 • The approval rate decreases in the following order: DEG, 
sequa, GIZ, for reasons that could not be finally clarified.
 • The ratio of public to private funds differs fairly strongly 
between the implementing organisations. Since it is not 
certain that the private measures would have been carried 
out without the public contributions, the evaluation 
refrains from referring to this ratio in general terms as  
a ‘leverage effect’.
 • Ninety per cent of traditional development partnerships 
with the private sector and all strategic development 
partnerships are implemented by DEG and GIZ. sequa 
carries out the fewest projects. This is mainly due to  
the size-related differences in implementation capacities 
and access to interested companies.
 • Compared with traditional development partnerships, 
there are relatively few strategic development partnerships 
with the private sector. However, since project funding 
for strategic partnerships is five times higher, they are 
highly relevant in terms of their funding level. 
 • Most projects are carried out in lower-middle-income 
countries, followed by upper-middle-income and  
low-income countries. China, Brazil and India are the 
countries with the highest number of implemented 
develoPPP.de projects. One in seven projects is 
conducted in an LDC.
Figure 6: Global distribution of develoPPP.de projects from 2009 to mid-2015
Source: author’s own based 
on the develoPPP.de Cloud as 
at 29 June 2015
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1.4
The develoPPP.de context:  
international and national trends
The following section places develoPPP.de in the context of 
international and national (official) development cooperation. 
It starts by briefly summing up the international debate on 
cooperation between (official) development cooperation and 
the private sector (Section 1.4.1), and goes on to compare the 
objectives of German development policy with international 
trends in cooperation with the private sector (Section 1.4.2).
1.4.1 International context and trends 
Over the past two decades, cooperation between development 
cooperation (DC) actors and the private sector has gained 
importance at international level. International agreements 
and declarations between government representatives in OECD 
and partner countries, and between multilateral, bilateral  
and regional organisations and the private sector itself, call for 
greater private sector involvement in DC. The establishment  
of global development partnerships involving the private sector 
is a key target of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
agreed in 2000 and is also enshrined as one of the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) adopted in 2015 (OECD, 2008;  
UN, 2003, 2009). Correspondingly, the Busan High Level Forum 
on Aid Effectiveness (2011), the European Union’s Agenda  
for Change (EC, 2011), the Third International Conference on 
Financing for Development in Ethiopia (UN, 2015) and the 
Development Co-operation Report 2015 (OECD, 2015) ascribe  
a key role to the private sector in terms of economic growth, 
employment, innovation and sustainable development.  
A distinction must be made between cooperation with the 
private sector (Private Sector for Development, PS4D) and 
private sector development (Private Sector Development, 
PSD). The former aims to promote cooperation between donors 
and other DC actors and the private sector in order to jointly 
achieve development objectives, while the latter predominantly 
comprises measures designed to develop the local economy  
in partner countries (Byiers & Rosengren, 2012). Against this 
backdrop, a growing number of corresponding cooperation 
10 Di Bella et al. provide a comprehensive overview of the different modes of cooperation between DC actors (bilateral donors, bilateral development banks, multilateral financing organisations, UN, 
OECD, international NGOs and think tanks) and the private sector (2013).
11 Bottom of the pyramid markets are geared to the needs of poor population groups and aim to integrate these into corporate value chains (Kirchgeorg, n.d.).
forms and programmes for cooperation with the private sector 
can be observed in many OECD countries  (Bilal et al., 2014; 
Heinrich, 2013; Roloff & Finkel, 2013).10
This development was driven by three key factors: 
1. Recognition of the private sector as a driver of development 
(UNDP, 2004). Development policy-makers have long 
recognised that economic development is a prerequisite for 
growth and prosperity, and have reacted by launching relevant 
projects and programmes. What is new is the approach  
of aiming to achieve economic development in the partner 
country by involving private sector actors from the Global 
North. This is related to the fact that ‘bottom of the pyramid’ 
markets11 in developing countries and emerging economies 
are attractive growth markets for companies (ODI, 2010; 
UNDP, 2004). 
2. The growing integration of corporate responsibility into 
business models as a key factor for companies’ economic 
success (Minor & Morgan, 2011; PwC, 2011; UN Global 
Compact, 2015).  This is also apparent from the growing 
number of voluntary commitments by businesses and 
participation in networks such as the Global Compact and 
corresponding demands by policy-makers and society,  
such as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
(OECD, 2011). 
3. The importance of foreign direct investment in developing 
countries and emerging economies that have several times 
the level of official development assistance (ODA) funding 
(OECD, 2014). 
The various programmes pursued by donor countries for 
cooperation with the private sector are based on the assumption 
that jointly covering costs and pooling resources generates 
development benefits for the partner countries on the one 
hand and commercial benefits for the companies involved on 
the other (Bilal et al., 2014; Callan & Davis, 2013; Di Bella et al., 
2013; Heinrich, 2013; Kindornay & Reilly-King, 2013; Kindornay, 
Tissot & Sheiban, 2014). The support instruments most frequently 
used by donors are matching grants and technical support 
services, as well as forms of financial support (such as loans). 
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In most cases, cooperation is not restricted to specific 
thematic areas or sectors (Di Bella et al., 2013; Heinrich, 2015).12 
The literature analysis shows that development goals and  
the demands placed on cooperation with the private sector 
have become more ambitious in recent years in connection 
with the debate on aid effectiveness and the post-MDG 
agenda. Following a pilot phase, the focus is increasingly on 
demands for contributions to systemic change and poverty-
reduction results (DEVFIN Advisers, 2014; ICAI, 2014, 2015; 
IOB, 2014; Johansson de Silva, Kokko, & Norberg, 2015; KPMG, 
2012). Studies on development partnership programmes at 
international level come to the conclusion that the relevance 
of the corresponding programmes could be enhanced by 
focusing on specific objectives such as poverty reduction or 
involvement in the poorest developing countries (DEVFIN 
Advisers, 2014; ICAI, 2015; KPMG, 2012). With regard to the 
post-2015 agenda, the European Centre for Development 
Policy Management (ecdpm, 2014) explicitly points to the  
need for a greater emphasis on country contexts and link-ups 
with existing programmes in partner countries. Alongside  
clear goals for development partnership programmes, demands 
include adaptation to national development strategies, since 
enabling institutional and political frameworks at national and 
international level are crucial to success (ecdpm, 2014; Pfisterer, 
Payandeh, & Reid, 2014). Various studies also question the high 
expectations of existing private sector cooperation programmes 
in terms of the results that can be achieved, given that the 
programmes’ overarching development results often fall behind 
expectations (DEVFIN Advisers, 2014; KPMG, 2012). The Donor 
Committee for Enterprise Development (DCED) established 
that ‘increasing interest in partnership mechanisms has  
not been matched by a growth in the evidence base regarding  
their impact’ (Heinrich, 2015). The evaluators of the Danish 
business-to-business programme and Norwegian cooperation 
with the private sector term the results achieved as a  
‘drop in the ocean’ because they are restricted to the local 
level (DEVFIN Advisers, 2014). For this reason, the Danish 
programme was discontinued in November 2014. IOB (2014) 
reaches similar conclusions with regard to Dutch cooperation 
12 Heinrich (2015, pp. 14-16) provides a comprehensive overview in tabular form of international PS4D programmes.
13 Examples include the Danida Business Explorer Program, the Business Partnerships Platform of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, or the SIDA  
(Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency) Public-Private Development Partnerships.
14 In its position paper (2011a), BMZ distinguishes between six basic forms of cooperation between DC and the private sector. Rohloff and Finkel (2013) allocate these differently and  
systematise the various approaches and programmes according to their levels of action (policy level, organisational level, programme level) and fields of intervention  
(international frameworks, local conditions, companies).
between DC and the private sector. A study by the European 
Parliament on the role played by the private sector in 
development financing (European Parliament, 2014) calls for  
a stronger focus on measures to dismantle barriers to private 
investments rather than aiming to leverage private funds  
on a piecemeal basis. 
Overall, it can be said that the importance of the private  
sector as a key actor for development is emphasised at 
international level. At the same time, there is a trend towards 
focusing partnership programmes more strongly on overarching 
development goals and poorer countries in order to enhance 
the programmes’ effectiveness.13 At present, though, limited 
knowledge is available on the development effectiveness of 
partnership programmes.
1.4.2 National context – BMZ’s objectives for cooperation 
with the private sector
Similarly to the development in other OECD countries, in 
Germany too, cooperation with the private sector has become 
established as an important thematic area of development 
cooperation. This is shown by BMZ’s corresponding sector 
strategies and strategy papers (BMZ, 2011a, 2011b, 2013b;  
Doc 13) and by the multitude of instruments and support 
programmes developed in recent years (BMZ, 2011a; Doc 21; 
Roloff & Finkel, 2013).14 Apart from develoPPP.de, examples 
include sector-specific support programmes (e.g. sector 
initiatives, Digital Africa programme) or investment promotion 
arrangements (e.g. scaling-up programme, innovation vouchers) 
and regional programmes (e.g. PPP Fund for Fragile States  
of West Africa, Employment for Sustainable Development in 
Africa (E4D)) (see Annex 5.3). BMZ’s primordial objective is  
to implement overarching development goals, i.e. the guiding 
principle of sustainable development in the partner countries, 
through cooperation with the private sector (BMZ, 2011a, 
2013b, 2016). Against the backdrop of the SDGs, the private 
sector – a driver of development – is considered to play a  
key role for sustainable development and the implementation 
of the 2030 Agenda  (BMZ, 2016; German Government, 2016). 
This cooperation is expected to help set up competitive and 
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sustainable economic structures and to contribute to sustainable 
investments and inclusive growth in partner countries. The 
focus in this context is on generating reciprocal benefits for 
private sector and public sector partners (BMZ, 2013b, 2016). 
The extensive portfolio of support instruments and forms of 
cooperation with the private sector is extremely heterogeneous, 
not just as regards the respective goals to be achieved, but  
also in terms of the stakeholders involved and the performance 
expected from DC and the private sector. Another factor that 
contributes to this complexity is that responsibilities at BMZ 
are divided between different divisions. Other ministries  
are also involved besides BMZ. These finance similar support 
programmes, e.g. as part of sector initiatives or climate 
partnerships15. While the majority of programmes are mainly 
geared towards German and European companies, there are 
some that are also accessible to local companies in the partner 
countries. The specific cooperation objectives vary depending 
on the form of cooperation or support programme, and include 
primary development goals, such as the mobilisation of private 
15 The climate partnership programme receives funding from the German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety (BMUB) and is implemented by 
DEG. Similar policy frameworks apply as to the develoPPP.de programme (DEG, n.d.).
16 According to di Bella et al. (2013), SMEs have so far been seen as target groups for development cooperation rather than cooperation partners.
capital and expertise for development purposes. Other goals 
are increases in efficiency when it comes to providing public 
services, and the goal of supporting German companies in 
tapping into markets (BMZ, 2011a, 2011b, 2016; Roloff & Finkel, 
2013). The latter aspect and the support provided to 
corresponding programmes such as the ExperTS programme  
or the Import Promotion Desk (IPD) illustrate BMZ’s efforts  
to dovetail development cooperation more closely with foreign 
trade promotion (BMZ, 2016). BMZ especially highlights 
German medium-sized enterprises as important cooperation 
partners (BMZ, 2011a, 2011b, 2016; Doc 3). This distinguishes 
BMZ from other donors, who generally have no explicit focus 
on promoting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)  
(Di Bella et al., 2013)16. Seen as a whole, the development in 
Germany largely corresponds to international trends for 
cooperation with the private sector. Germany has a comparatively 
large portfolio of cooperation programmes and comprehensive 
experience with partnership projects, especially via the 
develoPPP.de programme. 
Key findings  
 • The key role of the private sector as a driver of 
development is underlined in international agreements 
and strategies. In addition, the enshrinement of 
corporate responsibility in companies’ business models 
is increasingly seen to be a key success factor. As a 
result, a growing number of programmes for 
cooperation with the private sector have been set up in 
OECD countries over the last two decades. 
 • The development-related demands made on 
cooperation between DC and the private sector in 
international donor programmes have grown in recent 
years. This is based on the recognition that the results 
of the projects initiated by the programmes have mainly 
been restricted (to the local level). The demand is for 
measures that focus the projects on contributions to 
poverty reduction and networking with other actors to 
expand development results. However, little evidence 
has so far been provided of the effectiveness of 
partnership programmes.
 • The development in Germany largely corresponds to 
trends in cooperation with the private sector at 
international level. Germany has developed a relatively 
large portfolio of different programmes. Unlike the 
programmes of other donors, BMZ programmes aim to 
cooperate with small and medium-sized enterprises in 
Germany and other European countries.
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1.5 
Programme theory
Owing to its demand orientation, the develoPPP.de programme 
is a promotional approach that is programmed very much  
in line with conditions and less in accordance with a rigid 
framework of final objectives. If project ideas can stand up to  
a criterion-based selection and appraisal process, they are 
eligible for support independently of the respective industrial 
or development-policy sector (conditional programming).  
BMZ only provides an abstract objectives framework (final 
programming). As a result, the range of projects supported  
is intentionally large, both in terms of content, financing  
and regional focus. The evaluation approach is based on theory 
in order to draw wider conclusions from the specific project 
activities within this loose programmatic framework and assess 
the programme’s effectiveness. The focus is on the programme 
theory as a model for how develoPPP.de is supposed to 
contribute to results by supporting projects. Since no such 
theory was in place for the programme, the theory was 
reconstructed in a relatively laborious process that involved 
the programme stakeholders.
1.5.1 Reconstruction of the programme theory
The evaluation defines ‘programme theory’ as an explicit 
theory or model of how one or more measures contribute to a 
sum of specific outcomes via a series of intermediate outcomes 
(Funnell & Rogers, 2011). The extremely heterogeneous  
nature of develoPPP.de projects made it essential to devise a 
programme theory in order to define and delimit together with 
the evaluation stakeholders the key areas of the programme 
that were to be evaluated. The drafting of this theory is also  
a precondition for identifying key assumptions that transcend 
individual projects and give the develoPPP.de promotional 
approach its programmatic character. The examination of how 
and why project activities contribute to achieving specific 
programme objectives draws conclusions from the specific 
project activities and evaluates the programme’s effectiveness17. 
Ultimately, the programme theory can feed into the further 
strategy process of BMZ and the implementing organisations, 
and support negotiations and the fleshing out of a monitoring 
17 The question of how and why activities lead to the achievement of objectives is also discussed under the term ‘mechanism’, e.g. of a project. Hedström (2005, quoted from Leeuw, 2012;  
courtesy translation) defines a mechanism as a ‘constellation of entities and activities that are interconnected in such a way that they regularly generate a specific type of outcome’.  
See Hedström and Ylikoski (2010) for an overview. Spelling out the assumptions related to mechanisms is intended to unpack the black boxes of the develoPPP.de programme (Astbury & Leeuw, 
2010). The procedure presented here is aligned with the policy-scientific approach to the reconstruction of programme theories (Leeuw, 2003).
and evaluation (M&E) system, for instance.Key steps involved 
in reconstructing the programme theory were the mapping of 
content from strategy documents (deduction step) and a 
comparison of operational documents with the programme 
stakeholders at a joint workshop (induction step). The 
evaluators compared the working version of the programme 
theory obtained in this way with the provisional findings of 
the content analysis, the first company survey, expert 
interviews and national and international literature. Key 
findings of this reconstruction were (1) the programme’s set 
of objectives (see Fig. 87) and (2) the identification of key 
assumptions and adjustment mechanisms related to how 
develoPPP.de as a ‘stimulus programme’ can help achieve 
these objectives.
1.5.2 Programme theory narrative: develoPPP.de as  
a stimulus programme
Since the programme is intended to put innovative project 
ideas into practice, this rules out close alignment with 
preconceived objectives from the perspective of BMZ and  
the implementing organisations. The joint design of projects 
by implementing organisations and companies is also seen  
as a key step in the intended process of making entrepreneurs 
aware of development issues. In keeping with the criteria in 
the programme guidelines, develoPPP.de is intended to set a 
framework that reliably ensures that projects are designed  
to be commercially successful and to achieve development 
goals (see Annex 5.5). A further key assumption is that these 
projects, which meet the given criteria, achieve the objectives 
established during the design phase. It is also assumed that 
the programme will introduce companies to and enable them 
to learn about development issues.
develoPPP.de projects require low funding and have short 
project terms. Compared with the large-scale programmes  
of bilateral official development assistance, development 
partnerships with the private sector are unlikely to generate 
far-reaching results within the two- to three-year project term. 
The assumption is that they will be more likely to provide 
stimulus for innovations in areas that are key to development 
(provision of stimuli). This evaluation understands innovation 
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as ‘doing new things or doing things in a new way’ 
(Schumpeter, 1947; quoted in Stockmann, 2007, p. 54). 
When assessing the provision of stimuli, it must be borne in 
mind that what makes the introduced innovation convincing  
is the relative advantage it presents, i.e. it is considered better 
than previous ideas, practices or objects (Rogers, 2003).  
The stimulus provided should extend beyond the end of project 
support. The programme guidelines attach great importance 
to the aspects of sustainability and broad-based impact.  
The latter relates to the more ambitious strategic development 
partnerships with the private sector. As well as providing 
stimuli, then, it is also assumed that the project results will 
endure beyond the end of support (safeguarding of stimulus) 
and will spread beyond the direct project stakeholders and 
target groups (dissemination of stimulus). Figure 7 illustrates 
this stimulus logic as a diagram. The diffusion of innovations 
over the course of time is assumed to be S-shaped. To begin 
with, it takes a while for the innovation to be perceived  
as advantageous. After that, it spreads relatively quickly and 
slows down as it spreads more widely (Rogers, 2003).
1.5.3 The reconstructed set of objectives of the  
develoPPP.de programme
The inputs by BMZ, implementing organisations and third 
parties described in the programme schedule are used  
to implement a variety of project activities in line with the 
described criteria and standards. Via various outputs in  
the partner country’s institutional or entrepreneurial setting, 
the develoPPP.de projects are intended to achieve specific 
outcomes, i.e. short-term and medium-term effects. Effects  
are especially intended to be generated at target group  
level in the partner countries.
A develoPPP.de project is not intended to contribute to all  
of the impacts identified in the programme theory’s set of 
objectives (see Fig. 8). The set of objectives instead represents 
the key activities and outcomes that are addressed differently 
in different projects. The arrows between the activities and the 
intended results (outputs, outcomes and impacts) represent 
causal links and relationships. When reconstructing the 
programme theory, the three key content areas and two rather 
more instrumental areas/cross-cutting themes were identified 
that are relevant to the majority of develoPPP.de projects. 
Figure 7: develoPPP.de as a stimulus programme for transferring innovations
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The entry point most frequently used by develoPPP.de projects 
(termed causal pathway 1) encompasses activities, outputs and 
outcomes that help to improve existing products and services 
or introduce innovative new ones. This pathway particularly 
involves carrying out activities for knowledge and technology 
transfer (e. g. technical training courses), for developing 
innovative ideas (e. g. introducing product innovations) and 
introducing new high-quality process and/or production 
standards (e. g. activities related to certification). These are 
intended to help improve or launch new products and services 
by entrepreneurs and/or public institutions in the project 
country, and to enhance the quality of services and products 
over the course of time. Since most develoPPP.de projects  
are intended at the very least to contribute to this kind of 
innovation transfer, the case studies focus on this causal 
pathway.
Another point of entry for develoPPP.de projects subsumes 
improvements in environmental and social standards (causal 
pathway 2). Via accreditation, certification and standardisation 
activities, develoPPP.de projects are intended to improve the 
environmental, labour and social standards of entrepreneurs 
involved in the project. In terms of content, this pathway  
links up with the intended changes in companies in line with 
causal pathway 1.
A third area encompasses activities, outputs and outcomes 
intended to enhance employability (causal pathway 3). 
Mainly by involving public institutions, activities such as 
setting up training centres are to help improve the quality  
of products and services in the initial and continuing training 
sector. However, project activities in this sector may also  
focus directly on target groups, for example by training 
company staff.
It is difficult to distinguish between the outcomes of individual 
projects at aggregated level. Often, the programme assumes 
that the project activities along the various causal pathways 
either have a direct effect on the income and/or employment 
situation of the target groups, or an indirect effect via the 
improvement in productivity and sales of the entrepreneurs 
involved. The greater competitiveness of companies in the 
partner country is intended to help strengthen private sector 
structures and, depending on the sectoral context, solve key 
development challenges faced by the project.
In addition to these three substantive causal pathways,  
the set of objectives covers two instruments. To safeguard the 
sustainability and broad-based impact of the projects and 
achieve key sub-targets, many develoPPP.de projects conduct 
awareness-raising and PR activities, as well as activities 
designed to set up networks with various stakeholders at meso 
and macro level (see Box 2). This serves to disseminate lessons 
learned by the projects at meso and macro level (cross-cutting 
pathway 1).
Box 2: Definition of terms: micro, meso and macro level
The understanding of the micro, meso and macro level  
in this evaluation is based on BMZ’s Sector Strategy on 
Private Sector Development (BMZ, 2013b). This defines  
the level of individual companies as the micro level,  
that of (individual) institutions as the meso level, and the 
policy level as the macro level.
It is observed to what extent projects that initially address 
the micro level with target groups (such as local companies) 
link up with institutions (such as associations or policy 
discourse in the respective sectoral context), or establish 
such dialogues for the first time. The focus here is not  
on formal communication structures but on whether and 
to what extent the project is networked with its setting.
Where this distinction between policy levels is not 
applicable, the terms are understood to apply to regions 
similarly to GIZ’s multilevel approach in order to assess 
the dissemination or reach of the projects: local/municipal 
– micro; regional – meso; national – macro.
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Figure 8: Reconstructed set of objectives of the develoPPP.de programme
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A second cross-cutting pathway refers to changes within  
the European partner companies. By sensitising these to 
development-related challenges (cross-cutting pathway 2),  
the projects are intended to make a contribution towards 
learning processes within the companies taking part in the 
programme. Here it is assumed that the drafting, design  
and subsequent implementation of projects together with 
the implementing organisations makes companies aware of 
development-related challenges and may lead to a change of 
attitude at the company that fosters organisational change.
1.5.4 Implications for the evaluation
The above description of the object reveals a key challenge  
in terms of evaluation. How can we draw conclusions from a 
heterogeneous project portfolio that covers extremely different 
parts of the set of objectives in order to assess the effectiveness 
of the programme?
The stimulus logic presented above shows that develoPPP.de 
projects, independently of the specific objectives in the  
given industrial or development-policy sector, can be rated  
as successful if the key assumptions stated above can be 
empirically fulfilled. That includes the following aspects:
1. The projects stand up to the examination of the develoPPP.de 
criteria on the ground.
2. The projects achieve objectives in line with their respective 
sector-specific design, i.e. provide stimuli along the 
formulated causal pathways.
3. The project results endure beyond the end of support,  
i.e. the stimulus is safeguarded in order to guarantee the 
sustainability of the project results.
4. The project results are disseminated beyond the actors  
and target groups directly involved in the project. This 
dissemination of stimuli corresponds to cross-cutting 
pathway 1, the dissemination of lessons learned (at the 
project) at meso and macro level, and is a prerequisite  
for the broad impact of the projects.
5. The awareness-raising and educational function of the 
develoPPP.de programme as regards development issues  
is expressed by the fact that attitudes and behaviours at  
the participating companies change in harmony with the 
guiding principle of sustainable development (cross-cutting 
pathway 2).
Apart from these assumptions examined by the evaluation,  
key adjustment mechanisms can be identified from the 
programme’s stimulus logic. The programme officers can  
exert at least an indirect influence on these mechanisms.  
The evaluation paid particular attention to four adjustment 
mechanisms:
1. Negotiations between the implementing organisations 
and companies when designing the project, i.e. the 
process that leads from a project outline by a company 
to a shared understanding of the project by the 
implementing organisation and the company, to the 
mutual benefit of both sides. 
2. Coordination by the company during project 
implementation, i.e. the process of implementation  
by the company (possibly involving other actors)  
to achieve the established project objectives. 
3. Monitoring by the implementing organisation,  
i.e. the process in which the organisation supports 
project implementation. 
4. Establishing networks and disseminating lessons 
learned, i.e. the process of diffusing project results 
beyond the project’s direct stakeholders. 
These assumptions and adjustment mechanisms are constituent 
factors for the effectiveness of the develoPPP.de programme 
and are intended to apply across various projects. They are the 
key focus of empirical investigation by the evaluation and  
form the guiding framework for elaborating the evaluation 
approach and methods.
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1.6
Evaluation approach and methods
1.6.1 Evaluation approach
The evaluation pursues a theory-based approach. It centres  
on the programme theory described in Section 1.5. Given the 
heterogeneous nature of the projects, the programme theory 
served to determine and delimit the areas of the programme 
to be evaluated, and to identify key assumptions that transcend 
individual projects and give the promotional approach its 
programmatic character. A combination of methods was 
selected for collecting data (see Fig. 9). 
 • The response to evaluation question 1 is mainly based  
on document and literature analysis, bearing in mind the 
findings of the subsequent methods. 
 • Evaluation questions 2 and 3 were examined with particular 
reference to expert consultations, the first company survey, 
ongoing content analysis of project documents and an  
in-depth portfolio analysis. 
 • The typology-based case-study approach was generally 
used to answer evaluation questions 3, 4 and 5. 
 • Statements on the sustainability of develoPPP.de projects 
and answers to evaluation question 5 were also generated 
by a second company survey. 
These methods are described in detail in Annex 5.2.
The evaluation matrix (see Annex 5.1) is the basis for evaluating 
data collected using the various different methods and for 
synthesising the findings across all methods. The matrix allocates 
judgement criteria to the evaluation questions. Each judgement 
criterion was rated based on the findings of the relevant data 
collection methods. Finally, these findings were collated across 
all methods and triangulated. The criteria were assessed using 
five categories: 
18 The assessment system is explained in Annex 5.2.2.
19 DEval uses the acronym ‘Int’ for the individual interviews with representatives of the organised business community, together with a serial number, having pledged confidentiality towards  
the interview partners.
 • largely fulfilled/largely successful, 
 • fulfilled to a significant degree/rather successful,
 • partially (not) fulfilled/partially (not) successful  
(indifferent ‘middle’ category),
 • not fulfilled to a significant degree/rather unsuccessful, 
 • largely unfulfilled/largely unsuccessful.18
1.6.2 Methods
Content analysis
Based on a total of 685 development partnership projects  
with the private sector, a random sample of 216 projects was 
created for the content analysis. In the inception phase  
at the start of the evaluation, the cross-project activities and 
objectives of the develoPPP.de programme were identified  
by analysing the project reports. These findings were used to 
devise the programme theory. Furthermore, generalisable 
findings were generated on the degree to which individual 
projects adhered to implementation plans and achieved their 
objectives. The random sample made it possible to generalise 
the findings with an error rate of no more than 20 percentage 
points in relation to the overall population. The develoPPP.de 
Cloud served as the data basis. 
Company survey
The purpose of the company survey was to gather the lessons 
learned and perspectives of the companies involved in the 
develoPPP.de programme. During the inception phase of the 
evaluation, it provided exploratory findings on key private 
sector objectives, and also on the aspects that were conducive 
or obstructive in cooperation with the three implementing 
organisations. A second series of surveys at the end of the data 
collection phase was used to empirically examine aspects of 
sustainability and the triangulation of findings from the case 
studies and the other data collection methods. Semi-structured 
interviews were carried out by phone or face to face at a total 
of 36 companies19. The companies to be interviewed were 
selected based on previously defined criteria. The aim was to 
include the largest possible variety of project forms in the 
random sample (maximum variation sampling).
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Portfolio analysis
The portfolio analysis involved the empirical examination  
of the develoPPP.de programme’s allocation patterns,  
i.e. the regional distribution of projects and the funds used.  
It considers the project portfolio from a macro perspective.  
It was examined whether the degree of need, the policy 
frameworks and/or the attractiveness of the market in a 
project country foster or impede 
1. submission of an application, 
2. approval of an application and 
3. the premature discontinuation of a develoPPP.de project. 
The findings are presented in a separate publication (Lücking  
& Roggemann, 2016). The develoPPP.de Cloud provided the 
data for the examination. This database includes statements 
on the projects and was supplemented by country-specific 
indicators on the project countries. 
Figure 9: Overview of the evaluation’s methodological approach
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Expert consultations
Semi-structured expert interviews were used to collect lessons 
learned, knowledge and assessments of the programme 
steering procedures (at BMZ level), of project implementation 
(at implementing organisation and company level) and of the 
coordination processes between the stakeholders. Interviews 
were held with 46 people on an exploratory basis or to enable 
validation after the case studies. The selection of experts 
depended on the organisation, the individuals’ positions in  
the organisation and their ability to influence or participate  
in the relevant decisions or actions. 
Case studies
The case studies were mainly used to examine whether the key 
assumptions in the programme theory can be empirically 
fulfilled at specific develoPPP.de projects (= cases). It was 
examined whether the promotional approach generates 
develoPPP.de projects that provide, safeguard and disseminate 
development-related stimuli as defined by the programme 
theory. Twelve projects were identified in four countries (Brazil, 
Ethiopia, India and Uganda) using a typology-based selection 
process. Data were mainly collected via semi-structured 
individual and group interviews. The interviewed groups 
included representatives of companies, the implementing 
organisations, further project partners and various target 
groups. In order to assess the extent to which changes can be 
plausibly attributed to the projects, interviews were held with 
people who were comparable with the project’s target groups, 
other companies and market players, and other experts in the 
given project sector and from civil society in the partner 
country.20
1.6.3 Assessment of the methodological approach
The results were triangulated and methodological weaknesses 
largely offset by combining different data collection and 
evaluation methods. However, the following limitations must 
be borne in mind:
20 A report was drawn up on each case study. To safeguard the anonymity pledged towards the project partners, the case study reports will not be published.
With the exception of the portfolio analysis, this evaluation 
makes no quantified statements on the likelihood that the 
effects of develoPPP.de projects will occur, or on their scope. 
This is not due exclusively to the chosen methodology, but also 
to the object of the evaluation. Whereas for content analysis it 
was possible to use a random sample to generalise the findings 
to all project reports in accordance with the definition of the 
population, such a rigorous approach was not feasible for the 
company survey and the case studies within the period 
scheduled for the evaluation. Owing to the programme’s 
heterogeneity in terms of content and regions, DEval decided 
to maximise analytical depth rather than analytical breadth. 
This implied the intense and in-depth interviewing and 
examination of selected experts, companies and projects 
(cases). This approach (with its small number of units 
interviewed or examined) does limit the statistical possibility 
of generalising the findings to all units of the overall 
population (external validity). However, the transferability and 
relevance of the findings were safeguarded by using criteria-
based selection procedures. 
The aim was to obtain findings of the highest possible quality 
by a systematic approach in all methods, e.g. by basing the 
operationalisation of data collection tools on the evaluation 
matrix and by computer-assisted evaluation along the matrix. 
The findings were triangulated with regard to methods 
(synthesis across all methods), data (e.g. comparison of case 
study findings with non-involved sector experts and 
comparison groups) and team members (cross-check principle 
for collating cases, and for the synthesis). All evaluation 
products (strategy paper, inception report, portfolio analysis 
and this evaluation report) underwent a peer review process 
both at DEval and externally, and were checked with the 
reference group for factual correctness. Any different 
interpretations of findings were discussed.
2. 
FINDINGS
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2.1
Strategic orientation and conceptual framework  
of the develoPPP.de programme
To determine how appropriate the develoPPP.de programme  
is for achieving relevant development objectives (evaluation 
question 1), we will go on to present and analyse the key 
elements of the programme that can be formally designed and 
in which changes can be generated. These are: the programme’s 
strategic orientation (Section 2.1.1) and the conceptual 
framework that lays down its formal rules (Section 2.1.2). The 
findings of this analysis also serve to make a final assessment 
of the programme’s relevance in line with the OECD-DAC 
criteria (Section 2.1.3). 
2.1.1 Strategic orientation of the develoPPP.de programme 
To assess the programme’s strategic orientation, the 
programme’s objectives need to be analysed. To what extent 
do the objectives of the programme and of the individual 
projects match BMZ’s overarching objectives? To what extent 
does the programme consider the needs of the target  
groups of development interventions in partner countries?  
The latter is a fundamental component of BMZ’s overarching 
development objectives and a key aspect for rating the 
programme’s relevance. This section also sheds light on the 
programme’s basic conceptual assumptions.
Objectives of the develoPPP.de programme and alignment  
with BMZ objectives
As shown in the portfolio overview (Section 1.3.2), develoPPP.
de is one of BMZ’s key programmes for cooperating with the 
private sector (see Annex 5.3). It addresses BMZ’s overarching 
objective related to cooperation with the private sector. Jointly 
implemented projects are intended to help achieve global 
development goals. The focus is on the objectives designed to 
build a global development partnership and to reduce poverty 
(Doc 11). The programme’s objectives are laid out in the 
programme guidelines. They include: 
21 At output level, most projects aim to achieve outcomes related to the objective of strengthening innovation (SDG 9 and Charter for the Future priority area 7), and to the programme objective of 
transferring knowledge and technologies. The only recognisable differences relate to alignment with the MDGs. Whereas 70 % of the projects
1. strengthening private sector structures in partner 
countries, 
2. mobilising private sector resources for development 
cooperation, 
3. transferring knowledge and technologies, 
4. increasing private sector investments in developing 
countries, and 
5. enhancing the sustainability of development results 
through the long-term engagement of the private  
sector (Doc 11). 
Overall, the programme’s objectives largely match BMZ’s 
overarching development objectives (such as those of BMZ’s 
Charter for the Future). A fundamental characteristic of 
develoPPP.de is the aspect of partnership, whose distinguishing 
feature is that the actors involved cooperate transparently  
and as equals ‘in order to achieve a joint objective for sustainable 
development’ (BMZ, 2011a). The focus is on the reciprocal 
benefit that can be achieved for the public and private sector 
partners. Companies are to create jobs and income in emerging 
economies and developing countries, transfer expertise, 
introduce future-ready technologies and act as role models for 
local enterprises by introducing labour, environmental and 
social standards. In return, these companies receive support in 
tapping into new markets and can buffer their financial risk 
(BMZ, 2013b; GIZ, 2013). 
The content analysis of over 200 develoPPP.de projects shows 
that the project goals match the programme objectives and are 
also aligned with BMZ’s overarching development objectives 
and strategies. There are very few differences in this respect 
between the different implementing organisations and forms 
of development partnerships with the private sector.21 
According to statements by the experts interviewed at BMZ, 
there are no specific instructions concerning the strategies 
with which the projects should primarily be aligned (Int 2; Int 
3). The objectives depend on the project proposals and 
business interests of the companies, and vary widely due to 
the heterogeneity of the proposals submitted. 
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As far as alignment with overarching development objectives 
is concerned, the programme’s set of objectives is on the 
whole abstract. A programme theory that explains the 
objectives and assumed results of the programme was only 
developed to a certain extent during the evaluation (see 
Section 1.5). Corporate interests that are to be served by the 
programme are not specified in any great detail, either at 
programme level or at the level of the individual projects. The 
companies’ business case, i.e. the economic investment 
scenario, which may extend beyond the term of the develoPPP.
de project, does not figure in the project documents and is 
only vaguely described in most of the project applications. The 
findings of the expert consultation (Int 2; Int 3) and of key BMZ 
documents (BMZ, 2011b, 2016) indicate that the focus on 
German/European companies is linked to the objective of 
promoting the awareness of development-policy issues on the 
part of the involved companies, and of enhancing the social 
acceptance of development cooperation in Germany. This 
objective is not explicitly laid down in the programme, though. 
Despite long experience with the programme, there is no 
common understanding of its primary objectives either 
between the individual implementing organisations and BMZ, 
or within the implementing organisations or the Ministry itself. 
This is apparent from the different opinions of whether the 
programme should also serve to raise awareness at companies, 
or whether it should be coordinated with the priority areas of 
development cooperation. Acceptance of the programme 
within the organisations themselves is therefore limited in 
some cases (Int 2; Int 3; Int 6; Int 8; Int 23).
The programme addresses key development strategies 
because it is intended to engage the private sector in achieving 
development objectives via partnership projects. Aligning the 
programme with overarching policy objectives and their 
enshrinement in the guidelines and project designs of 
individual measures has raised the expectations to be met by 
cooperation with the private sector, in Germany as in the 
programmes of other donors. However, these expectations are 
not accompanied by specific measures for focusing the 
develoPPP.de programme more closely on sectors or regions 
that are particularly relevant for development, or aligning the 
programme’s content more closely with the aim of poverty 
reduction. On the other hand, the evidence basis is limited as 
regards the results of development partnerships with the 
private sector, both at international level and in Germany. The 
last evaluation of the develoPPP.de programme was carried out 
in 2002. 
Overall, it can be stated that the programme is indeed aligned 
with BMZ’s overarching development objectives, and takes 
into account international development strategies for 
cooperation with the private sector. However, the 
programme’s primary objectives remain unclear due to its 
abstract set of objectives and the implicit goals related to the 
programme. 
Alignment of the objectives of the develoPPP.de programme  
with the needs of partner countries 
To identify whether the develoPPP.de programme is aligned 
with the needs of partner countries, the first step is to 
determine how it is formally incorporated within BMZ. The fact 
that the programme is attached to Directorate 11 (Civil society; 
churches and the private sector in development cooperation) 
gives special status to cooperation with the private sector. 
Firstly, projects can be carried out in all countries on the 
OECD-DAC list of developing countries, also those that are not 
BMZ partner countries. Secondly, individual develoPPP.de 
projects do not have to be coordinated with the partner 
countries. Programme officers at BMZ consider the 
programme’s resulting flexibility to be a key prerequisite for its 
successful implementation (Int 2; Int 3). This also takes into 
account the fact that it is a partnership programme, which 
aims to achieve mutual benefits for the partners involved and 
gives equal consideration to BMZ’s development-policy 
requirements and the companies’ business requirements. On 
the other hand, the lack of coordination with partner countries 
runs counter to development strategies such as the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. The arguments in favour of 
formal assignment of cooperation with the private sector 
within BMZ’s organisational structure have not been clearly 
documented in writing so far. The acceptance of this 
assignment within the organisations themselves and in the 
public arena is therefore limited (Int 2; Int 3; Int 4; Int 6; Int 8; 
Int 9; Int 11).
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The evaluation findings provide the following basis for 
considering the needs of partner countries. Both the case 
studies and the literature analysis confirm that the majority of 
develoPPP.de projects give consideration to development 
needs (for example as regards the development and 
introduction of new technologies, or the transfer of specific 
expertise to the given sectors and/or regions of the partner 
countries). The same finding applies to the projects of other 
partnership programmes (Bürkle & Palenberg, 2009; DEVFIN 
Advisers, 2014; Doc 17; Doc 20; Johansson de Silva et al., 2015; 
KPMG, 2012). However, the case studies, particularly in the 
BRICS countries India and Brazil, show that the products 
developed by the companies are not always tailored to the 
needs of the target groups of development interventions listed 
in the project documents, since this runs counter to corporate 
interests (CS 1; CS 2; CS 5; CS 12)22. Some of the external 
experts interviewed come to similar conclusions. They criticise 
the fact that develoPPP.de projects do not adequately consider 
the development needs of the groups targeted by 
development policy because overarching corporate interests 
overshadow more effective alternatives (Int 33; Int 36; Int 40). 
The following quotation sums up this criticism: ‘Cooperation 
with German companies implies the use of their products. 
These are not always the best offerings for the beneficiaries, 
though’ (Int 33). Some staff members at the implementing 
organisations criticise the lack of or deficiencies in demand 
and needs analyses at develoPPP.de projects, and the related 
tensions between the objectives of target groups and product 
specifications (Int 9; Int 11).
22 DEval uses the acronym ‘CS’ and a serial number to designate individual project case studies, in order to respect a pledge of confidentiality towards the surveyed companies.
Box 3: Project example of inadequate consideration  
of target group needs
One case study project was designed to develop financial 
products for low-income groups in order to buffer them 
from external shocks and minimise the risk of poverty. 
Given the market risks and very low overall demand 
among target groups for relevant financial products, the 
company developed a product geared to reducing risks for 
credit institutions. By aligning itself with the institutions’ 
needs, the company secured itself a sales market. 
Relevance for target groups of the development 
interventions remained limited because the product 
developed did not fully protect them from the risks of 
poverty, which was one of their basic needs.
On the whole, it can be said that the directorate to which the 
programme is attached at BMZ does not envisage policy 
coordination with partner countries governments. The 
flexibility this gives to the programme is consciously desired 
and reflects the programme’s demand orientation. However, 
BMZ has not yet sufficiently explained the reasons for the 
programme’s organisational assignment, which makes it 
difficult to understand. Although most of the projects are in 
keeping with the specific sectoral or technical development 
needs in the partner countries, some give no consideration to 
the specific needs of the target groups of development 
interventions described in the project documents.
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Basic conceptual assumptions of the programme –  
leveraging synergies
The programme’s key assumption is that corporate interests 
overlap with development objectives. This relationship  
is intended to leverage synergies for companies and DC 
organisations, so that the cooperation arrangement allows 
both partners to achieve their respective goals more cost-
efficiently, effectively and quickly (Doc 11) (see Fig. 10). Since 
companies and DC organisations pursue their own divergent 
goals, the programme’s orientation also gives rise to tensions 
between the interests of companies and development 
objectives. These tensions limit the synergies that could be 
generated and must be taken into account during the design 
phase, which must also position the programme appropriately 
between the different objectives in order to make optimal use 
of the existing synergies. 
The condition for leveraging the synergies assumed by the 
programme is that the respective goals of the private sector 
and DC actors are compatible and indeed complementary.  
This makes the overall benefit of the services provided by the 
partners greater than the sum of their individual services.  
The aim is to generate added value for both partners that 
would not have been possible without cooperation. In the 
programme guidelines, this is defined in particular via the 
complementarity criterion (Doc 11). 
Before we can examine the extent to which corporate objectives 
are compatible with those of DC, we need to look at both sets 
separately. The specific objectives of the private sector are  
not explicitly defined in the programme objectives. Nor are 
they mapped by the programme theory that was designed for 
the evaluation. The statements made in the company survey 
were therefore used to determine the corporate objectives, 
and were compared with the findings of the content analysis. 
The company survey shows that ‘harnessing or expanding 
existing sales markets’ is the most common company objective 
(26 of 36 statements). Other key corporate objectives are ‘to 
recruit or secure skilled labour’, ‘to set up or expand supply 
chains’, ‘to carry out corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
activities’ and to ‘raise the profile’ of the company. The most 
frequent DC objective in over 90 % of the projects covered by 
Figure 10: Structural model of develoPPP.de
ST
A
R
TI
N
G
 S
IT
U
A
TI
O
N
R
ES
U
LT
S
SY
N
ER
G
IE
S
M
EA
SU
R
ES
Public partner
Private partner
Proposals 
(in-demand principle)
Objectives/
interests
Objectives/
interests
Resources/
support
Resources/
support
Synergies are ensured by 
means of project/company criteria 
and the negotiation process
(conditional programming)
Raising/strengthening awareness 
of development issues
Source: authors’ own based 
on Budäus (1998)
30Findings  |  2. 
the content analysis is ‘to transfer private sector knowledge 
and technologies to partner countries’. All surveys confirm that 
corporate objectives are largely compatible with DC objectives 
(Int 2; Int 3; Int 9; Int 11; Int 14; Int 15; Int 18; Int 19; Int 23; Int 32; 
Int 34; Int 35; Int 42; Int 43; Int 44). The case studies show  
that in those cases where the objectives were not compatible 
(CS 6; CS 7; CS 8; CS 11), this was due to the failure to include 
the dissemination of project successes in the project design. 
This was the case, for example, if the diffusion of an innovation 
that was intended to promote development ran counter to the 
corporate interest of securing consumer loyalty to the product. 
In these cases, project activities were mainly carried out in line 
with corporate interests, while development-policy interests 
took a back seat (CS 3; CS 7; CS 10). 
The findings of the case studies and surveys confirm that  
the companies and implementing organisations provide 
complementary services in partnership with each other,  
which give rise to synergies for both partners (Int 2; Int 3;  
Int 9; Int 11; Int 14; Int 15; Int 18; Int 19; Int 23; Int 32; Int 35;  
Int 42; Int 43; Int 44). Synergies for companies were mainly 
related to minimising risks (CS 1; CS 2; CS 3; CS 4; CS 5;  
CS 6; CS 10; CS 11; CS 12). In the survey, eight out of 36 companies 
stated that in addition to the funding provided they had 
benefited from the implementing organisation’s knowledge  
of the country and contacts in partner countries, particularly  
in projects supported by GIZ. Development synergies  
can be leveraged primarily in the transfer of knowledge  
and technologies to local partner companies, or to public 
institutions in partner countries and DC organisations.  
The case studies show that in the majority of projects, the 
companies provide specific sectoral or technical expertise  
that did not previously exist in the partner countries, and that 
the implementing organisations or BMZ could not provide  
on their own.
Limitations with regard to synergies
The potentials that arise from cooperation are offset by 
constraints that relativise the assumptions related to synergies. 
The case studies show that synergies were often not harnessed 
when corporate interests overshadowed development objectives 
during implementation. This was in part due to the fact that 
the implementing organisations confined their role to that of 
financiers, and did not sufficiently contribute complementary 
(advisory) skills to the projects when it came to networking 
with other actors or coordinating activities with DC programmes. 
In these cases, one-sided added value was mainly generated 
for the companies, with limited added value in terms of 
development. This predominantly applied to projects based on 
service contracts, under which the implementing organisations 
mainly contributed to project design and monitoring. It applied 
to GIZ’s Strategic Alliances too, however (CS 2; CS 3; CS 5;  
CS 6; CS 7; CS 8; CS 11). Statements made in the company 
survey corroborate the case study findings. Nine of the 36 
companies surveyed state that the achievement of objectives 
could have been improved with stronger support from the 
implementing organisation for local implementation, better 
coordination with DC programmes in the partner countries, 
and follow-on measures after the end of the project. However, 
there are structural limitations to the networking efforts of 
companies, e.g. the fact that GIZ’s country offices can only step 
in if GIZ receives an official commission to do so. Seven of  
the 36 companies also expressed fundamental needs for closer 
cooperation with the implementing organisations or BMZ  
after the projects are completed. 
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Box 4: Project examples of comprehensive / 
limited use of synergies
Example of comprehensive use of synergies: 
In the project on establishing agricultural value chains  
for two niche products, a concept was developed together 
with the company. This was intended to reach about 
12,000 farmers using a relatively low public contribution 
of EUR 200,000 and helped to increase production and 
achieve positive income effects for these farmers. The 
synergies for development cooperation resulted from the 
purchase guarantees given by the company for these 
products beyond the project term, and from the long-term 
safeguarding of the effects achieved. The financial 
contribution reduced the risks involved for the company  
in setting up the value chain and helped speed up project 
implementation. The company also benefited from  
the implementing organisation’s support in setting up a 
multiplier structure.
Example of limited use of synergies: 
The project was designed to set up a value chain for 
renewable raw materials. One development objective was 
to create new sources of income for smallholders through 
the sale of raw materials. The company’s objectives were 
to have a continuous supply of high-quality raw materials 
and to develop a product for the export market. The 
company hoped to tap into synergies by providing funding 
and benefiting from the implementing organisation’s 
expertise in business development and product 
development in the partner country. However, the 
implementing organisation was not able to provide such 
expertise, because its special knowledge lay in designing 
DC processes but not in providing advice to companies  
or in technical product development. The implementing 
organisation, for its part, needed a reliable partner who 
would buy the raw materials from the farmers. Owing to 
delays in developing the export product, the company  
has not been able to purchase any raw materials so far. 
This meant that the potential for synergy along the value 
chain could not be harnessed as envisaged by the project 
design.
The interviews with experts also made clear that potential 
development synergies, in particular, are often overestimated 
(Int 4; Int 7; Int 8; Int 9). The following quote by a project 
manager illustrates this fact: ‘Overall, the objectives and 
indicators of develoPPP are much too ambitious for the budget 
provided. The objectives and indicators resemble those of 
bilateral programmes, but the budget does not.’ This correlates 
with the findings of previous studies and lessons learned from 
the international context (DEVFIN Advisers, 2014; ICAI, 2014, 
2015; Johansson de Silva et al., 2015). For example, Altenburg 
(2005) draws the conclusion that the potential synergy effects 
resulting from cooperation are offset by risks such as conflicting 
objectives and interests between the public and private sector 
partners, as well as by deadweight effects through non-additional 
investments and the high transaction costs of the partnership. 
Overall, the findings presented here allow us to confirm in 
principle the programme’s key assumption – that synergies 
are realised through the provision of complementary services 
by companies and implementing organisations. On the other 
hand, synergies are sometimes overestimated, and are not 
sufficiently harnessed, or are harnessed to achieve corporate 
objectives.
2.1.2 Conceptual framework of the develoPPP.de 
programme
The following section examines the extent to which the 
conceptual framework, i.e. the formal rules that apply to the 
programme, are appropriate for realising its objectives and 
basic assumptions. For this purpose, we will first explain the 
basic parameters laid down in the programme guidelines 
before going on to address key content areas of the guidelines 
in separate sections. We will then go on to sum up the areas 
of tension inherent to the programme.
Programme guidelines
The programme guidelines set out the conceptual framework 
for implementation of the programme by the organisations 
involved. These guidelines have been further developed since 
the start of the programme, up to the current 2013 version. 
The criteria laid out in the programme guidelines form the 
basis for assessing whether projects are eligible for support 
and set the framework within which the programme operates. 
In line with the programme’s demand orientation, the 
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framework for develoPPP.de is designed to provide the 
broadest possible scope for cooperation arrangements. The 
promotional approach is conditional rather than complying 
with a rigid framework of final objectives. Projects can be 
implemented if they are found to be eligible for support (from 
a development perspective) in the course of a criteria-based 
selection and appraisal process. BMZ only provides an 
abstract objectives framework. The criteria specified by BMZ 
for implementing develoPPP.de projects are aimed at 
‘promoting the interests of all parties involved in and affected 
by the project, as well as fostering sustainability’ (Doc 11). We 
will go on to examine whether the criteria meet this standard. 
We distinguish between company criteria that lay down the 
conditions for access to the programme by companies, and 
project criteria, which serve to promote the interests of the 
parties involved in the project, and ensure that the projects 
are relevant and effective at development policy level. We also 
discuss social, environmental and human rights standards that 
are intended to prevent any negative effects of the projects. 
Although the programme guidelines do not highlight the 
political relevance of these standards, the programme staff 
consider them highly relevant in this respect (Int 2; Int 3; Int 9; 
Int 11; Int 14; Int 15; Int 16; Int 18; Int 19; Int 20). 
Company criteria
The following companies are eligible to apply for the 
develoPPP.de programme: German and European companies 
and companies in partner countries in which German or 
European companies hold a stake of at least 25 %. Other 
minimum requirements for support relate to the 
creditworthiness of the companies: 
1. annual turnover of at least EUR 1 million, 
2. at least 10 employees, and 
3. at least three years of business operations.
The interviewed representatives of NGOs, in particular, 
question the limitation to European and German companies 
in view of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. They 
criticise the systematic exclusion of local (and non-European) 
companies that might be able to provide greater expertise 
than German companies (Int 33; Int 36; Int 38; Int 40). An 
internal study to determine a best-practice strategy for the 
programme (Binder et al., 2007) suggests that this could be 
limiting the development results achieved. Some staff 
members at BMZ and the implementing organisations are also 
in favour of expanding the countries of origin and opening up 
the programme to companies from developing countries and 
emerging economies (Int 4; Int 9; Int 14). This contrasts with 
BMZ’s objective of dovetailing foreign trade and development 
cooperation more closely, and especially of enlisting support 
from German (and European) companies for achieving 
development objectives (BMZ, 2016). A further argument is 
that other BMZ instruments and support programmes are 
available for cooperation with local companies, such as GIZ’s 
integrated development partnerships, or the Employment for 
Sustainable Development in Africa (E4D) programme (Int 3). 
Another aspect raised is the difficulty of examining the 
creditworthiness of non-European companies. Companies and 
private sector representatives, on the other hand, mainly 
perceive the programme as a form of foreign trade promotion 
(Int 34; Int 35; Int 42; Int 44). The findings clearly show that 
BMZ has so far not sufficiently justified or legitimised the 
exclusion of local companies.
Both the interviewed experts and the companies consider the 
criteria applied to companies for establishing their 
creditworthiness to be appropriate. Programme staff basically 
approve the current flexible application of these criteria (Int 3; 
Int 11; Int 14; Int 18; Int 19; Int 20), which was piloted in early 
2016. The rule that companies had to have been in operation 
for at least three business years was reduced to two. One of 
the two other minimum criteria (10 employees, EUR 1 million 
in annual turnover) can be undershot by 20 % (Doc 1). 
Different views are taken of any further flexibilisation, such as 
exceptions for start-ups or smaller companies, because these 
do offer the advantage of attracting more applicants (Int 1; Int 
2; Int 9; Int 11; Int 12; Int 21; Int 22; Int 26), but on the other 
hand also entail the risk of a higher drop-out rate (Int 3; Int 15; 
Int 16; Int 17). The private sector also sees little point in 
approving smaller businesses because it sees stable corporate 
structures as a relevant factor for engagement in foreign 
countries (Int 32; Int 34; Int 35; Int 42). As one entrepreneur 
puts it: ‘Without financial backing, a project like this would not 
have been possible for a start-up. Every project hits a rough 
patch now and then.’ (Int 46). The case studies showed that 
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larger companies tend to be somewhat more successful as 
regards project implementation and effectiveness, although 
there are no significant differences. All companies basically 
meet the specified company criteria in the 12 case studies 
examined. On the whole, the criteria used to establish 
creditworthiness are rated as appropriate, as are the related 
appraisal processes based on these criteria. However, the 
complexity of the piloted 80% rule for the minimum criteria 
related to employees and annual turnover hampers uniform 
application by staff at the implementing organisations.
Project criteria 
The project criteria are mainly geared to generating the 
synergies described above. They are designed to promote  
the interests of all parties affected by the project, i.e. ensure 
the development relevance and long-term effectiveness  
of the projects while giving equal consideration to company 
interests. We will now go on to examine whether the content 
of the criteria is relevant. We will then use the case study 
findings to examine whether the projects plausibly meet the 
criteria during implementation in the partner country.
The criteria ‘compatibility with development-policy objectives’, 
‘complementarity’, ‘subsidiarity’ and ‘sustainability’ are meant 
to ensure the relevance of the projects in terms of development 
policy. Additional criteria apply in this context to strategic 
development partnerships with the private sector: ‘level of 
innovation’ and ‘potential for replicability’. The ‘commercial 
interest of the companies’ and the ‘private sector contribution’ 
are intended to ensure that equal consideration is given to 
corporate and development-policy interests, and to filter out 
projects that are of purely public benefit (see Annex 5.5 for  
a detailed list of criteria). The interviewed programme staff 
consider these criteria suitable for ensuring that the projects 
are relevant both in terms of development policy and company 
interests (Int 2; Int 3; Int 9; Int 11; Int 14; Int 15; Int 16; Int 18;  
Int 19; Int 20). They also meet European Commission criteria 
on cooperation with the private sector (Council of the 
European Union, 2014; EC, 2014). 
However, it becomes clear that some of the project criteria 
are not specific enough. The programme officers at the three 
implementing organisations consider this an advantage 
because it gives greater leeway for interpretation and for 
taking into account the different needs of the companies 
seeking support (Int 9; Int 14; Int 18). The selection and 
appraisal processes of the three implementing organisations 
are designed to give project staff a certain degree of flexibility 
when appraising the projects. At the same time, the case 
studies show that flexible interpretation of the project criteria 
jeopardises fulfilment at times. It also becomes apparent that 
documentation of the appraisal processes is difficult to verify. 
In six of the 12 case study projects, the project criteria are 
partially not fulfilled (CS 3; CS 5; CS 6; CS 8; CS 11; CS 12).  
The criteria ‘subsidiarity’, ‘complementarity’ and the additional 
criteria for strategic development partnerships with the 
private sector are cases in point.
The ‘complementarity’ criterion should ensure that public  
and private contributions complement each other in such  
a way that both partners achieve their respective objectives 
more quickly, more effectively and more cost-efficiently.  
The definition of this criterion remains very vague, though. 
The designs of many develoPPP.de projects neither make  
clear how complementarity is to be ensured, nor are relevant 
indicators formulated. As a result, synergies are sometimes 
overestimated and false conclusions are drawn about 
underlying assumptions. Consequently, synergies are not 
adequately harnessed, or are biased towards corporate 
objectives.
Subsidiarity means that a public contribution to a develoPPP.
de project is only made if the private partner would otherwise 
not carry out the project, or that the project generates an 
appropriate economic development benefit for the developing 
country that exceeds any commercial benefits for the private 
partner. Many programme staff members consider it impossible 
or very difficult to verify the subsidiarity criterion (Int 3; Int 9; 
Int 16; Int 17; Int 28). The examination of subsidiarity is also 
considered an empirical challenge within international debate, 
where it is refered to as additionality (Heinrich, 2015; ICAI, 
2015). In five of the 12 cases, an on-site review during the case 
studies clearly showed that the projects would have been 
implemented anyway in the same or slightly modified form,  
or at a later point in time, even without state support  
(CS 2; CS 3; CD 5; CS 6: CS 7). This critical finding is supported 
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by statements made during the company survey. The appraisal 
mechanisms used so far are strongly based on self-declarations 
by the company (Int 3; Int 16). The partnerships’ subsidiarity  
is therefore partly hypothetical, because it is repeatedly 
declared as being fulfilled without convincing justification. 
The evaluations of comparable programmes (IOB, 2014 for  
23 The programme guidelines (Doc 11) speak of the following qualitative requirements rather than additional criteria: (1) high level of innovation and potential for replicability, (2) above-average 
structure-building results, (3) broad-based impact, (4) multi-stakeholder approach. As can be seen from the body of the text, DEval changed the subdivision or compilation of these aspects.
the Netherlands; DEVFIN 2010; KPMG 2012 for Finland) draw 
similar conclusions for subsidiarity (i.e. additionality). In this 
context, BMZ and GIZ stress the advantage of cooperation 
agreements, under which services are always delivered in the 
form of contributions in kind (Int 2; Int 9).
Box 5: Project example of a lack of subsidiarity (i.e. additionality)
The company involved in this project aimed to set up  
a training centre for technicians. At the time cooperation 
was approved by the implementing organisation in 2013, 
the company had already bought land and started  
to build the centre. Email correspondence between the 
implementing organisation and the company shows that 
the project was already well advanced when the decision 
was made to support the partnership. The develoPPP.de 
guidelines explicitly state that projects may not be 
supported if implementation by the company has already 
started, unless new elements are subsequently included 
that are valuable in terms of development policy. 
Asked how the project would have come along without 
support, a staff member at the project replied:  
‘The project was designed in 2009/2010. There was a concept  
and budget and resources had already been mobilised.  
The infusion of the developPPP.de resources had little effect  
on the project. The money provided was used for providing  
the fittings and completing the interior of the buildings.  
The capacity of the training centre did not change, though 
everything was done nicer’ (CS 11). The subsidiarity criterion  
was rated as ‘largely unfulfilled’.  
It is virtually impossible to verify how the additional criteria 
for strategic development partnerships with the private sector 
are examined23. They are very vaguely worded in the programme 
guidelines (Doc 11). For example, the special potential for 
replicability or the multi-stakeholder approach are neither 
defined nor clearly mapped in the design phase. Given  
the lack of qualifying statements to underpin these additional 
requirements, it is also not clear what distinguishes strategic 
development partnerships with the private sector from 
traditional development partnerships. The latter also involve 
 a variety of stakeholders in the project and implement 
innovative concepts with potential for replicability. The low 
degree of influence of these criteria can also be seen from  
the lack of a clear distinction between traditional and strategic 
development partnerships with the private sector in terms  
of their content. The rating of compliance with the additional 
criteria for strategic development partnerships with the 
private sector is mainly negative. This suggests that strategic 
development partnerships with the private sector tend not to 
meet their higher expectations in practice. While the criteria 
stated so far apply both to DEG’s Strategic Projects and GIZ’s 
Strategic Alliances, the latter are supposed to meet two 
further criteria. They are to be carried out with at least two 
partner companies and in at least two developing countries. 
Closer inspection shows that compared with Strategic 
Projects, Strategic Alliances more frequently involve several 
partner companies as part of multi-stakeholder approaches. 
The second criterion is not always met. According to the 
develoPPP.de Cloud, 15 of the 35 Strategic Alliances were only 
located in one country. Seven out of 21 DEG Strategic Projects 
were implemented in several countries. The special rules  
for Strategic Alliances were abolished in 2015 because the 
involvement of several countries sometimes proved 
counterproductive owing to the greater complexity involved 
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and synergies were limited (Int 1). This also became apparent 
in some of the case studies. Abolishing the special rules 
therefore appears justified, also because there are no obvious 
reasons why different rules should apply to Strategic Alliances 
and Strategic Projects.
There are also indications of different standards being applied 
to approvals for projects with close links to the company’s 
core business, i.e. the business segment of a company that 
provides most of the company’s return on investment (Int 1;  
Int 9; Int 22; Int 23). The dividing lines between core business 
and business segments eligible for support are often fluid,  
as the case studies show. This is especially true when companies 
operate in areas that are relevant to development, e.g. 
renewable energies or bottom-of-the-pyramid approaches. On 
the one hand, project staff believe such projects are especially 
likely to be sustainable. However, since support for the core 
business would simultaneously undermine a project’s 
additionality, the tensions are particularly clear in this case. 
Interviews with BMZ and the implementing organisations 
show that no definition is in place across the programme as  
to what makes core business eligible or ineligible for support. 
Nor do the programme guidelines explicitly describe how  
to handle core business. The interviews suggest that the  
three implementing organisations take different approaches  
to resolving such tensions (Int 1; Int 9; Int 17; Int 22). This 
indicates the need for a transparent manner of addressing 
support for projects that are closely related to a company’s 
core business. 
Social and human rights standards
In 2011, the United Nations Human Rights Council adopted 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. These 
declare that states should introduce additional measures to 
protect against infringements of human rights by companies 
where the states provide substantial support to these companies. 
To comply with these requirements, BMZ developed a human 
rights strategy (BMZ, 2011c) and corresponding guidelines  
on incorporating human rights standards and principles (BMZ, 
2013a). Human rights are therefore a mandatory element of 
24 Explicit mention is made of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, specifically sections II and IV, the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and 
Social Policy, including the ILO core labour standards, and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.
25 Both DEG and GIZ have complaints mechanisms for human rights infringements. The evaluation did not find any indications that develoPPP.de projects make systematic use of these platforms, 
however.
BMZ’s objectives, programmes and procedures. To fulfil this 
responsibility also within the develoPPP.de programme, social, 
environmental and human rights standards were established 
as a guiding framework for assessing project ideas, even if 
they were not included as criteria in the develoPPP.de 
guidelines. Explicit reference is made to the ‘exemplary role 
played by German companies for local enterprises as regards 
the respect for human rights or labour and environmental 
standards’ (Doc 11). 
In 2013, provisions were included in the programme contracts 
that oblige companies to comply with human rights due 
diligence requirements and to meet minimum social 
standards.24 However, programme staff at BMZ and DEG 
doubt whether companies have grasped the extent of the 
standards they are required to meet (Int 3; Int 14; Int 15). These 
staff say that for many companies, it is not possible ‘to 
guarantee compliance with social standards/ILO standards for 
the entire supply chain’ (Int 14). Although the evaluation team 
acknowledges the inclusion of standards in the programme 
contracts, it appears that responsibility for meeting the 
standards is passed on to the companies via BMZ’s and the 
implementing organisations’ contracts and agreements, and 
that the emphasis is on setting up political safeguards (Int 2; 
Int 17). Case studies and expert interviews clearly show that 
no systematic examination of human rights aspects is 
incorporated either in the appraisal processes before the 
project starts, or in the monitoring system during project 
implementation (Int 3; Int 14; Int 15; Int 26; Int 29)25. This is a 
highly critical point – because the programme guidelines 
oblige implementing organisations to appraise human rights 
risks and impacts in the run-up to all projects (BMZ, 2013a) 
– and one that is also criticised by civil-society actors (Int 2; 
Int 12; Int 16: Int 17; Int 33). GIZ’s Strategic Alliances are an 
exception. Here, an appraisal mechanism is embedded at least 
in the project initiation and design phase as part of business 
partner screening (Doc 5). The lack of appraisal mechanisms 
may have negative consequences, as shown by the project 
example in Box 6. 
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Box 6: Example of a project that does not comply  
with ILO Core Labour Standards
A traditional project on agricultural value chains aimed  
to provide farmers and agricultural labourers with access 
to practical agricultural training and at the same time 
improve their social situation. 
During a case study visit, it became clear that the precarious 
working and living conditions of the agricultural labourers 
had not improved at all. Instead, poor practices  
had become even more entrenched because underlying 
employment relationships at the local company had  
not been changed. Through indirect employment via 
subcontractors (middlemen), the company circumvented 
all of its statutory responsibility for the social protection 
of workers, such as health insurance. At the same time,  
the legal possibilities of workers are severely restricted, 
e.g. with regard to the right to form trade unions and the 
right of assembly. While the implementing organisation 
did refer critically to these aspects in its final report, these 
deficiencies were not addressed, or not to an adequate 
extent, in the ex-ante appraisal and the mid-term reports.
Overall, it is clear that BMZ and the implementing 
organisations do not yet have a common understanding of the 
form an appropriate appraisal of human rights aspects should 
take. The instruments used so far to safeguard human rights 
standards are rated as ‘rather inappropriate’. Negative 
consequences for the target groups cannot be ruled out. 
However, BMZ is currently engaged in an overarching 
discussion process regarding the adjustment of existing 
regulations for cooperation with the private sector in terms of 
human rights. It would appear expedient to plan potential 
modifications to the develoPPP.de programme against the 
backdrop of this overarching discussion and also in view of 
Germany’s forthcoming National Action Plan on Business and 
Human Rights.
Positive criteria - regional and substantive orientation  
of the programme 
The programme’s regional and substantive orientation is 
examined against the backdrop of development objectives, 
especially the overarching objective of poverty reduction that 
is formulated in the develoPPP.de guidelines (Doc 11). The 
findings of the expert consultation and portfolio analysis 
show that the programme is largely open as regards regions 
and sectors. BMZ staff members take a positive view of this 
openness. Interviewees believe that a programmatic focus on 
specific regions, countries or sectors would not be appropriate 
because it would limit the programme’s demand orientation 
(Int 1; Int 3; Int 4; Int 5; Int 8; Int 23; Int 28). At the same time, 
the positive criteria formulated in the programme guidelines 
and BMZ’s shifting thematic priority areas are geared towards 
a regional and substantive focus (Doc 11). Projects in LDC 
partner countries (in line with the OECD-DAC list) and/or 
projects that address specific target groups (e.g. women, 
informal businesses, minorities) are considered particularly 
eligible for support. Both the findings of the portfolio analysis 
and the statements in the annual reports show that the 
majority of projects are carried out in lower-middle-income 
and upper-middle-income countries, i.e. in poor countries but 
not in LDCs (Doc 13; Lücking & Roggemann, 2016). The extent to 
which the supported projects focus on especially marginalised 
target groups cannot be conclusively determined. The findings 
of the case studies indicate that this tends not to be the case, 
however. Altogether, only two of the 12 projects examined 
target disadvantaged groups (CS 3; CS 8). As regards the 
setting of priorities, only four applications were submitted for 
the special ideas competition ‘One World – No Hunger’ in 
2014 (Doc 13). Project staff make little use of the options for 
focusing the develoPPP.de programme on BMZ’s strategic 
priority areas or LDCs because these are usually not in the 
interest of companies (Int 3; Int 15; Int 18; Int 19; Int 20). There 
is also a lack of incentives systems for companies to increase 
the number of applications in these areas (Int 14). Based on 
the findings, the functions of the positive criteria and the 
setting of priorities for the regional and substantive steering 
of the programme can be rated as limited.
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Summary of areas of tension inherent to the programme 
There are tensions between the programme’s required 
orientation towards providing a broad range of cooperation 
arrangements to the private sector on the one hand and 
focusing on development results in developing countries and 
emerging economies on the other. These tensions limit the 
synergies that can be leveraged from cooperation. Areas of 
tension are visible in four key areas, which are outlined in Fig. 12. 
1. Project criteria and standards: In terms of content, the 
criteria are geared to ensuring the development-policy 
relevance and effectiveness of projects. Since they can be 
flexibly applied, these criteria can cover the different needs 
of companies and safeguard the programme’s demand 
orientation. At the moment, the criteria tend to respond 
more to demand orientation. Their low specificity and high 
scope for interpretation mean that less consideration is 
given to development-policy interests.
2. Regional and substantive alignment of the programme: On 
the one hand, support is meant to enable cooperation with 
as many companies as possible in different segments. On 
the other, countries of particular relevance to development 
policy (such as LDCs) and development themes are also to 
be covered. The latter is only done to a limited extent 
because short-term priorities and positive criteria have 
little traction in terms of regional and substantive steering.
26 The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action (OECD, 2008) call for the untying of aid with regard ‘partner orientation’. This is expressed as follows in the Declaration: 
‘Untying aid generally increases aid effectiveness by reducing transaction costs for partner countries and improving country ownership and alignment. DAC Donors will continue to make progress 
on untying as encouraged by the 2001 DAC Recommendation on Untying Official Development Assistance to the Least Developed Countries (Indicator 8).’
 3. Consideration of the interests of the actors involved: The 
broad promotional approach and the separation of the 
programme from bilateral DC enable companies to submit 
a wide range of innovative project proposals. However, this 
means that project content, locations and target groups 
are largely determined by company interests. The scope 
that partner country representatives or institutions have 
for codetermining these elements takes second place. 
4. Limitation of support to European and German companies: 
Given the objective of enlisting the support of these com-
panies to achieve development objectives, the restriction is 
understandable. This objective is not explicitly laid down in 
the programme, though. Moreover, limiting access runs 
counter to calls for the untying of aid that are voiced in 
global development agreements26.
On the whole, the programme is currently geared more  
to covering the various needs of companies, in line with  
its demand orientation. This orientation makes sense  
if the objective is to achieve a large range of cooperation 
arrangements with German and European companies. 
However, it curtails the programme’s orientation to 
development results in the partner countries.
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2.1.3 Key findings and assessment of relevance in line with OECD-DAC
 • Seen in the international context, the programme’s 
underlying ambition (to enlist the support of the private 
sector in achieving development results via joint projects) 
ties in with key development strategies and is consistent 
with the programme approaches of other donors. 
 • As far as alignment with overarching development 
objectives is concerned, the programme’s objectives 
framework is on the whole abstract. This framework 
neither clearly presents the corporate interests to  
be served by the programme, nor does it reflect the 
implicit objective of enlisting the support of German 
and European companies to achieve development 
cooperation goals, while at the same time enhancing 
the awareness and acceptance of development issues 
among these societal actors. The programme still  
lacks a clear strategic orientation and the related 
legitimation against the backdrop of the SDGs.
 • The programme’s current assignment within BMZ’s 
organisational structure limits policy coordination  
with governments and public institutions in partner 
countries. BMZ has not yet transparently explained  
the reasons for this organisational assignment. While 
the projects usually address the general development 
needs of sectors of industry or society in partner 
countries, the specific needs of the target groups of 
development interventions are sometimes neglected.
Figure 11: Overview of programme orientation in the areas of tension between 
demand orientation and development results in partner countries
Focus on: 
Broad orientation to 
private sector demand
Focus on: 
Development results 
in partner countries
Loosely defi ned 
project criteria and standards
Narrowly defi ned 
project criteria and standards
Orientation of the 
programme design
Open regional and 
substantive orientation
Regional and substantive 
orientation to DC priority areas
Companies co-determine 
project content
Local actors co-determine 
project content
Access restricted to 
European companies
Access open to 
all companies
Synergies
Source: authors’ own
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 • The programme’s key assumption – generating synergies 
through the provision of complementary services by 
companies and implementing organisations – can be 
confirmed in principle. Potential synergies for the 
companies lie in minimising their risks when tapping 
into new markets; for development cooperation actors, 
they lie in transferring technology and expertise  
to partner countries and implementing organisations. 
Potential synergies are sometimes overestimated, 
however, and are not sufficiently harnessed, or are 
harnessed to achieve only corporate objectives.
 • The criteria applied to companies for establishing their 
creditworthiness are considered appropriate for creating 
a balance between companies’ access to the programme 
and minimising the risk that they will drop out. However, 
the complexity of the 80 % rule for the minimum criteria 
related to employees and annual turnover, as tested 
during the pilot phase, impedes standard application  
of the rule by staff at the implementing organisations.  
The programme ties aid by limiting support to German 
and European companies. This has not yet been 
sufficiently justified and legitimised and goes against 
the requirements for partner orientation set out in 
global agreements.
 • The project criteria are rated relevant because they 
cover both corporate and development-policy aspects. 
However, since they are not very specific and can be 
flexibly interpreted by the implementing organisations, 
they are only partially applied and jeopardise the 
success of the programme’s conditional approach. 
 • The following-up of social and human rights standards 
has been ‘rather inappropriate’ to date. The guidelines 
and contracts that apply to the programme transfer 
responsibility from BMZ to the companies, via the 
implementing organisations. Compliance with standards 
has not been systematically examined so far. 
27 The OECD-DAC relevance criterion (OECD, 2009) is intended to enable a summary assessment of the extent to which a programme’s objectives and design meet development-policy requirements 
and are appropriate against the backdrop of changes in the general framework (BMZ, 2006).
 • The usefulness of the positive criteria and the setting  
of priorities for the regional and substantive steering  
of the programme can be rated as limited.
 • The programme operates in a continuum between  
its focus on overarching development objectives on  
the one side and corporate interests on the other.  
At present, it is geared more to the various needs of  
the companies and the related demand orientation.  
This orientation makes sense given the objective of 
realising a wide range of cooperation arrangements  
with German and European companies. In the final 
analysis, though, it lessens the focus on specific  
regional and substantive development priority areas. 
Overall, there is a need for a clear orientation 
framework for the programme’s conceptual orientation. 
Assessment of relevance in line with OECD-DAC27 
Given the key role the private sector is believed to play  
in the development of emerging economies and developing 
countries, the develoPPP.de programme can be considered 
relevant also in the international context. This is due to its 
objective to enlist greater support from the private sector  
in achieving development goals through cooperation 
arrangements. However, the programme’s unclear strategic 
orientation and related conceptual weaknesses impede 
implementation in accordance with its objectives and the 
programme only partly achieves its high ambitions as a  
result. Beyond this, its lack of orientation towards the needs  
of marginalised target groups of development interventions  
in partner countries, and its failure to consider key demands  
of international agreements such as the Paris Declaration  
on Aid Effectiveness, have not been adequately justified  
so far. Altogether, the programme is therefore rated as only 
partially relevant.
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2.2
Organisational structure of the develoPPP.de 
programme
We will now discuss two key elements of the develoPPP.de’s 
organisational structure. Section 2.2.1 addresses how 
programme implementation is broken down across three 
implementing organisations. Section 2.2.2 presents the 
available resources. By comparing the conceptual justification 
for these elements with their actual application, we seek  
to establish whether the organisational structure can be 
considered appropriate for achieving the programme’s 
objectives. The findings are summarised in Section 2.2.3. 
2.2.1 Programme implementation via three  
implementing organisations.
Dividing implementation responsibility across three different 
implementing organisations goes back to the pilot nature  
of the programme when it was established in 1999 (Altenburg 
& Chahoud, 2002; Binder et al., 2007). The programme was  
set up to explore options for fostering development alliances 
with the private sector and to make available experience  
on mainstreaming PPP approaches in bilateral technical 
cooperation (TC) and financial cooperation (FC) (Altenburg  
& Chahoud, 2002). Encouraging ‘competition’ between the 
implementing organisations was also designed to boost 
efficiency (Binder et al., 2007). Fifteen years after its inception, 
one must ask whether this division of responsibility between 
three organisations has succeeded in generating added value 
for the programme.
Using the implementing organisations’ expertise for  
the programme
The three implementing organisations have different corporate 
principles and tasks, and therefore offer different skills profiles. 
In line with its role as an implementing organisation, DEG’s 
core expertise lies in financing and providing advice to 
investors, whereas GIZ’s key skills are in technical cooperation, 
organisational development and capacity building. GIZ’s field 
structure also gives it extensive contacts and networks in 
developing countries and emerging economies. Through its 
partnership programme with chambers and associations, 
sequa has long-standing experience in cooperating with the 
organised business community in Germany and in developing 
countries and emerging economies. It has also amassed 
experience in its vocational training partnerships programme.
The professional public is often unaware that three 
implementing organisations are responsible for programme 
implementation. Six of the 36 surveyed companies explicitly 
underlined this lack of transparency, which was also criticised 
by business associations and consultants (Int 32; Int 35; Int 39; 
Int 44). As a result, decisions by companies to cooperate with 
a specific implementing organisation are largely unrelated to 
the expertise of the given organisation, especially for first-time 
applications. As a rule, companies do not consciously weigh  
up the different cooperation options. This is shown by a 
statement from one entrepreneur: ‘When I applied, I had no 
idea the programme was also run by other implementing 
organisations. My colleagues told me about this programme 
with GIZ’ (Int 47).
While the fact that the programme is operated by three 
implementing organisations is not widely publicised, 
participating companies do notice the organisation’s specific 
expertise when designing and implementing the project.  
Eight of 13 companies that cooperated with GIZ positively 
highlighted its contacts, structures and reputation at the  
local level. Five of the 14 companies that cooperated with  
DEG underlined its close contacts with the business community 
and its entrepreneurial expertise. Specific skills were less 
apparent at sequa, a smaller implementing organisation with  
a less extensive product range than GIZ and DEG. Here,  
close contacts with associations were the deciding factor for 
cooperation at two of nine companies. 
Analysis of the literature shows that despite repeated 
recommendations for closer alignment with the implementing 
organisations’ specific expertise, there has been no fundamental 
change in implementing structures since the programme’s 
inception 15 years ago. As far back as 2002, Altenburg & 
Chahoud  recommended that the implementing organisations 
specialise more strongly on their relevant expertise and the 
business clients they target. The study by Binder et al. (2007) 
also advises such a focus, and comes to the conclusion that  
the parallel implementation structures of the three organisations 
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lead to increased costs without recognisable added value.  
This correlates with current views at BMZ, which believes that 
the added value of having three implementing organisations 
results less from use of their specific key expertise or their 
links with other business segments than from the enhanced 
potential to acquire business partners for the programme (Int 2).
Differences between the portfolios of the implementing 
organisations
In terms of content and regions, there are few differences 
between the implementing organisations’ portfolios. The main 
differences lie in the size of the cooperating companies. The 
content analysis shows that 80 % of projects supported by 
sequa are carried out with smaller companies (annual turnover 
of less than EUR 50 million). DEG and GIZ cooperate more 
often with larger companies too, particularly as regards 
strategic development partnerships with the private sector 
and cooperation projects, which are predominantly conducted 
with large companies. Overall, the differences in the portfolios 
do not indicate that wide use is made of the implementing 
organisations’ core areas of expertise.
One key difference between the implementing organisations 
at conceptual level is that GIZ and DEG also implement 
strategic development partnerships with the private sector  
as well as traditional development partnerships based  
on the ideas competition. GIZ also operates development 
partnerships with the private sector based on cooperation 
agreements, as well as those based on traditional service 
contracts. For GIZ at least, this expands the range of services 
so that the public contribution can also be provided through 
its own inputs. However, the allocation of forms of 
development partnerships to the implementing organisations 
based on their specific areas of expertise does not always  
seem to be determined by conceptual considerations. It may 
also be for pragmatic reasons. GIZ, for example, carries out 
traditional development partnerships based on service contracts 
although the transfer of funding to another implementer  
does not really correspond to its own understanding as an 
organisation (Int 9).
28 While the statements both at DEG and at GIZ related to full-time equivalents, the time management systems at sequa do not allow jobs to be calculated on this basis. We therefore state the 
number of staff who spend at least 50 % of their working hours on the develoPPP.de programme.
29 Owing to restructuring within GIZ, costs and staff positions for the develoPPP.de programme have been settled differently since 2009 (Int 9; Int 10). The develoPPP.de programme was divided 
between three regional departments at GIZ prior to 2011.
Overall, the core areas of expertise of each implementing 
organisation are not systematically used for the programme. 
Although they are fed into project implementation to differing 
degrees, no specific profiling or systematic use of these areas 
of expertise can be detected in the way responsibility for the 
programme is divided among the three organisations.
2.2.2 Provision of resources to the programme
 
The programme’s human resources
The programme is steered at BMZ by a desk officer and receives 
support in the areas of M&E and public relations from the  
GIZ Sector Project Private Sector Cooperation. Discussions 
with staff at BMZ and the implementing organisations show 
that the available staffing level at BMZ is not considered 
appropriate, and that the Division’s heavy workload leads to 
implementation delays (Int 2; Int 3; Int 8; Int 9; Int 18; Int 19). 
Since BMZ, as a federal ministry, is bound by a staffing plan  
and cannot increase its staffing resources, BMZ staff see the 
stepping up of cooperation with the Sector Project as one 
possible means of tweaking the system (Int 1; Int 2; Int 3). As 
far as human resources are concerned, frequent staff turnover 
within BMZ’s Division 114 (four desk officers since 2009) is 
seen as a strong limiting factor. Processes are set back every 
time there is a change in staff, and adequate knowledge 
management systems have not yet been put in place. These 
findings lead to an assessment of BMZ’s staffing levels as 
‘rather inappropriate’.
In 2015, 10 people worked on the develoPPP.de programme  
at DEG, 29 at GIZ and eight28 at sequa. Whereas the staffing 
level remained constant at DEG and sequa from 2009 to 2015,  
it has risen slightly at GIZ since 2013, from 23 to 29. No precise 
information was available from GIZ for the period prior to  
2013 because programme restructuring within GIZ made it 
impossible to determine how staff were allocated before 
201329. On average, DEG staff manage the most projects and 
GIZ staff the least. GIZ says this is because of the additional 
effort involved in implementing cooperation agreements, 
among other reasons (Int 9; Int 10). sequa and GIZ calculate 
higher annual personnel costs than DEG. However, since DEG 
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posts especially high additional costs (such as overheads)  
as compared with sequa and GIZ, the data suggest that  
the higher number of projects per staff member does not 
necessarily equate to higher production efficiency during 
programme implementation.
Staff at the implementing organisations consider staffing levels 
to be adequate both in terms of quality and quantity. Critical 
comments were made regarding the limited business know-how 
of some staff, and at GIZ particularly the frequent staff changes, 
as shown by the company survey and a company study carried 
out in 2013 (Doc 16). On the whole, though, the case studies, 
the company survey and the company study all rate the 
qualitative skills of programme staff positively. HR levels at  
the implementing organisations are therefore assessed as 
‘rather appropriate’. 
The programme’s financial resources 
In 2015, BMZ provided funding of roughly EUR 35 million for 
the develoPPP.de programme, which accounted for 38 % of the 
funds available for the divisional budget item ‘Development 
partnerships with the private sector’ (EUR 91.8 million).30 
Between 2013 and 2015, 45 % of the overall budget was 
allocated to GIZ, 46 % to DEG and 9 % to sequa. Since 2009, 
programme funds have only grown slightly by an average of 
1.4 %. Since the number of project applications has remained 
fairly constant over the years, it was possible to support all 
projects classed as eligible with the existing funds, as the 
expert consultations confirm (Int 1; Int 3). The current good 
funding level for the programme – compared with applications 
(see Section 2.4.2) –means that competition among the 
implementing organisations plays a more minor role than 
originally intended. The programme’s financial resources are 
therefore considered adequate. Bearing in mind the limited 
use of the competition mechanism, the question is whether 
the resources provided exceed the programme’s actual 
requirements.
Given the programme’s good funding level, it should be 
examined whether the programme funds are used cost-
efficiently. In the develoPPP.de guidelines, BMZ emphasises 
30 In addition to develoPPP.de, the following programmes are also funded via this budget item besides: The DC Scout Programme, the GIZ Sector Project Private Sector Cooperation, innovative 
cooperation approaches, feasibility studies and business support services, partnerships with chambers and with the Savings Banks Foundation for International Cooperation, Import Promotion 
Desk, BMZ’s Agency for Business and Economic Development, AFOS (Foundation for Entrepreneurial Development Cooperation), practice-oriented partnerships with DAAD, DEG innovation 
vouchers and subsidies for transaction costs.
31 For sequa as a grant recipient with a lump-sum administration rate and only one form of project, this limitation is of less importance.
minimising administrative costs during project implementation 
as a key judgement criterion (Doc 11). Since the programme is 
implemented by three organisations, analysing the administrative 
costs across all three should provide important information  
for programme steering at BMZ. This is almost impossible based 
on the available financial data. Firstly, the financial systems  
at DEG, GIZ and sequa do not allow costs to be allocated to 
individual projects, nor to the different forms of development 
partnerships with the private sector. This means that the  
costs of the different forms of development partnerships with 
the private sector cannot be compared31. Secondly, GIZ’s 
statements for the years 2009 to 2012 do not contain all 
administrative costs for the develoPPP.de programme.  
This is due to restructuring processes within GIZ (for example,  
some of the programme-related administrative costs were 
settled via the regional departments prior to 2011) (Int 9;  
Int 10). GIZ says that the statements for 2013 to 2015 are 
representative (Int 10). Thirdly, there are other administrative 
costs for the develoPPP.de programme that are not financed 
via the implementing organisations but via the Sector Project 
Private Sector Cooperation, e.g. the costs for PR activities 
across the programme. It was not possible to record these 
costs either during the evaluation. 
The different forms of contracts and agreements present  
an additional challenge when it comes to comparing the 
administrative costs incurred by the implementing 
organisations. Whereas administrative costs can be clearly 
allocated to projects based on service contracts, this is  
more difficult for cooperation agreements, which GIZ staff  
use to implement projects. According to GIZ (Int 10),  
staff members financed from project funds exclusively perform 
project work for the programme, and do not take on any 
overarching administrative tasks. Staff on the GIZ core team 
therefore handle GIZ projects based on cooperation 
agreements as well as projects based on service contracts, 
whose costs are settled via develoPPP.de. It may well be  
that project staff lighten the GIZ core team’s workload and 
thus go some way towards reducing GIZ’s administrative costs. 
A similar situation can be presumed as regards cooperation 
with external consultants assigned in particular to DEG and 
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sequa projects. Any possible distortions in this context appear 
negligible. However, to assess the efficiency of the different 
modes of implementation, it would be important to know what 
proportion of funds flows back to GIZ from projects based  
on GIZ cooperation agreements via salaries and subcontracting, 
and what funds are paid to external consultants by DEG,  
sequa and possibly GIZ via subcontracting. Funds have not 
been broken down in this way so far.
Bearing in mind the restrictions described above, it becomes 
clear that statements regarding production efficiency, which 
relates the resources used for develoPPP.de to the services 
provided, are difficult to make. Owing to the cut-off date at  
GIZ, comparative statements on the average administrative 
costs at the three implementing organisations can only be 
made for the period from 2013 to 2015. For this period, the 
average administrative costs at DEG were 19.2 %, compared 
with 16.67 % at sequa and 16.3 % at GIZ. That amounts to 
average programme administrative costs of 17.7 % for 2013 to 
2015. The programme’s total administrative costs are higher. 
Owing to data availability, costs that are settled via the Sector 
Project cannot be taken into account. Compared with similar 
programmes by other donors, the administrative costs of the 
develoPPP.de programme are rather high. Administrative costs 
at the Danish Business-to-Business Programme amount to 8 % 
and to 17 % at the Dutch Private Sector Investment Programme 
(Triodos Facet BV, 2010). Other international evaluations do 
not provide any information in this respect. These programmes 
differ from develoPPP.de as regards implementation and  
a direct comparison can only be made to a limited extent.
The programme makes no statements about total 
administrative costs. Nor was the evaluation able to make 
reliable estimates, because of the limited data available. These 
data restrictions also make it impossible to compare the 
implementing organisations and the forms of development 
partnership with the private sector. It becomes clear that the 
available financial data do not permit an adequate assessment 
of production efficiency, and therefore allow no in-depth 
analysis of differences in efficiency between the implementing 
organisations or the implementation of individual forms of 
development partnership. The limited data available point to 
major deficits in financial monitoring, and make informed 
policy decisions virtually impossible. This constraint appears 
all the more weighty in view of the standard laid down by BMZ 
in the programme guidelines to use administrative costs as a 
judgement criterion for the implementing organisations. It also 
deserves critical examination given the programme’s good 
resource levels. Although the expansion of financial systems to 
record management-related data would require increased 
resources at the implementing organisations, it appears 
indispensable for facts-based programme steering. 
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2.2.3 Key findings 
 • Programme implementation by three implementing 
organisations offers potential in that the organisations 
have complementary expertise. However, the main 
added value for the programme so far is only reflected 
in broader access for companies, because the division  
of responsibility between three implementing organisations 
does not raise their specific profiles or make systematic 
use of their expertise. 
 • The conceptual justifications given for the allocation of 
forms of development partnership with the private sector 
to the implementing organisations are not sufficient. 
Systematic allocation based on expertise is only obvious 
in relation to GIZ’s cooperation agreements.
 • The staffing level at BMZ is considered inadequate.  
Staff tend to have a very heavy workload. Staffing  
levels at the implementing organisations appear to  
be adequate, though. The number of projects handled  
by each staff member varies from one implementing 
organisation to the other, making any statements  
on efficiency impossible.
 • The programme’s financial resources are considered 
adequate. The limited use of the competition 
mechanism raises the question whether the provided 
resources exceed the programme’s actual requirements. 
 • Very little financial data is available on the programme’s 
administrative costs. Firstly, the financial systems at 
DEG, GIZ and sequa do not allow costs to be  
allocated to individual projects or forms of development 
partnerships with the private sector. Secondly, 
statements on GIZ’s administrative costs for 2009  
to 2012 are not representative. Thirdly, additional  
costs incurred via the Sector Project Private Sector 
Cooperation are not recorded. 
 • Based on the available data, robust estimates of the 
programme’s total administrative costs can only be 
made to a very limited extent. These show average 
programme administrative costs of 17.7 % for 2013 to 
2015. The financial data only allow limited comparisons 
between the implementing organisations and none 
between the different forms of development partnership 
with the private sector. 
 • It is virtually impossible to make informed policy 
decisions on the continuation of the tripartite 
programme structure based on production efficiency. 
The poor data basis also highlights strong deficits  
in financial monitoring. This limitation appears all the 
more weighty in view of the standard that BMZ laid 
down in the programme guidelines to use administrative 
costs as a judgement criterion for the implementing 
organisations. Improving financial systems would 
appear to be a key prerequisite for fact-based steering. 
2.3
Steering of the programme by BMZ
The following section provides findings related to evaluation 
question 2. It analyses the processes that influence BMZ’s 
ability to steer the programme. We start by taking a look at  
the instruments that allow BMZ to set an overarching policy 
framework (Section 2.3.1). BMZ takes a very meticulous 
approach to steering the selection of projects. The relevant 
steering instruments will therefore be looked at separately 
(Section 2.3.2). The chapter concludes by examining the 
monitoring and evaluation systems (Section 2.3.3) and 
summing up the key findings (Section 2.3.4).
2.3.1 BMZ’s steering instruments
This section describes and discusses the instruments used to 
steer the programme. The programme guidelines were already 
addressed in the context of the programme’s design in Section 
2.1. We will go on to analyse the extent to which the implementing 
organisations’ offers and applications for approval, the develoPPP.de 
team meetings and the creation of thematic reference 
frameworks enhance BMZ’s capacity to steer the programme.
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Commissions/grant notifications
BMZ steers the programme by means of the programme 
guidelines, by means of commissions for programme 
implementation to DEG and GIZ, and grant notifications  
to sequa. The objectives and modes of implementation that 
apply to the individual implementing organisation are laid 
down in the relevant offers or applications for the programme. 
However, the policy frameworks and objectives defined in the 
programme guidelines are rarely specified in further detail. 
Although performance indicators apply to the performance of 
the commission by GIZ and DEG, these are rather unspecific 
and hard to verify (Doc 6; Doc 7; Doc 8). The interviews show 
that BMZ makes very limited use of the grant notifications to 
sequa and the commissions granted to DEG and GIZ to steer 
the programme content. A programme officer at one of the 
implementing organisations explicitly criticised the usefulness 
of offers in steering the develoPPP.de programme (Int 10).  
BMZ uses commissions and grant notifications more as a means 
of steering and controlling outgoing funds to the individual 
implementing organisations. Critical mention is made of the 
different types of process for GIZ and DEG on the one hand 
and sequa on the other, because these increase administrative 
effort at BMZ. The effort involved for the grant allocation 
procedure is considered particularly high (Int 2; Int 3).
develoPPP.de team meetings
The responsible desk officers in BMZ’s Division 114 chair the 
develoPPP.de team meetings, which take place every three 
months. Points on the agenda include the comparison of 
project proposals received under the three-monthly ideas 
competition, and consultation on overarching programme 
topics such as PR work. The findings are noted in minutes and 
apply to further implementation of the programme. Permanent 
participants are the responsible desk officers at BMZ and the 
programme officers at DEG, GIZ and sequa. Sector Project staff 
and PR officers take part as required. The project applications 
are discussed based on project lists that are drawn up by the 
implementing organisations prior to the meeting and shared 
with BMZ’s Division 114. Both the implementing organisations 
(Int 9; Int 14; Int 18) and BMZ (Int 2) state that the meetings 
are efficient and expedient on the whole (Int 2; Int 9; Int 14;  
Int 18). Use of the minutes is also rated positively. Challenges 
can be discussed at an early stage, joint solutions worked out and 
generally applicable changes can be promptly recorded and 
decided on via the minutes.
Thematic reference framework
BMZ’s Division 114 endeavours to focus the programme  
on themes of particular relevance to development policy by 
cooperating with the sector divisions and initiatives, the 
Special Initiative ‘One World - No Hunger’, and the ‘Partnership 
for Sustainable Textiles’. The ‘Reference framework for 
development partnerships in the agri-food sector’ was the  
first instrument to refer the relevant projects directly to the 
respective programmes at BMZ and in the field. The framework 
contributes to networking without impairing the thematic 
flexibility of the develoPPP.de programme. A similar reference 
framework is currently being created for cooperation with  
the ‘Partnership for Sustainable Textiles’ (Int 2; Int 5). This 
cooperation is rated positively both by staff at BMZ’s Division 
114 and in the sector divisions. Staff members clearly see this  
as a possibility of increasing the programme’s development-
policy relevance without curtailing its flexibility (Int 2; Int 4; 
Int 5). For their part, programme staff at the implementing 
organisations take a critical view of the reference framework 
because further criteria defined therein prevent companies 
from making applications but do not create any additional 
incentives (Int 14; Int 19; Int 20). This assessment is corroborated 
by the low number of applications related to specific thematic 
areas (see Section 2.1.2). Overall, though, the creation of the 
reference framework and closer cooperation between BMZ’s 
Division 114 and the sector divisions are seen as important 
steps towards more extensive networking of the develoPPP.de 
programme inside BMZ and in the country programmes.  
The criteria set out in the reference framework are considered 
necessary since they call for standards that should apply to all 
BMZ projects in the agricultural sector. The incentives systems 
and acquisition measures envisage a number of adjustment 
mechanisms that appear to have been unable so far to 
motivate the specific corporate target group to become more 
involved in the programme. 
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2.3.2 Steering processes involved in project selection 
During the project selection phase, BMZ steers the programme 
via a coordination process on the one hand and the recently 
introduced management information bulletin on the other. 
Several individual coordination meetings are also held by BMZ 
and the implementing organisations during project selection. 
These will be discussed below. We examine the extent to  
which these rather meticulous steering processes improve 
implementation of the develoPPP.de programme. 
Two-step coordination process involving the regional divisions
Most decisions to provide support are made by the implementing 
organisations without consulting BMZ in each individual case. 
develoPPP.de projects in politically sensitive countries are  
an exception. These are decided via a one-step coordination 
process between BMZ’s Division 114 and the implementing 
organisation. Strategic development partnerships with the 
private sector, and projects in thematic priority areas, which 
are decided in a two-step coordination process, are another 
exception. Only once this process has taken place does the 
company receive final approval. BMZ’s Division 114 involves 
the responsible regional or sector division in this process and 
asks for its comments. Based on BMZ’s internal comments,  
the project is further developed by the implementing organisation 
and the company, and then submitted to BMZ’s Division 114 for 
final approval in the two-step process (Int 2; Int 3). Programme 
staff at BMZ considers these coordination processes to  
be necessary  (Int 2: Int 3). The coordination of projects in 
countries such as Chad or Ethiopia is due to their political 
sensitivity and the need to give consideration to security aspects. 
The coordination of larger strategic development partnerships 
with the private sector and projects in thematic priority areas 
is due to the strong relevance of these projects for the country 
programmes, and to the higher risk they pose to the reputation 
of BMZ and the implementing organisation.
Both BMZ and the implementing organisations describe these 
processes as labour-intensive and time-consuming. The approval 
periods may last up to six months in some cases (Doc 16; Doc 19; 
Doc 20; Int 9; Int 14; Int 16; Int 17). This applies in particular  
to the process used for strategic development partnerships 
with the private sector (Doc 20; Int 9; Int 14). BMZ also 
highlights the fact that dividing responsibility for programme 
implementation between three organisations makes 
communication and coordination processes more laborious. 
This applies to this form of cooperation between BMZ and  
the implementing organisation, but also to other cooperation 
arrangements (Int 2; Int 3). Both BMZ (Int 2) and the 
implementing organisations (Int 9; Int 14; int 18) propose that 
the process be streamlined. The delays are sometimes attributed 
to lengthy feedback processes at BMZ (Int 9; Int 16; Int 17), 
which are due among other factors to the time-consuming 
consultations between BMZ’s Division 114 and the regional 
divisions (Int 3; Int 9). This points to tensions between the key 
requirements of BMZ’s Division 114 and the regional divisions. 
While Division 114 stresses the programme’s demand 
orientation and expects the regional divisions to assess the 
overarching security aspects (Int 2; Int 3), the staff members  
in the regional divisions underline the need for coordinating 
content matter or for embedding the projects to a greater 
degree in the priority areas of the respective country (through 
active networking, use of potential synergies) (Int 6; Int 8;  
Int 23). Since the procedural guidelines and responsibilities  
of the regional divisions in this coordination process are  
not transparent, and the regional desk officers are indeed 
sometimes unaware of them (Int 6; Int 7; Int 8), this process  
is sometimes extremely time-consuming. Nor is the added 
value of the second review step by BMZ’s Division 114 entirely 
clear. It is more a formal step in the process, since any 
discrepancies in terms of content will already have been 
clarified at this point. It should not therefore be necessary  
for BMZ to conduct another appraisal. 
Management information bulletin for project selection
Since 2016, BMZ’s Division 114 has been using a management 
information bulletin (Doc 2; Int 2; Int 9; Int 15; Int 19) to reach 
agreement with BMZ’s management on project applications  
for the develoPPP.de programme. This bulletin informs  
the management level about all project proposals eligible  
for support in the given quarter and of newly commenced 
projects. BMZ’s management uses the bulletin on the one 
hand to meet the detailed information requirements of 
members of the German Bundestag (German Federal 
Parliament) (Int 2; Int 3). It informs members of parliament 
directly about new projects that have been initiated in  
their constituency. At the same time, it involves the BMZ 
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management level directly in the selection process, although 
this in fact primarily comes under the implementing 
organisations’ responsibility for implementation according  
to the programme guidelines (Doc 11). The implementing 
organisations can only send out rejections or approvals after 
they have been notified of the decision by BMZ’s management 
level (Doc 2). This delays programme implementation (Int 2;  
Int 9; Int 15; Int 19), increases the required staff capacities (Int 9, 
Int 15) and cancels out previous simplifications, such as shorter 
reporting intervals (Int 2). Although the programme guidelines 
make explicit reference to possible coordination with BMZ, 
neither the expert consultations nor an analysis of the 
management information bulletin provided any verifiable 
justification or indication of the added value of involving 
BMZ’s management level in the selection decision. 
Individual agreements on multiple funding 
Although the programme has been running for 15 years, BMZ’s 
programme framework does not contain clear instructions on 
how to address key elements of project selection. This increases 
the number of individual agreements and results in a heavy 
workload (Int 2; Int 3; Int 9; Int 14; Int 18). Such agreements 
concern the application of company criteria, but especially 
multiple funding. Although the programme guidelines state 
that multiple funding is ‘not desirable’, it is possible, pending 
approval by BMZ on a case by-case basis (see Doc 11: page 5). 
The lack of instructions on action to be taken appears to be 
due above all to information deficits at BMZ, since no robust 
data are available on the effects of multiple funding on project 
success, nor on its compliance with European State aid law. 
The assessment of a random sample taken from the develoPPP.
de Cloud suggests that a large number of the projects involve 
multiple cooperation arrangements. Some companies or their 
subsidiaries have been supported more than 10 times since 
1999. A ban on this would presumably lead to a sharp reduction 
in the number of projects eligible for support. The findings  
of the case studies show that the implementing organisations 
consider the negotiation process at such projects to be easier 
and less problematic (CS 1; CS 2; CS 3; CS 5). ‘The actors are 
already known in the lead-up to the project, which makes for 
very trusting and constructive cooperation’ (CS 5). Multiple 
32 Corresponds to Article 87 Section 1 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, now the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which was in force up to 2009.
33 In specific, exceptional, cases the European Commission can approve subsidies (although this involves a lengthy process). The de minimis regulation was introduced to simplify this process.  
This rules that subsidies below a specified minimum level can be awarded without notification to or clearance by the European Commission. This applies to aid that is provided by a  
Member State or through State resources to individual companies and does not exceed the current ceiling of EUR 200,000 within the present calendar year and the last two calendar years.
funding can indeed generate positive projects and boost 
efficiency during cooperation. The findings do not generally 
speak against approving project applications from companies 
that have already received support. In addition to this content-
related component, the subject of multiple funding also needs 
to be examined in light of European State aid law. This bans  
the provision of aid ‘in any form whatsoever which distorts or 
threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings 
or the production of certain goods ... in so far that it affects 
trade between Member States’ (Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union, Article 107 para. 132).33 It has not yet  
been clarified whether this applies to multiple funding. This 
lack of clarity prevents a relevant decision from being taken. 
Addressing the legal aspects of compliance with European 
State aid law exceeds the scope of this evaluation. The legal 
expert opinions drawn up so far do not appear to offer BMZ  
the necessary information base to take a clear position for or 
against the implementation of multiple funding (Int 3). 
2.3.3 M&E systems of the develoPPP.de programme 
This section analyses whether the M&E systems support BMZ 
and/or the implementing organisations in performing their 
role of monitoring and steering the activities at programme 
and portfolio level. It also examines how the monitoring 
systems at project level provide the information required  
to help make individual develoPPP.de projects successful. 
M&E systems at programme and portfolio level
The monitoring system at programme level is based on two 
instruments; develoPPP.de's annual reports and the executive 
summaries of the final project reports (Int 2; Int 3). Staff at 
BMZ and the implementing organisations highlight the 
substantial added value of the develoPPP.de Cloud both for 
drawing up the annual reports and for everyday work processes. 
Since 2013, the content of the annual reports has been based 
on a standard report template and focuses exclusively on 
output level (e.g. number of projects carried out in specific 
sectors) (Doc 12; Int 3). Impacts are only highlighted using 
exemplary best case scenarios (Doc 12). Programme staff  
at BMZ, among others, criticise the low informative value of 
the annual reports (Int 2; Int 3; Int 12). A review of the one-  
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to two-page summary reports on projects that are collected 
and submitted once a year to BMZ’s Division 114 shows  
that the quality of the content matter is often insufficient for 
judging the success of the project, and project results are  
often presented too positively. The large number of projects 
completed each year (about 100) also makes it impossible  
for the responsible BMZ staff at portfolio level, much less at 
programme level, to make an overall assessment. Neither  
the annual reports nor the summary reports enable BMZ to 
assess the achievement of objectives by develoPPP.de projects, 
or the results at outcome or impact level. The monitoring 
systems at programme level are therefore largely rated 
‘inappropriate’. There are signs of serious attempts on the  
part of the stakeholders to make improvements in this  
area, though. Apart from the develoPPP.de Cloud, particular 
mention should be made of the recruitment of an M&E  
officer by the Sector Project, and of theme-related meetings 
between BMZ and the implementing organisations, and 
sectoral conferences on this subject. 
From 2009 to 2012, additional external ex-post appraisals  
of a total of 89 develoPPP.de projects were performed in  
33 countries (Doc 17), and selected strategic development 
partnerships with the private sector were appraised (Doc 20). 
This can generally be considered positive. However, the focus 
on successful projects that can be used for PR and the quality 
of the scientific approach greatly restrict the usefulness  
of these assessments (Doc 17; Doc 20). The only evaluation of 
the develoPPP.de programme published to date was carried  
out in 2002 (Altenburg & Chahoud, 2002). Another study by 
Binder et al. (2007) on the develoPPP.de programme was  
only published in excerpts. The evaluation instruments used  
so far are therefore rated as ‘rather inappropriate’. 
Altogether it must be stated that the present M&E systems  
do not permit an assessment regarding the achievement of 
objectives or results either at portfolio or programme level. 
BMZ’s Division 114 and the implementing organisations can 
therefore only perform their overarching role of monitoring 
project content at portfolio level to a very limited extent. 
Steering (and decisions concerning the continuation of the 
programme) are based on inadequate information.
M&E system at project level
Monitoring systems across the programme and portfolio use 
the monitoring information provided by individual develoPPP.
de projects, which is collected in mid-term reports, progress 
reports and final reports. Analysis of the case study reports 
shows that the project objectives are often multidimensional. 
Although the case studies rate most of the project indicators 
as SMART (specific, measurable, assignable, realistic, time-
bound), they only partially measure the results to which they 
are attributed. The achievement of objectives is frequently 
only assessed at the level of individual project activities, not 
for the project as a whole. There are also differences in the 
assessment systems of the implementing organisations. All 
three implementing organisations clearly focus on indicators 
at input and output level. Indicators at the outcome level  
are seldom used, and indicators at impact level are hardly  
ever used. This explains why the monitoring instruments  
at portfolio and programme level do not extend beyond the 
output level. Many mid-term and final reports point to 
insufficient documentation of the fulfilment of indicators,  
and thus of the achievement of results and objectives. Both 
the content analysis and the ex-post evaluations (Doc 17,  
Doc 18; Doc 19; Doc 20) suggest that the anticipated results 
formulated in the final reports, in particular, are presumed to 
have been achieved rather than being substantiated by facts, 
and that potentials are described rather than the results that 
were actually generated. This poses a risk of misrepresenting 
the degree to which project objectives are achieved. 
Differences between the implementing organisations are 
apparent as regards project monitoring. This is usually done 
based on the mid-term and final reports by the implementing 
organisations’ project manager. The reports are underpinned 
by evidence such as lists of participants. However, the case 
studies show that this evidence often does not have to be 
provided for all of a project’s indicators. Frequently, they remain 
at output level, and the project managers find it hard to trace 
them back. Some project staff clearly stated that it ‘is very 
difficult to get a handle on project progress based on the 
reports alone’ (Int 30). Project visits allow a better assessment 
of project outcomes and impacts, but only DEG systematically 
visits the majority of projects. The case studies show that  
the focus of these visits is more on examining whether funds 
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are being correctly used than to appraise results. There is  
no systematic assessment of whether project objectives are 
achieved. No differences are apparent in the detail with which 
DEG’s traditional and strategic development partnerships with 
the private sector are appraised. GIZ makes project visits as 
part of the overall implementation of projects under Strategic 
Alliances and cooperation agreements. However, these 
missions tend to focus rather on joint tasks related to project 
implementation. GIZ commissions additional mid-term 
reviews to be carried out at Strategic Alliances. The case 
studies show that these reviews were only carried out at  
two of three Alliances visited (CS 4; CS 12) and that only one  
of them is of the required quality to provide information for 
improving the project (CS 4). In general, DEval gives a positive 
rating with regard to project visits and mid-term reviews. 
However, the way in which they are implemented is only 
partially appropriate. 
This is also confirmed by the case studies. In six of the 12 
projects, the implementing organisations lack the ability to 
assess project success based on the systems used so far  
(CS 2; CS 3; CS 5; CS 7; CS 8; CS 11). The option of reorienting 
activities in order to achieve objectives is limited due to 
information deficits. No systematic differences are apparent 
either between the monitoring systems used by the 
implementing organisations and the forms of development 
partnership with the private sector, or as regards the quality  
of indicators and reports. 
Programme staff confirm the challenges described as regards 
the programme and project monitoring systems (Int 2; Int 3;  
Int 9; Int 11; Int 12; Int 18; Int 19; Int 20). ‘That [the M&E system] 
is a really sore spot in programme implementation’ (Int 2),  
as one staff member put it. This aspect was already criticised  
in previous ex-post evaluations (Doc 17; Doc 20). At the same 
time, project staff note that both specific partner constellations 
and the modest project sums (at least for traditional projects) 
have to be taken into account when designing monitoring 
activities. In this context, the surveys and case studies 
(CS 10; CS 11) show that the majority of companies and 
consultants (Int 42) rate the reporting system and the related 
cooperation with implementing organisations as ‘relatively 
uncomplicated’. However, 10 companies in the company survey 
rated monitoring and especially auditing as ‘rather time-
consuming’. On the whole, companies show understanding  
for the need to have M&E systems that provide robust 
information. 
Summing up, it can be said that the monitoring systems used 
by the implementing organisations at project level are strongly 
based on trust. They sometimes lead to information deficits  
at the implementing organisations and are not adequate for 
verifying the projects’ development activities and results, and 
for safeguarding these in the final analysis. They also offer little 
scope for enabling BMZ and the implementing organisations 
to learn from experience. Only the systematic assessment  
of lessons learned makes it possible to judge what forms of 
project are successful, and in which areas private partners  
can make the best contributions. As well as having good M&E 
data, this presupposes the willingness to report on negative 
experiences with cooperation and to exchange views. This 
applies both to the exchange of experience between public and 
private partners and to exchanges between the implementing 
organisations and BMZ. Carrying out innovative projects  
also means testing new methods that may prove unsuitable. 
The develoPPP.de programme should also keep an open mind 
as regards possible failures or partial failures (Doc 15; Doc 20). 
The documented Lessons Learned for project managers  
(Doc 22) and the develoPPP.de sectoral conferences offer positive 
approaches in this regard. Beyond these, neither project 
reporting nor systematic assessment and exchange platforms 
appear to actively support this kind of experiential learning. 
Binder et al. (2007) also pointed out in 2007 that this wastes 
development opportunities. Similar findings relate to 
comparable international programmes (Binder et al., 2007; 
ICAI, 2014; IOB, 2014; Johansson de Silva et al., 2015).
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2.3.4 Key findings
 • BMZ’s instruments for steering the develoPPP.de 
programme are not sufficiently used to further define 
the objectives and policy framework of the programme, 
as formulated in the develoPPP.de guidelines. In particular, 
insufficient use is made of the offers for implementation 
of the programme by DEG and GIZ, and applications  
for approval from sequa. 
 • The develoPPP.de team meetings are highlighted  
as an instrument for the rapid and uncomplicated 
establishment of the policy framework.
 • The meticulous nature of the steering processes used  
to select projects, as well as their unclear rules and 
workflows, makes them relatively complex and resource-
intensive. While the two-step coordination process can 
generally be considered expedient, there is still room for 
improvement as regards coordination with the regional 
divisions and the number of appraisal steps. 
 • BMZ’s management information bulletin appears 
suitable for covering the management level’s information 
requirements. However, it is not apparent that this 
resource-intensive coordination with the management 
level of all projects eligible for support offers any  
added value for the develoPPP.de programme.
 • Individual agreements regarding the unclarified 
question of multiple funding increase the need for 
coordination and slow down the selection procedure.  
It has not been possible so far to make a decision 
regarding multiple funding due to information deficits  
at BMZ. The evaluation findings do not speak against 
approving project applications from companies that 
have already received support. Addressing the legal 
aspects of compliance with European State aid law 
exceeds the scope of this evaluation. 
 • The M&E systems at programme and portfolio level  
are not considered appropriate because they do not 
permit either BMZ or the implementing organisations  
to assess the develoPPP.de programme or portfolio in 
terms of the achievement of objectives or effectiveness. 
BMZ can therefore only use them to a very limited 
extent for monitoring and steering purposes. 
 • This is due to deficiencies in the monitoring systems  
of the implementing organisations at project level. The 
findings confirm that the project monitoring systems  
are not adequate for verifying the projects’ development 
activities and results, or for safeguarding these in the 
final analysis. De facto, the monitoring systems are 
strongly based on trust and may lead to information 
deficits at the implementing organisations.
2.4
Implementation of the develoPPP.de programme 
by DEG, GIZ and sequa 
This section provides findings that address evaluation question 
3. Which conceptual and procedural changes could be used  
to adjust the processes for implementing the develoPPP.de 
portfolio of DEG, GIZ and sequa? It follows the programme’s 
implementation stages and successively analyses PR and 
acquisition (Section 2.4.1), the application and selection 
process, the design process and project implementation 
(Section 2.4.2). The findings are summarised in Section 2.4.3 
and efficiency is rated in line with the OECD-DAC criteria.
2.4.1 PR and acquisition by BMZ and the implementing 
organisations
In the following section we identify the degree to which  
the develoPPP.de programme is known, the demand for the 
programme, and the implications for partner acquisition  
and PR activities. We then discuss the potential of additional 
advisory services during the application phase. 
Extent to which develoPPP.de programme is known and  
demand for the programme
Demand on the part of companies is closely related to the level 
of awareness of the programme (Int 2; Int 3). No representative 
data are available on the extent to which German or European 
businesses are familiar with the develoPPP.de programme. 
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Most of the experts interviewed, including BMZ programme 
staff (Int 2; Int 3), representatives of business associations  
and consultants, rate the degree to which the programme  
is known among German businesses as rather low (Int 34;  
Int 35; Int 42; Int 44). The company survey confirms this rating. 
As one entrepreneur underlines: ‘... it would be good to expand 
the instrument and advertise it more widely. At present you 
only come across the programme if you explicitly search for it’ 
(Int 46). Programme staff at GIZ and DEG (Doc 9; Int 14) and 
an online survey in 2014 (Doc 21) come to a different conclusion. 
They establish that the programme is relatively well-known 
compared with other BMZ programmes for cooperation with 
the private sector. Altogether, the findings reveal an ambivalent 
picture, but suggest that the programme is not yet widely known.
At the same time, there are indications of certain constraints 
regarding demand for the develoPPP.de programme. Both 
experts and the surveyed consultants underline that the 
programme is only of interest for some German and European 
companies (Int 22; Int 42). For instance, the programme is of 
limited interest for many medium-sized companies – one of 
the programme’s key target groups according to the develoPPP.de 
communication strategy (Doc 10) – because risky investments 
in developing countries are not very attractive for many 
medium-sized enterprises (Int 22). One must ask how large  
the actual target group of the develoPPP.de programme really 
is, and the extent to which the market is already saturated.  
The number of develoPPP.de applications has been constant 
since 2009. The large number of multiple funding arrangements 
and corresponding statements on similar programmes in  
other countries (DEVFIN Advisers, 2014; Triodos Facet BV, 2010) 
support the assumption that the programme is only attractive 
for a portion of European companies, and that the German 
market, at least, may be somewhat saturated now that the 
programme has been operating for more than 15 years.  
Beyond the superficial segmentation of target groups in  
the communication strategy, the companies of relevance  
for the programme have not been classified so far. This makes  
it difficult to assess this aspect. To make the programme 
interesting for a larger number of companies and expand  
its reach, companies and business associations propose that 
support be provided to a higher proportion of companies. 
Some project staff take a critical view of this proposal (Int 12; 
Int 15; Int 20), because you ‘can lead a horse [i.e. a company]  
to water but you can’t make it drink’ (Int 12). 
The findings make it clear that it is not enough to publicise  
the programme on a broad scale in order to tap the full market 
potential of the develoPPP.de programme. Firstly, the programme’s 
market potential should be assessed and the companies for 
which the programme is of interest should be clarified. PR work 
and acquisition activities can only be efficiently adjusted once 
this information is obtained. 
Cross-programme PR work and acquisition
PR and acquisition are key mechanisms for increasing  
the number of applications. Acquisition is handled by the 
implementing organisations and involves encouraging 
companies to apply to the programme. As part of the Sector 
Project Private Sector Cooperation, PR activities come  
under the direct remit of BMZ and are intended to support  
the implementing organisations with acquisition (Int 13).
The company survey, literature analysis and expert interviews 
clearly show that the majority of companies become aware  
of the programme via the existing contacts and networks of 
the implementing organisations (Int 1; Int 3; Int 18). GIZ makes 
particular use of its field structure (CS 12; Int 11) and even tasks 
staff members in some countries with handling acquisition  
(Int 28). DEG uses direct customer contacts with companies from 
other business segments (Int 14) and to German Chambers  
of Industry and Commerce (AHKs) (Int 15). For sequa, both its 
own programmes such as the Import Promotion Desk (IPD) 
and chambers, associations and AHKs play a key role in 
initiating contacts (Int 1; Int 19). The possibility of acquiring 
projects via the decentralised systems of the three implementing 
organisations represents major added value for the programme. 
Proactive acquisition measures by the implementing 
organisations, such as trade fair visits and informative events, 
on the other hand, rarely lead to project applications. With 
regard to consultants (i.e. external service providers who acquire 
companies for the develoPPP.de programme and support them 
in designing and implementing projects), on the other hand, 
acquisition appears to work especially well via trade fair visits 
(Int 34; Int 42). This points to a certain degree of advertising 
potential via such measures, which the implementing 
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organisations make limited use of to date. BMZ and the 
implementing organisations appear to have no shared 
understanding of the extent to which proactive acquisition 
measures, such as directly approaching companies in specific 
sectors, are worthwhile or permissible (Doc 4; Int 2; Int 18), 
although this is standard practice for GIZ via staff at its 
country offices, for instance (Int 28). Given the tensions that 
exist between the programme’s demand orientation and its 
development effectiveness, which were outlined earlier on,  
a clear acquisition strategy would appear essential in order  
to enhance the usefulness of acquisition measures.
Staff at BMZ and the implementing organisations, as well as 
business associations, rate the PR support, especially via the 
provided PR materials, as good to satisfactory (Int 2; Int 11;  
Int 13; Int 14; Int 20). The failure to adapt the materials to the 
needs of the individual implementing organisations is criticised 
in some quarters (Int 18; Int 19). The materials contain very  
few messages for specific target groups, e.g. family-run medium-
sized enterprises34. Most of the key objectives laid down in the 
communication strategy, such as making the programme more 
widely known, are not backed by indicators and are therefore 
not monitored. This makes it difficult to judge how successful 
PR work has been so far. The higher than expected click-through 
and download rates on the develoPPP.de web page suggest 
that PR has a positive influence on familiarity with the 
programme as a whole. However, companies and representatives 
of the organised business community say it has not been 
possible so far to position the develoPPP.de programme 
transparently on the market (Int 34; Int 35; Int 39; Int 42;  
Int 44). The following quote by an entrepreneur bears this out: 
‘The plethora of support options is too big to handle. 
Companies have no knowledge of the support programmes 
that exist. That’s because there are no suitable information 
channels to publicise them.’ These tasks cannot be handled 
using only the PR capacities available to the develoPPP.de 
programme, which correspond to less than 1 % of overall 
programme funds. This is a cross-sectoral challenge that faces 
all of BMZ’s support programmes, as well as those of other 
ministries. By setting up the new Agency for Business and 
Economic Development (AWE) in April 2016, BMZ created  
a key point of contact for companies that want to become 
34 Neither the develoPPP.de brochure, the develoPPP.de booklet nor the develoPPP.de website make explicit reference to this target group.
35 In the DC Scout Programme, DC scouts advise German companies on global engagement for sustainable business. DC scouts are seconded to business associations, country associations,  
chambers of industry and commerce and chambers of skilled crafts as contacts for all matters related to development cooperation.
involved in developing countries and emerging economies.  
The Agency is designed as an interface between development 
cooperation and the private sector, and intended to pool 
information on the existing instruments of German DC for 
cooperation with the private sector. However, it is obvious  
that the programme staff are not yet clear about the role that 
BMZ’s management level has assigned to the Agency for 
Business and Economic Development. They fear that involving 
AWE will increase the amount of bureaucracy without creating 
true added value for the programme (Int 2; Int 14). 
The DC Scout Programme35 is also intended to increase the 
transparency of BMZ’s support programmes and specifically 
acquire companies, also for the develoPPP.de programme.  
The 2014 Annual Report highlights some positive aspects of 
the DC Scout Programme (Doc 13) and the DC scout evaluation 
shows that develoPPP.de is the programme most frequently 
advertised by the DC scouts (Doc 14). Many programme staff 
members, though, believe that the DC scouts have had little 
success in acquiring projects so far (Int 2; Int 3; Int 14). The 
case studies and company survey do not explicitly mention  
DC scouts even once. Owing to a lack of available data on  
the acquisition channels (see also Doc 14; Int 13), no robust 
statements can be made on the number of projects generated 
through the work of the DC scouts. In all, the findings suggest 
that DC scouts have had little influence so far on project 
acquisition. 
Advisory services during the application phase
Staff at BMZ and the implementing organisations as well as 
other experts highlight the need to provide greater support 
during the application phase, especially for small companies 
(Int 2; Int 22; Int 41) and projects in LDCs (Int 4; Int 41)  
(Int 2; Int 3; Int 4; Int 11; Int 18; Int 22). Thought is currently 
being given to involving consultants, i.e. external service 
providers, to a greater extent in project acquisition (Int 3;  
Int 16) and in providing support with submitting applications 
(Doc 1; Int 2; Int 3; Int 16). The proportion of projects acquired 
for the programme by consultants has not been documented 
at a higher level so far. Statements by programme officers  
and consultants indicate that this proportion lies somewhere 
between 10 and 20 % (Doc 13; CS 7; CS 9; Int 2; Int 17; Int 42). 
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This shows that consultants are highly relevant for acquiring 
projects for the programme. The quality of these projects, on the 
other hand, receives an ambivalent rating from programme 
staff, both in the company survey and the case studies (Int 2; 
Int 16, Int 17). Besides some good examples, some ‘consultant-
driven projects should be handled with caution’ (Int 17)  
since the consultants’ expectations do not always match the 
specifications of the develoPPP.de programme. What is more, 
the ‘farming out’ of key aspects of cooperation, such as aspects 
of communication regarding reports, appears to run counter  
to the programme’s concept of partnership and may lead to 
companies devoting less attention to the programme. The 
programme guidelines spell out that it is the task of the 
implementing organisations to ensure that projects are aligned 
with development policy, using their own core expertise  
(Doc 11). Farming out these tasks to consultants deserves critical 
attention. Finally, it must be asked whether the services of 
consultants, which eat up between 7 and 12 % of the funding 
(Int 42) can be considered more efficient than the provision  
of similar services by the implementing organisations. While 
consultants may well represent added value in terms of 
acquisition, the support they provide during the application 
phase and during the programme is rated rather critically. The 
findings suggest that additional advisory services and support 
during project implementation should be provided by the 
implementing organisations. They also indicate that thought 
should be given to greater involvement of the DC scouts  
and possibly AWE in providing advisory services (Int 2; Int 18). 
2.4.2 Selection, design and implementation of  
develoPPP.de projects
We will now examine the key implementation stages of 
develoPPP.de projects. Alongside the application and selection 
processes, we will examine the design process and project 
implementation.
Application and selection procedure 
The develoPPP.de programme has a systematic application 
procedure that takes a different form for traditional and 
strategic projects. A joint internet portal was set up in 2009  
to provide information to companies. However, companies 
continue to apply directly to one of the three implementing 
organisations. 
Companies can apply in one of the four ideas competitions 
each year to carry out traditional projects with DEG, GIZ and 
sequa. Overall, programme staff at BMZ and the implementing 
organisations rate the ideas competitions positively as a form 
of selection procedure (Int 2; Int 3; Int 14; Int 18). They are 
suitable for ensuring equal access by German and European 
companies, which averts the risk of distorting competition. 
While the ideas competitions offer equal access to all companies, 
the relatively low number of good project applications in relation 
to resources contradicts the basic idea of the competition.  
In the final analysis, all projects that meet the minimum criteria 
are supported (Int 1; Int 3; Int 17; Int 20). Limited demand 
restricts scope for selecting the best projects from a large 
number of high-quality applications. Owing to the constraints 
in selecting the best applications, the procedure is only rated 
as ‘partially appropriate’. 
Throughout the year, companies apply for strategic 
development partnerships with DEG and GIZ. How these 
applications are initiated is less clear than in the case of  
the ideas competitions. Projects often arise from existing 
programmes or contacts; some of them are proactively 
initiated by the implementing organisations, as shown by case 
studies and the company survey (CS 3; CS 6; CS 11; CS 12). 
There are no reservations in terms of competition because 
GIZ’s Strategic Alliances are carried out on the basis of 
cooperation agreements, and DEG’s Strategic Projects are 
examined by legal experts with regard to their compliance  
with competition law (Int 14). Since strategic development 
partnerships with the private sector call for a more intensive 
exchange between the implementing organisations and 
companies during the application phase, it makes sense to use  
a more flexible procedure than with the ideas competitions. 
Given that the additional criteria for strategic development 
partnerships with the private sector are frequently not met, 
the lack of transparency in the business initiation processes  
is seen as a deficiency. The application procedure is therefore 
only rated ‘partially appropriate’. 
Development of the project design by implementing organisations 
and companies
Companies jointly elaborate their declarations of interest  
with the implementing organisations during the design phase. 
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Here, we examine whether they succeed in devising high-
quality project designs and developing a joint understanding 
of the project’s objectives. 
The project designs usually give a good and verifiable overview 
of the project context, project objectives and corresponding 
measures. This can be seen from the designs reviewed during 
the case studies. Most of the attached plans of operation are 
also easily verifiable. However, the designs of six of the 12 case 
studies still show major deficiencies (CS 1; CS 4; CS 5; CS 8;  
CS 9; CS 11). Some of the intended results and causal links are 
not apparent or are based on overly optimistic assumptions 
and ambitious packages of measures (see Box 7). Phasing-out 
or exit scenarios are only very briefly outlined. Similar 
deficiencies were highlighted in previous evaluations and 
studies (Altenburg & Chahoud, 2002; Doc 17; Doc 20).
Expert interviews and process documents show that the 
project design, indicators and plan of operations are devised 
using similar procedures at DEG, GIZ and sequa (Int 9; Int 14; 
Int 19). Analysis of the project designs shows that the processes 
used so far make it possible to anchor development objectives  
in the designs. Conflicts with divergent corporate interests and 
the resulting risks are not adequately disclosed, however.  
The project designs are therefore too optimistically designed.
Box 7: Project example of challenges during  
the design phase
According to its design, the project was intended to 
minimise the risk of poverty for low-income population 
groups by developing and disseminating a financial 
product. The experience gained by the project was also  
to be shared with other companies in this sector. The 
overlaps between corporate and development-policy 
interests were clearly identified in the design, but 
potentially diverging interests were not explicitly 
addressed. 
During a field visit, it became clear that the development 
objectives described during the project design had been 
too optimistically formulated. Owing to market risks and 
the rather low overall demand from solvent clients, the 
company finally decided to disseminate a product with the 
highest added value for the company, not the one with  
the highest added value in terms of development policy. 
The relevance to the target groups described in the project 
design remained limited because the product that was 
finally developed did little to cover their needs for protection 
against the risks of poverty. It also became clear that 
planned activities to disseminate business know-how to 
other companies with global operations were not carried 
out because this was not in the company’s business 
interest. 
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The case studies make clear that it is often not possible to 
develop a joint understanding of project objectives among all 
project partners, beyond the written project design (CS 1; CS 4; 
CS 5; CS 9; CS 10). This aspect is extremely critical because 
expert consultations, analysis of the literature and case studies 
consider this as the key success factor for achieving the project’s 
development objectives. If development objectives and company 
objectives diverge, priority is mainly placed on the business 
objectives  (Int 9; Int 19; Int 37; Pfisterer et al., 2014). The local 
implementing partners in particular are often not aware of  
the development objectives, or accord them lower priority (CS 2; 
CS 3; CS 4; CS 5; CS 7; CS 8; CS 11; CS 12). The implementing 
organisations’ design processes do not envisage any systematic 
involvement of the local partners in the design process; it is up 
to the European company to involve the local partner company 
in the negotiation process. This has been done to an insufficient 
degree to date. The European companies are generally well 
involved, though. In the three cases where no consensus could 
be reached, there are deviations from the standard processes 
because neither the project design nor the indicators were 
jointly devised to any significant degree (CS 6; CS 7; CS 11). The 
companies underline that they would like the design phase to 
be handled swiftly. The company survey and case studies show 
that this is achieved to a large degree. The effort involved for 
companies in designing the project should be kept to a minimum. 
This can only be done if the design phase is sufficient for 
addressing the challenges described above. The design processes 
used so far are rated only partially appropriate for meeting this 
requirement. The processes should therefore be expanded in 
some cases. 
The way in which the design process is elaborated, e.g. the type 
and frequency of communication, varies less between the 
implementing organisations DEG, GIZ and sequa than between 
the responsible project managers. GIZ carries out additional 
internal consultation processes with sectoral divisions and 
country offices. One aim of these processes is to link measures 
up with existing bilateral programmes. The design phase is 
therefore often more time-consuming and demanding, a fact 
that some companies explicitly criticised. It also becomes clear 
that the higher conceptual demands to be met by strategic 
development partnerships with the private sector are reflected 
to a very limited degree in the project designs. Both the 
content analysis and the case studies confirm this. The higher 
expectations in terms of the broad-based impact and structure-
building results of Strategic Projects and Strategic Alliances are 
due to the higher funding level and in part because the projects 
are carried out in several countries. Special content-related 
approaches play a lesser role here. GIZ’s Strategic Alliances are 
also geared more strongly to the meso/macro level through 
activities to disseminate lessons learned at institutional level 
and multi-stakeholder approaches. 
Project implementation by companies 
Companies are responsible for implementing develoPPP.de 
projects. Case studies, the company survey and expert 
interviews show that a local partner or local subsidiary is often 
responsible for key aspects of project implementation on site, 
and not the European company. The local company/subsidiary 
is therefore of crucial importance for the quality of project 
implementation (Doc 4; CS 8; CS 10; Int 9; Int 16; Int 17; Int 18; 
Int 19; Int 20). The case studies rate project implementation  
by the companies as professional for the most part (CS 1; CS 2; 
CS 3; CS 4; CS 5; CS 7; CS 8; CS 9; CS 10; CS 11). Although the 
coordination and agreement between the European and the 
local company, or within the project team, could be improved 
in some cases (CS 2; CS 5; CS 8), overall both the European and 
local partners usually have appropriate financial and human 
resources to implement the develoPPP.de project in a professional 
manner. Only in two cases are the project management 
capacities of the implementing companies questioned to some 
extent (CS 6) or to a large extent (CS 12). Overall, the quality  
of project implementation by the companies is rated as rather 
high. However, project implementation confirms what was 
indicated in the design phase: where company and development-
policy objectives diverge, priority is given to implementing 
business objectives. Since the implementing organisations 
exert relatively little influence on project implementation, with 
the exception of projects based on cooperation agreements, 
there is an obvious need to improve the processes used to 
develop the project design. Further developing the projects’ 
M&E systems would also appear essential (see Section 2.3.3).
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In projects based on cooperation agreements, companies 
receive support from GIZ in carrying out the projects.  
GIZ’s contribution may be made either in the form of services 
or in kind. The type, mode and extent of support vary from 
project to project36. Companies highlight collaboration on 
cooperation projects as especially positive. The case studies 
also show that a lack of clarity concerning the responsibilities 
of implementing organisations and companies may lead to a 
disproportionate level of steering effort at the companies  
(CS 3; CS 4). The implementing organisations do not always 
succeed in involving field structures to an adequate degree  
36 Whereas in one project, the GIZ manager who handles coordination is based at GIZ Head Office in Eschborn and only plays an overarching coordination role (CS 3; CS 4), in another project,  
the GIZ staff member is located in the project country and also plays an active role in the everyday business and implementation of the project (CS 12).
in designing and implementing development partnerships  
with the private sector. While DEG and sequa have very limited 
field structures, or none at all, GIZ has the greatest potential  
in this respect based on its core expertise. However, the case 
studies make clear that the networking of develoPPP.de projects 
and the field structure varies greatly from one country 
programme to another. Statements by GIZ staff members 
indicate that this may have to do with the country offices’ 
affinity with the programme (CS 8; Int 9; Int 28). Countries  
in which traditional DC business is declining have higher 
incentives in this respect (Int 9). 
2.4.3 Key findings and assessment of efficiency in line with OECD-DAC
 • The develoPPP.de programme is not widely known 
among companies. However, publicising the programme 
on a broad scale would probably not be enough to 
increase the number of applications. Expedient 
adjustments to PR work and acquisition measures can 
only be made by assessing the market potential and 
precisely segmenting the corporate target groups. This 
applies in particular to medium-sized companies, which 
is precisely the group the programme wants to address.
 • The possibility of acquiring projects via the implementing 
organisations’ wide array of decentralised networks is  
one of the major advantages of the programme’s tripartite 
structure. So far the implementing organisations have  
no programme-wide acquisition strategy, though this 
would appear essential given the tensions between the 
programme’s demand orientation and development 
effectiveness. DC scouts have little influence on project 
acquisition.
 • Apparently it has not been possible so far to position 
the develoPPP.de programme transparently on the market. 
The creation of the new Agency for Business and 
Economic Development might remedy this situation, 
but it may also increase bureaucracy.
 • Consultants may well provide added value in the 
acquisition context. However, their further provision  
of support during the application phase and during 
project implementation is viewed critically. It would  
be better for the implementing organisations to provide 
such additional advisory services in the application 
phase and support during project implementation.
 • Ideas competitions are suitable for guaranteeing  
equal access by German and European companies.  
At the same time, limited demand restricts the  
way the ideas competition work in terms of selecting 
the best project ideas. The processes used to initiate 
strategic development partnerships with the private 
sector are not designed in an entirely verifiable manner.
 • The design processes are rated partially appropriate. 
The limited verifiability of the causal links, overly 
optimistic assumptions with regard to results and  
overly ambitious packages of measures deserve 
particular criticism. The shared and diverging interests  
of implementing organisations and companies, and  
the resulting risks, are often not handled transparently. 
 • A common understanding of both business and 
development objectives by all project partners is key to 
achieving project objectives. In practice, this common 
understanding is often lacking. Local and European 
project partners tend to give greater priority to the 
business objectives. 
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 • It is also clear that the higher conceptual demands to  
be met by strategic development partnerships with the 
private sector are reflected to a very small degree in  
the project designs. Both the content analysis and the 
case studies confirm this. The higher expectations to  
be met in terms of broad-based impact and structure-
building results are due more to the higher funding 
level. The concepts for Strategic Alliances are also geared 
more strongly to the meso/macro level through activities 
to disseminate lessons learned at institutional level and 
multi-stakeholder approaches. 
 • Project implementation by the responsible companies  
is rated as rather positive. Limiting factors are inadequate 
coordination between the European and the local company, 
and in isolated cases a lack of management capacities.
37 The OECD-DAC efficiency criterion is intended to allow a summary assessment of whether and to what extent the development measure has achieved the programme objectives cost-efficiently.  
A distinction is made between two results levels. To determine production efficiency, the resources used for the development measure are placed in relation to the services provided. To determine 
allocation efficiency (also termed impact efficiency), the resources and results that are placed in relation to each other (BMZ, 2006).
Assessment of efficiency in line with OECD-DAC:37 
The programme’s financial systems strongly restrict scope  
for assessing the programme’s efficiency. Bearing in mind  
the substantially limited data available, the programme’s 
average administrative costs for 2013 to 2015 are estimated  
to be at least 17.7 %. This means that they are high compared 
with similar programmes of other donors. Comparisons 
between the implementing organisations and forms of 
development partnership with the private sector cannot  
be made based on the available data. A final assessment  
of the efficiency of the develoPPP.de programme can only  
be made with reservations. So far it has not been possible  
to harness the substantive value of having the programme 
implemented by three organisations. At the same time,  
this reduces the possibility of exploiting economies of scale 
and increases administrative effort for the programme. The 
cost-efficiency of programme implementation is therefore 
rated as ‘rather inappropriate’.
2.5
Effectiveness
This section presents findings that answer evaluation  
question 4. To what extent and under which circumstances is 
the develoPPP.de programme effective in terms of promoting 
projects at the level of the directly involved local companies, 
public institutions and target groups, and at the level of 
European partner companies?
The reconstructed programme theory, and the related logic of 
develoPPP.de as a stimulus programme, are the starting point 
for assessing effectiveness. We begin by examining whether 
the projects achieve the objectives established in the design 
phase, i.e. provide a stimulus along the formulated causal 
pathways (Sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2). Section 2.5.3 examines 
whether there are changes in the attitudes and behaviours  
of the participating companies, in keeping with the guiding 
principle of sustainable development (cross-cutting pathway 
2). The key findings are then summarised and effectiveness  
is rated in line with the OECD-DAC criteria (Section 2.5.4).
2.5.1 Achievement of objectives by develoPPP.de projects  
in accordance with their design
The content analysis, company survey and case studies are 
used as a basis for assessing whether develoPPP.de projects 
achieve the objectives that were established in the design 
phase. The content analysis of 104 final reports suitable for 
evaluation shows that 96% of the completed projects (100 out 
of 104 projects) are considered to have ‘fulfilled’ their targets 
or ‘fulfilled [their targets] to a significant degree’. It should  
be borne in mind that this rating is based on the projects’ own 
reports. Only in one case is the target rated as ‘not fulfilled’. 
The company survey comes to a more critical conclusion: Here, 
26 of the 36 company representatives interviewed report that 
project objectives are only ‘fulfilled to a significant degree’. 
Since this assessment is not based on a representative sample, 
though, it cannot be transferred to all projects, unlike the 
content analysis.
The 12 case studies probably represent the most stringent  
form of appraisal. As well as an independent survey of project 
stakeholders, these studies also include a factual on-site 
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examination of whether objectives were achieved. This is 
therefore not solely based on self-assessment of the project 
indicators. Only half of the 12 projects fulfilled their objectives 
‘to a significant degree’. Although this finding cannot be 
generalised to all develoPPP.de projects (e.g. expressed as a 
percentage success rate), the very divergent assessments based 
on the different methods applied point to problems in the  
current reporting practice. Project reports tend to overestimate 
the projects’ actual effectiveness. In their contracts with the 
implementing organisations, the participating companies 
assume accountability for the use of funds and project success, 
and for reporting by means of self-reports and appropriate 
forms of evidence. They therefore bear a two-fold responsibility 
for implementing measures and monitoring success. The 
implementing organisations, in turn, are accountable to BMZ 
for the use of funds and the success of their product portfolios. 
Added to this, because of the programme’s demand orientation 
both BMZ and the implementing organisations have a 
(legitimate) interest in using effective PR measures to present 
the projects in a positive light in order to acquire further 
companies for develoPPP.de. This system therefore creates 
incentives for reports that highlight the success achieved 
rather than for critical status reports that are relevant for 
steering. The almost complete lack of external measures to 
verify the companies’ self-assessments and the challenges 
related to the M&E systems that are discussed in Section 2.3.3 
tend to encourage positive ratings.
Comparison between the achievement of development-policy  
and company objectives  
The develoPPP.de programme guidelines specify that projects 
should achieve development-policy and company objectives  
to largely the same degree. We will go on to examine whether 
this expectation is fulfilled.
The companies consider that the cooperation arrangements 
have largely provided the expected added value in terms of 
development. Two thirds of the 36 companies surveyed state 
that both development-policy and company objectives were 
38 Because of the low number of case studies and surveyed companies, the findings cannot be applied to the entire develoPPP.de programme in general. However, the criteria-based selection and 
in-depth examination of projects do make it plausible to apply the content of the findings to the programme in general. If we break the findings down further, e.g. to implementing organisation level 
or forms of development partnership, the number of cases is so low that the differences would need to be very clear in order to be transferrable. We therefore interpret any differences very cautiously. 
However, the fact that no major differences can be established between the different implementing organisations and types of contract using the given methods constitutes a finding in itself.
achieved. This points to a balanced response to company and 
development interests, from the perspective of the surveyed 
entrepreneurs. The case studies serve as a means of 
comparison. The company objectives are largely achieved in all 
12 case studies. By contrast, the achievement of development 
objectives is rated ‘successful’ in only six of the 12 cases (see 
Box 8). This discrepancy between the two ways of looking at 
the objectives achieved suggests that greater added value is 
generally leveraged for companies than for development 
policy, measured against the project design. This is due to the 
design process. The main focus when formulating project 
objectives is on development objectives, whereas company 
objectives are only implicitly contained in the activities and 
the outputs to be generated. As a rule, company objectives and 
DC objectives overlap at the projects. However, companies 
carrying out the projects do not subscribe to some of the 
development expectations and objectives because they are not 
in their key interests. The tensions that arise between 
divergent company and development interests are not 
disclosed, which means causal development assumptions are 
frequently too optimistic. We have already mentioned (see 
Section 2.4.2) the project partners’ failure in many cases to 
achieve a common understanding of the project during the 
design phase. The available findings corroborate this fact. It is 
true that the projects essentially achieve their outputs in line 
with the project design and manage to provide development 
impetus. However, if we break down the achievement of 
objectives into the dual structure (public sector/private 
sector), which is the assumption underlying each development 
partnership with the private sector, the achievement of DC 
objectives systematically decreases across the case studies.  
In absolute terms, this reduces the added value of development 
partnerships with the private sector, which are intended to 
serve development-policy and company interests in equal measure.
The case study and company survey findings do not point to 
any major differences in the projects’ achievement of 
objectives between the implementing organisations or 
between traditional and strategic development partnerships.38 
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Box 8: Example of a project where company and development-policy objectives are not equally achieved
The company involved in this project aimed to expand  
the market for its products. Since the products are more 
environment-friendly and safer to use in the workplace 
than common alternatives in the partner country, they  
can be considered to offer clear environmental and social 
added value. This is where the public interest comes in: 
the project is intended to raise the sector’s awareness of 
resource-saving production methods and occupational 
safety, and also achieve results that are not related to the 
product.
The project is based on the assumption that awareness-
raising workshops in the partner country can serve both 
company and development interests. The workshops  
are designed on the one hand to provide the sector with 
information on resource conservation and occupational 
safety independently of the product, and on the other  
to promote commercial solutions to these problems by 
means of product presentations. According to a further 
assumption, raising awareness in this way will disseminate 
more environmentally friendly and socially compatible 
production methods.
The on-site case study showed that the workshop 
organisers saw themselves as sales representatives and 
not as multipliers for occupational safety and resource 
conservation. It also transpired that the target groups 
were already informed about resource conservation and 
occupational safety. This questioned the key assumption 
of a lack of awareness in this sector, and with it the 
eligibility for support of awareness-raising measures. The 
workshops therefore served mainly to make a competitive 
product more widely known.
Influence of design and adherence to implementation plans  
on the achievement of objectives
In order to improve the achievement of project objectives,  
it is crucial to decide whether adjustments should be  
in the design phase, or only during implementation. This 
differentiation is discussed in the evaluation literature  
as ‘theory vs. implementation failure’ (Stame, 2010).
With regard to the design phase, we already established that 
while most of the indicators in the project designs are SMART, 
the project designs themselves often contain postulated  
causal links that are not verifiable, as well as overly optimistic 
contextual assumptions and overly ambitious packages of 
measures (see Section 2.3.3). The evaluation also reaches  
a positive assessment of the implementation of projects on  
the ground by the companies. These aspects are the first sign 
that problems in terms of achieving objectives are due more  
to conceptual weaknesses than to implementation problems 
on the part of companies.
The content analysis confirms this: the 106 randomly selected 
projects were examined in terms of their adherence to 
implementation plans, i.e. the extent to which projects were 
‘carried out as planned’ (Dusenbury, Brannigan, Falco, & 
Hansen, 2003) (see Table 2).
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Table 2: Adherence of develoPPP.de projects to implementation plans
Dimensions of adherence to implementation plans
Frequencies in %
(N = 106 final reports)
Yes No
1 Coverage of target group(s) according to plan? 63 37
2 Adherence to schedule? 41 59
3 Adherence to envisaged activity frequency? 66 34
4 Adherence to substantive objectives and/or activities? 58 42
5 Adherence to financial plan? 75 25
Source: authors’ own; dimensions 1 – 4 based on Carroll et al. (2007), dimension 5 was added by DEval
There are no significant differences between implementing 
organisations or forms of partnership as regards adherence to 
implementation plans (see Box 9). However, many changes are 
apparent across the board in terms of content and schedule. 
Around 60 % of the completed projects had to be adjusted 
during the evaluation period in terms of their schedule, and 
roughly 40 % in terms of their content (see Table 2). Successive 
companies take part in develoPPP.de and implement projects, 
but project design and planning is supervised by the three 
implementing organisations, which also bear sectoral 
responsibility for the projects vis-à-vis BMZ (Doc 11). The 
findings therefore indicate that the planning assumptions 
made during the design phase are sometimes too strong.
Box 9: Company size as a factor influencing project effectiveness
The case studies show that there are no differences 
between larger companies (i.e. those with an annual 
turnover greater than EUR 50 million) and smaller 
companies at the project design level. However, projects 
implemented by larger companies adhere more closely  
to implementation plans, i.e. they are more closely aligned 
with the project design. They also tend to fare better in 
terms of achieving the objectives outlined in the design. 
Of the twelve case studies, six of the eight projects that 
were implemented by larger companies were assessed as 
(rather) successful, whereas all four projects implemented 
by smaller companies were assessed as (rather) 
unsuccessful. This finding is supported in principle by  
the company survey. 
The literature evaluation provides a further breakdown  
of these findings. Context-specific factors such as the 
company size, international experience and whether the 
company is financially sound positively influence the 
project results to a certain degree, as does trust between 
the partners and their motivation level (DEVFIN Advisers, 
2014; Johansson de Silva et al., 2015; KPMG, 2012; Pfisterer 
et al., 2014).
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All in all, the findings of the case study and of the content 
analysis show that any deviations from plans during project 
implementation were primarily due to the fact that the 
assumptions made were too strong and to plans being unclear 
rather than to a lack of project management capacities within 
the companies themselves. Overall, the objectives laid down in 
project plans are assessed as rather too ambitious.
2.5.2 Contributions made by develoPPP.de projects  
to the programme results
Simply analysing the objectives achieved by the projects based 
on their design does not do sufficient justice to develoPPP.de’s 
programmatic character as a support mechanism. It is not 
enough to ask whether the programme implements projects 
that achieve their objectives. It is also important to examine 
whether the programme will achieve results that transcend 
individual projects. To this end, we will now take a look at the 
three causal pathways from the reconstructed programme 
theory (see Section 1.5).
Improvement or introduction of innovative products and services 
(causal pathway 1)
The ‘improvement or introduction of innovative products and 
services’ (causal pathway 1) is develoPPP.de’s key area of 
impact. A content analysis of a random sample of project 
documents shows that in 96 % of the projects examined, 
activities were implemented that help transfer private sector 
know-how and technologies to partner countries. This transfer 
falls under the definition of innovation as used in this 
evaluation (‘doing new things or doing things in a new way’) 
(Schumpeter, 1947; quoted in Stockmann, 2007: 54). The crucial 
factor when assessing innovations is that they are perceived to 
be better than previous ideas, practices or objectives  (Rogers, 
2003) – i.e. they offer a relative advantage (Box 10).
Box 10: Project example of successful innovation transfer
This project offers training and multiplier activities to 
smallholders to help them increase their productivity, 
taking into account social and environmental standards, 
and to improve their access to the export market. The 
innovative element here involves the introduction of new 
production methods via a comprehensive multiplier 
approach, together with high-quality, broad-based training 
measures.
The relative advantage offered by the innovation is evident 
in the fact that no comparable training courses are available 
in the project region. Furthermore, the production methods 
taught are very positively assessed by the smallholders on
 the whole. Although some participants are more critical  
of the content – the new methods are more labour-
intensive than traditional methods – any additional effort 
is offset by guaranteed sales and higher profits generated 
by crops produced in this way. What is more, preparation 
of the training content, which is relatively simple and 
target-group-oriented, and the use of the multiplier 
approach have helped to comprehensively disseminate  
the methods among about 12,000 farmers within just 
under three years.
On the whole, the project is assessed as successful in 
introducing innovative services among the target groups.
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In seven out of 12 cases, the programme’s effectiveness in 
terms of introducing innovations to the private sector may be 
assessed as (rather) successful (CS 1; CS 2; CS 4; CS 6; CS 7;  
CS 9; CS 10). These projects help develop innovative products 
and services at the local company level. In the other five cases, 
the products and services developed are so similar to existing 
ones or the constraints in relation to needs orientation for the 
intended target groups are so restrictive that sector experts 
and target groups of the measure regard the relative added 
value as minimal. For these projects, the project innovations 
cannot be assumed to generate a significant improvement,  
as the example in Box 11 shows. These case study findings tend 
to be confirmed by the company surveys. Of the 36 entrepreneurs 
surveyed, 16 (i.e. almost half) state that the projects helped 
develop innovative products and services in the partner 
countries. Examples given include changes in production  
and in the introduction of quality standards at suppliers.  
Two interviewees qualify their statements by saying that  
this only happened to a limited extent. Based on the case 
studies and company survey, this means that the programme’s 
effectiveness in relation to introducing innovations in the 
private sector in partner countries is rated as rather successful 
overall. Systematic differences between the implementing 
organisations or between traditional and strategic 
development partnerships with the private sector cannot be 
distinguished here.
Box 11: Project example of unsuccessful  
innovation transfer
The objective of this project is to introduce practice-
oriented, in-service training in the area of planning, 
installing and servicing sustainable energy plants on a 
commercial basis. The planned innovation is incorporated 
into the courses’ educational content and design. 
According to the sector experts interviewed on site and  
a comparison group similar to the target group, there are 
already similar courses on offer in the region that some  
of them regard as being of higher quality than the new 
courses. The approach chosen to transfer the courses’ 
educational content did little to transfer problem-
identification and problem-solving expertise, an aspect 
that is incorporated into other measures. As a result,  
the courses are only viewed as relatively advantageous  
to a limited degree.
On the whole, the project is assessed as rather unsuccessful 
in introducing innovative services among the target groups.
The objective of transferring innovation to public-sector 
institutions (rather than to private sector companies) was not 
a selection criterion used in the case studies. As it was the 
objective in five of the case studies, however, it could have 
been examined in parallel. In terms of content, projects that 
aim at transferring innovation to public-sector institutions 
tend to deal with cooperation arrangements with training 
providers or advisory services for public-sector infrastructure 
facilities (in the areas of sanitation and health care, for example). 
In this context, four of these five cases are rated as (rather) 
successful in a comparable assessment. This rating is supported 
in principle by the company survey. Based on the case studies 
and company survey, this means that the programme’s 
effectiveness in relation to introducing innovations at public 
institutions is rated as successful overall.
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Increasing income and employment (causal pathway 3)
In accordance with the programme’s set of objectives, successful 
innovation transfer is a means to an end to a certain degree 
and in itself only offers limited added value. The relative 
advantage of the innovation should also be reflected in the 
consolidation of private sector structures in partner countries 
(Doc 11), more specifically in the form of tangible income-
generating and job-creation effects among the target groups  
in the local population.
The design of 10 of the 12 case studies examined is geared  
to helping achieve income and employment effects. An actual 
contribution can only be identified in five of the 10 cases  
(CS 2; CS 4; CS 5; CS 6; CS 10). This is reflected, for example,  
in improved employability due to ‘in-demand’ qualifications  
in initial and continuing training projects, or in safeguarding/
increasing income among participating target groups in 
agricultural projects by increasing production. In the other  
five cases, the projects’ contribution is assessed as marginal. 
Either the income and employment effects only relate to a  
very specific group or there are no or only very minor income 
effects (see Box 12). These findings are supported by the 
company survey. Just under two thirds of the companies surveyed 
(20 of 36) state that the projects helped increase income  
and employment among the direct target groups. However,  
six of these companies regard the contribution as marginal  
or only related to a very specific group. Systematic differences 
between the implementing organisations cannot be identified  
in the case studies and company survey.39
Comparatively speaking, the income and employment effects 
of similar international programmes are also assessed as weak 
in other evaluations. These programmes usually target the 
participating companies’ consumers and producers rather than 
poor sections of the population. Therefore, inclusive economic 
growth and strong trickle-down effects are required if the 
poorest sections of the population are to benefit. As conditions 
are not always conducive to such effects, these evaluations 
indicate that the programmes should be expected to have only 
moderate direct impact on the poor (ICAI, 2014; IOB, 2014).
39 Strategic development partnerships with the private sector usually address larger target groups, which is why the constraint of marginal effects rather than of a very specific group applies  
(some examples in the case studies also show the opposite, however – see Box 12). It is not evident from the case studies or from the company survey that strategic development partnerships with 
the private sector have stronger income-generating effects among individual representatives of the target group.
Box 12: Project examples of successful and  
unsuccessful contributions to income generation  
and employment creation 
Positive example
In one project offering continuing training on a commercial 
basis, it can plausibly be assumed that income and 
employment effects will be generated. Graduates state 
that their expertise is in demand on the labour market and 
between 70 and 80 % of them are placed in employment, 
with an average starting salary slightly above initial 
salaries for similar positions, according to the sector 
experts surveyed. 
Negative example –  
effects on a very specific target group
This strategic development partnership with the private 
sector aims to train skilled experts over and beyond the 
company’s requirements, which in turn should generate 
income and employment effects by offering better job 
opportunities among the local population. Interviews with 
graduates show that, job-wise, they benefited from the 
course content. However, to date less than 40 graduates 
have been trained over two years in this strategic 
development partnership with the private sector – 50 % 
less than planned.
The findings of case studies, company surveys and evaluations 
of other PS4D programmes show that translating innovation 
transfer into income and employment effects among the local 
population is successful to some degree. Many projects only 
cover small target groups/segments of the population, only 
achieving limited change as a result. Consequently, the 
programme’s effectiveness in terms of contributions to income 
and employment effects is only rated partially successful on 
the whole. It also remains unclear how develoPPP.de intends to 
reconcile tensions between the target groups of development 
interventions and those of companies at programmatic level. 
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While development cooperation is geared towards marginalised 
and vulnerable sections of the population, these are usually  
of little interest as corporate target groups (i.e. as consumers 
or producers). Against this backdrop, it cannot be presumed 
that develoPPP.de projects as such will contribute to inclusive 
economic growth in the partner countries and have poverty-
reducing effects.
Improving environmental and social standards (causal pathway 2)
An improvement in environmental and social standards was 
not a selection criterion for the projects where case studies 
were conducted, although it does represent a key area in the 
programme’s set of objectives. It was possible to examine  
the achievement of objectives in three of the 12 case studies 
that pursued related objectives. Of these three projects,  
two can be assessed as successful. In one of these, the company 
involved offered training to approximately 12,000 small-scale 
agricultural producers on internationally tried-and-tested 
environmental and social standards. In the project that was 
rated unsuccessful, the design included training measures  
on improving compliance with environmental standards among 
local industries. However, local project staff state that this 
course was not run as there was no commercial demand for it. 
Based on the interviews, no correlation can be established 
with climate change adaptation and resource conservation 
either. All in all, the company survey also corroborates the 
positive findings, though: eight of the 36 interviewees say  
that their projects aim to improve environmental and social 
standards; two of these assess the contributions as minimal. 
Overall, the findings suggest that positive effects were achieved 
in this context. Given the restricted data base however,  
the effects are merely illustrative and are not deemed to be 
transferable to the programme level.
Unintended effects
There are no indications from the evaluation findings of 
positive or negative unintended effects that transcend 
individual projects. Any unintended effects are project-specific 
and are not systematically generated by the programme. 
Positive unintended effects are observed in four of the 12 case 
study projects and four of the 36 projects examined in the 
company survey. Here, there are positive spillover effects  
(CS 6; CS 7; CS 9; CS 11) that usually involve the project 
objectives being surpassed, i.e. objectives and target groups 
are reached to a greater degree than anticipated, because  
for example, an unexpected large order helped bring about an 
(unintended) multiplication of the innovation supported by  
the project. Negative unintended effects are observed in two 
case studies and include losses of reputation (e.g. of the company 
and of German DC due to slower-than-planned project 
implementation and poor management of expectations) and 
moral hazard (a financial product is offered that indemnifies 
against losses and farmers therefore make no provision for 
lower yields; as a result, their socio-economic circumstances 
are worse than those of uninsured farmers in the region).
2.5.3 Fostering change at the level of participating 
European companies
In addition to the development objectives of the individual 
projects, the strategic orientation, conceptual structure and 
implementation of the programme give rise to an additional 
programme objective that is not explicitly mentioned in the 
guidelines. develoPPP.de aims to raise private sector awareness 
of development issues in order to mainstream development 
cooperation to a greater degree within society as a whole, 
above and beyond the state and civil society. Staff at BMZ and 
at implementing organisations therefore give an ambivalent 
assessment of the corresponding potential of the develoPPP.de 
programme. 
Changes in attitude and behaviour among participating  
European companies
Approximately one third of the 36 companies surveyed in  
the company survey and six of the 12 involved in the case 
studies stated that their awareness of development issues  
had changed (CS 1; CS 3; CS 4; CS 7; CS 9; CS 12). Companies 
reported a greater awareness of development cooperation 
language and of ‘how the DC world works’. Usually however, 
there was no critical reflection of the intended and unintended 
results brought about by companies’ investments as part of  
a project, and the possibility of generating added value in terms 
of development. That said, this was usually the first time that 
the companies involved had come into contact with DC, and 
this was thanks to develoPPP.de. In the other six case studies, 
the companies had already developed a special culture of 
social responsibility before participating in develoPPP.de, as 
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had eight of the 36 companies surveyed, so that no changes 
can be observed. This indicates that the companies decided  
to become involved in the programme on their own volition.  
In other words, participation in develoPPP.de happens because 
a company already has a fine-tuned sense of social responsibility 
and is willing to commit to a development engagement for 
which develoPPP.de is viewed as a specific source of funding. 
On the positive side, at some of the projects examined, 
participation in the programme facilitated initial exposure to 
development engagement; at others it offered an opportunity 
to step up an existing commitment (see Box 13).
Box 13 Company size as a factor influencing  
awareness of development issues
Some studies purport that smaller companies (i. e. with  
an annual turnover of under EUR 50 million) are better able 
to develop an awareness of development issues because 
projects are ‘within easier reach’ of the management board 
(Doc 15; Int 41). The findings of this evaluation contradict 
this assumption, however. Of the 12 case studies, three of 
the eight larger companies report (a greater likelihood of) 
changes, whereas all four of the smaller companies 
involved state that there are no changes (in all likelihood). 
The company survey also clearly shows that the companies 
that reported change tended to be larger companies  
with which Strategic Alliances or Strategic Projects were 
implemented.
The fact that it was usually not possible to sensitise 
participating companies to development issues is regarded as 
problematic. Twenty-four of the 36 entrepreneurs surveyed say 
that they had not gained greater awareness of development 
issues, even after the project had finished. It is also noted that 
even where a company had developed such an awareness, the 
impact on the company was often weak. More often than not, 
the projects sensitised individuals, such as project managers, 
to aspects related to ‘responsible business’. Such concepts 
rarely gained hold throughout the company as a whole and, as 
a result, rarely triggered change beyond the individual level, as 
proven by case studies and company surveys. The company 
survey shows that GIZ projects in particular – above all 
Strategic Alliances – helped sensitise companies to 
development issues. The case study findings fail to clearly 
corroborate this fact, however.
As a result, the programme is assessed as being only partially 
successful in terms of its ability to sensitise companies to 
development issues. In terms of the programme’s further 
development, it may be noted that the companies – as a target 
group of the programme – are broken down into segments. 
Some are coming into contact with DC for the very first time, 
while others are looking for funding opportunities for an 
existing engagement. It is obvious too that some companies 
who wish to participate in the programme have their eye first 
and foremost on securing a public-sector subsidy rather than 
on nurturing any real engagement with development issues. 
Given the different expectations in terms of PR activities and 
acquisition measures, each of these segments will react 
differently and can be expected to require different forms of 
advice when project ideas are being fleshed out. As regards 
support for companies in the last segment, the question that 
arises for BMZ and for implementing organisations is whether 
it is considered sufficient for projects to achieve development 
results in the partner country or whether they should always 
go hand-in-hand with fostering a greater awareness of 
development issues. The programme’s function of sensitising 
companies to development issues therefore needs to be 
fleshed out to a greater degree.
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Use of the lessons learned from projects by participating  
European companies
The case studies show that the lessons learned from projects 
are by all means used at the business level. In six of the 12 case 
studies, additional changes are observed following 
participation in the develoPPP.de programme. This is due to 
former project activities being mainstreamed into the 
company’s core business following the end of the promotion 
term (CS 2; CS 3; CS 5; CS 6; CS 11). In these cases, products and 
services developed or modified as part of the project were 
incorporated into the company’s key activity area once the 
project had finished. Almost one third of the 36 companies 
interviewed in the company survey also report being able to 
leverage business opportunities more successfully. Eight 
companies say that the project boosted their business 
experience at the international level. In two cases, the project 
is used for marketing and in one instance, the company uses it 
to gain a foothold in new business segments. An analysis of 
evaluation literature from other PS4D programmes further 
corroborates these findings. European companies can benefit 
from the lessons learned by becoming involved in new markets 
and being exposed to other cultures, which enhances their 
competitiveness (Bürkle & Palenberg, 2009; DEVFIN Advisers, 
2014; KPMG, 2012).
40 The case studies cannot be used as the cases were selected based on the activities implemented, in accordance with programme theory and not on corporate interests. Therefore, any comparison 
drawn would have no informative value. It is also impossible to correlate corporate interests with project effectiveness in the content analysis as the (self-) assessment of project success in the 
random sample taken from the content analysis came to 96 %. This lack of variation (ceiling effect) prevents variances from being examined.  
The main corporate interests stated in the company survey were as follows: Development of sales markets/market expansion for companies’ products (20 of the 36 companies surveyed), creation 
and expansion of supply chains (ten companies) as well as launching of services or advisory inputs on the market (five companies). Of the 36 companies surveyed, 26 stated that the business case 
had been implemented. Although most of the failures reported lie in the area of developing new sales markets for products, the ten cases in which the business case was not successful or was only 
successful to a limited degree do not allow any robust conclusions to be made regarding improved business activities, due to the low number of cases involved.
These postulations raise the question we would all like 
answered: are there any specific corporate goals and business 
cases that increase the development effectiveness of projects? 
Providing a corresponding answer is beyond the scope of this 
evaluation, unfortunately.40
The assumption that companies wish to become involved in 
the programme out of an increased sense of social 
responsibility is believed to fall short of the mark. Any 
incentives to conduct business and achieve DC objectives in 
the process must be motivated by entrepreneurial logic and 
must serve business interests above and beyond the project. A 
desire to act in favour of the common good is not enough. This 
requires strategic reflection and decision-making on the part 
of BMZ and implementing organisations: in terms of 
development needs, what changes should develoPPP.de 
projects bring about together with the participating company? 
Furthermore, what changes can be initiated for the company in 
the process? Otherwise, the involvement of private sector 
actors in develoPPP.de projects will not unlock their full 
development potential. Explicit objectives for the involvement 
of private sector actors should therefore be formulated for the 
programme.
 
 
2.5.4 Key findings and rating of effectiveness based on OECD-DAC criteria
 • Based on the achievement of objectives, as outlined in 
the project designs, develoPPP.de’s projects are successful. 
 • On the negative side, the case studies show that the 
corporate added value outweighs that for development. 
If we break down the achievement of objectives into the 
dual structure (public/private sector), which is the 
assumption underlying each development partnership 
with the private sector, the achievement of 
development objectives systematically decreases across 
the case studies. In absolute terms, this reduces the 
overall added value of development partnerships with 
the private sector, which should serve development  
and private sector goals to an equal degree.
 • As regards the achievement of objectives by projects in 
accordance with their design, no significant differences 
can be established between the implementing 
organisations or between traditional and strategic 
development partnerships with the private sector.
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 • Any differences between the activities outlined in project 
designs and those actually implemented are mainly  
due to assumptions being too ambitious or to plans being 
unclear rather than to shortfalls in companies’ project 
management capacities. Overly high expectations of 
projects are another factor.
 • The reports submitted by companies to implementing 
organisations tend to highlight positive success ratings, 
giving rise in some cases to information asymmetries 
between the implementing organisation and companies 
that render adjustments by the implementing 
organisations difficult.
 • At the overarching level, the programme’s projects  
help promote knowledge and technology transfer to the 
private sector in partner countries. Effectiveness is 
restricted here above all by the product focus being too 
strong. Overall, develoPPP.de is rather successful in 
stimulating innovation.
 • The programme is less successful in translating this 
transfer into income and employment effects among 
local target groups, as many projects only cover narrow 
segments of these groups or trigger minor changes. 
Furthermore, it cannot be assumed that develoPPP.de 
projects as such will contribute to inclusive economic 
growth in the partner countries because the groups that 
companies target (consumers, producers) usually do not 
belong to poor sections of the population.
 • The evaluation findings do not indicate any positive  
or negative unintended results that transcend individual 
projects.
 • Among the companies surveyed, only some degree  
of sensitisation to development issues can be identified. 
Organisational change has only occurred to a minor 
extent. Some of the companies say that this is due to 
the fact that they were already aware of development 
issues before the programme (the companies decided  
to become involved in the programme on their own 
volition).
41 According to OECD-DAC (OECD, 2009), the effectiveness criterion should facilitate an overall assessment of the degree to which the programme’s achievement of objectives is  
deemed sufficient (BMZ, 2006).
 • Other companies that carried out a project state that 
they did not gain an awareness of development issues, 
however. The question for BMZ and implementing 
organisations is whether it is deemed sufficient for 
projects to achieve development results in the partner 
countries or whether they also need to raise participating 
companies’ awareness of development issues as  
a mandatory element. The programme’s function of 
sensitising companies to development issues  
therefore needs to be fleshed out to a greater degree.
 • For companies, participation in develoPPP.de  
generates a far greater awareness of corporate –  
rather than development – issues. 
 • develoPPP.de seems to have been more successful  
in supporting and strengthening existing development 
activities than actually initiating such engagement  
in the first place. Overall, the programme can only be 
assessed as being partially successful in terms of its 
ability to sensitise companies to development issues. 
Assessment of effectiveness based on  
OECD-DAC criteria41:
Overall, develoPPP.de as a support mechanism facilitates 
projects that are generally successful and that help 
transfer innovation to the partner countries (innovation 
stimulus). As the programme’s results have been rather 
fragmented, however, expectations – in terms of income 
and employment effects or strengthening private sector 
structures, for example – tend not to have been fulfilled. 
Whereas corporate objectives are frequently achieved, this 
is much less true of development objectives. The function 
of raising private sector awareness of development issues, 
which develoPPP.de aims to pursue, is fulfilled to a limited 
degree. Its main role involves supporting and strengthening 
companies’ existing engagement rather than initiating  
a commitment in the first place. Consequently, the 
programme’s effectiveness in terms of the objectives it 
pursues is generally deemed to be only partially sufficient.
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2.6
Sustainability
This section presents the findings in relation to evaluation 
question 5: To what extent can the results achieved by  
the develoPPP.de programme’s promotion of projects be 
considered durable and broad-based? The findings are  
based primarily on the case studies and on the company survey.42 
In keeping with the view that develoPPP.de is a stimulus 
programme, this evaluation is based on a functional definition 
of sustainability (‘What is set in motion’ (BMZ, 1989: 88ff, 
quoted in Caspari, 2004)) rather than on a structural definition 
(‘What is left behind’; ibid.).43 This section looks at the 
establishment of the prerequisites for sustainability within  
the framework of projects (Section 2.6.1). The extent to  
which former project partners (Section 2.6.2) and project target 
groups (Section 2.6.3) use project results beyond the promotion 
period is then examined. In other words, to what extent are 
innovations safeguarded in the long term (safeguarding of 
stimulus)? Section 2.6.4 looks at whether the stimuli provided 
by the projects spread beyond the actors and target groups 
that are directly involved. In other words, to what degree  
do develoPPP.de projects help achieve broad-based change?  
The most important results are then summarised and the 
programme’s sustainability and impact are assessed based  
on OECD-DAC criteria (Section 2.6.5). 
2.6.1 Creating the prerequisites for sustainability
Whereas ‘sustainability’ in itself refers to the continuation  
of project results beyond the end of support, the required 
underlying framework is laid earlier, during project 
implementation. In seven of the 12 case studies, activities 
were carried out at the end of the project to ensure that the 
cooperation arrangements established during the develoPPP.de 
programme will continue and sustainably build capacities on 
the partner side. At five projects (CS 6; CS 7; CS 8; CS 11; CS 12), 
it was not possible to implement the planned measures  
laid down in the project design for continuing activities after 
the end of the project. In the company survey too, most 
entrepreneurs said that strategies had been developed in the 
42 Eight of the 12 case studies examined had been completed at the time the evaluation took place. The four projects that were still ongoing had been in operation since 2013 at least, which meant that 
they had progressed enough to allow a prognostic assessment of sustainability. Support for the completed projects had finished at least four months – and on average one year – previously.
43 The evaluation is therefore in keeping with the understanding of ‘impact’ held by OECD-DAC(OECD, 2009) and, consequently by BMZ, which covers model character, structure-building and 
broad-based results (BMZ, 2006). The one thing all aspects have in common is that they presuppose that DC measures achieve long-term results that extend beyond the end of the promotion period 
(Caspari, 2004).
projects in order to establish measures in the project countries 
in the long term. This supports the case study findings that  
the transfer of project activities following the end of the 
promotion period was rather successful. However, this related 
primarily to the aspects of the projects that were of special 
corporate interest. Company activities that served public 
interests (e.g. training more individuals for participation in  
the labour market than were required by companies) were 
scaled back.  
In nine of the 12 case studies, the projects have been 
embedded in long-term business relationships between the 
participating European companies and the partner companies 
(CS 2; CS 3; CS 4; CS 7; CS 8; CS 9; CS 10; CS 11; CS 12). In the 
company survey, 18 of the 36 companies questioned state that 
cooperation with the local partner company has continued 
following project completion. Just as activities are scaled back 
to areas that are relevant for core business following the end 
of the project, activities and cooperation partners also tend  
to be reduced in line with business considerations; development 
aspects played a more minor role. As regards these aspects,  
no significant differences are recognisable between the 
implementing organisations or between traditional and 
strategic development partnerships with the private sector, 
based on the case studies and the company survey.
The scaling back of DC-related activities at the end of the 
project is due to challenges in the design phase. Although  
the programme guidelines include a sustainability criterion 
that states that ‘a develoPPP.de project must be embedded  
in the long-term sustainable involvement of the company  
in the developing or emerging country’ (Doc 11, p. 6), this 
criterion is often only reflected in the project design in vague 
expressions of intent by the company to have longer-term 
business interests in the corresponding country. No further 
details are given regarding the extent to which this will result 
in the project’s development objectives being pursued beyond 
the project cycle. The documented findings show that this  
is not enough to consistently sustain the overlaps between 
business and public interests beyond the promotion period. 
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Section 2.4.2 describes how in many of the case studies 
examined, it has not been possible to give companies an 
adequate understanding of a project’s development objectives. 
The findings show that this has a negative effect not just on 
implementation but also on the projects’ sustainability. In 
order to step up the degree to which local implementation 
partners ‘buy in’ to a project, these partners need to be 
incorporated into project design to a greater degree.
Box 14: Project examples of the creation of prerequisites for sustainability 
Positive example
One of the projects included in the case studies 
incorporated a transfer strategy into the project design.  
To this end, the target group representatives were given 
seminar materials and a strategy that had been devised  
by the project in the local language. The representatives 
also networked with each other in events organised by  
the project. This network continued to run following the 
end of the promotion period. All of these activities 
strengthen the prerequisites for sustainably applying the 
know-how transferred by the project after its completion.
Negative example
Another project examined by a case study also made 
provision for handover at the end of the project. Here, 
local training institutions were established to sustainably 
embed the training strategies developed by the project 
within the region. The courses were to be funded by the 
payment of a participation fee. Additional public funding 
was also to be acquired to facilitate participation by 
individuals who could not afford the fee.
However, the local implementation partner has little 
interest in these project activities as they lie outside its 
core business. Cooperation with public institutions is also 
regarded as too time-consuming, and implementation is 
not being purposefully driven as a result. Public funding 
cannot be acquired within the country and the local 
training institutions cannot be established within the 
region. As public advisory services are already being 
provided free of charge, there is little demand  
for further training.
2.6.2 Continuation of the innovations by the corresponding 
project partner following project completion
Continuation of the processes, standards, products and/or 
services by the former project partners beyond the promotion 
period only takes place to a limited degree. In eight of the case 
studies, the local project partners only made the innovations 
introduced by the projects available to a limited degree in 
terms of regions, content and quantity following the end of 
support (CS 1; CS 2; CS 3; CS 4; CS 7; CS 8; CS 9; CS 11). In all 
cases where implementation of innovations was subsequently 
continued to a lesser degree, it is noticeable that there was 
a greater focus on key business interests, while aspects that 
were designed to generate added development value tend to 
be dropped. The findings of the case studies are consolidated 
by the company survey. In 15 of the 30 completed projects,  
the interviewees state that the local implementation partners 
involved also continue project activities beyond the project 
term. In all other cases, activities were either very restricted or 
completely discontinued. Neither the findings of the company 
survey nor of the case studies indicate differences between the 
implementing organisations or between the different forms  
of development partnership with the private sector.
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Box 15: Project examples of the continuation of project 
innovations by the corresponding project partners
Positive example:
In one project examined in a case study, continuing 
training measures were offered on a payment basis. The 
company’s implementation partner at the local level was 
an education provider that has a strong interest in 
continuing and expanding the courses on offer beyond the 
end of the project, as the return on investment had been 
fully leveraged during the project. There is demand for the 
measures and they are therefore still being offered. In 
terms of continuation of the innovations introduced by 
the project, the corresponding project partners therefore 
assess the case study positively.
Negative example:
Another project designed a training strategy for 
agricultural cultivation techniques. The rationale behind 
the strategy’s added value is that the region lacks holistic 
training strategies that go above and beyond a learning-
by-doing approach and enable farmers to cultivate their 
crops independently. The local partner, which buys crops 
from the farmers, helped develop the training measures 
and implemented them. Following the end of the project, 
however, the measures were scaled back to a minimum 
and were only implemented sporadically by the former 
project partner as on-the-job training. In this context, only 
the activities that were relevant for the former project 
partner to achieve an appropriate product quality were 
continued. Any activities designed to enable the farmers 
to become financially independent were dropped, 
however.
In terms of continuation of the innovations introduced by 
the project, the corresponding project partners therefore 
assess the case study negatively.
44 One project (CS 12) cannot yet be assessed for sustainability as no results have been achieved yet.
2.6.3 Continuation of the innovations by the corresponding 
target groups following project completion
Based on the case studies, the (former) project target groups’ 
use of the innovations introduced by the projects after their 
completion can be assessed largely positively. In 10 projects, 
the intensity and frequency with which the target groups used 
the processes, standards, products and services introduced in 
the project either did not decrease at all (CS 1; CS 3; CS 4; CS 6; 
CS 11), or only decreased marginally (CS 2; CS 5; CS 7; CS 9;  
CS 10). This means that skills learned by the target groups 
continue to be used after graduation or project completion 
(see Box 16). In one case, the target groups make very little  
use of the content, as the training strategy developed is only 
marginally geared to target group needs (CS 8).44 According  
to the companies interviewed in the company survey, the 
processes, standards, products and services continue to be 
used by local partner companies or target groups in half  
of all completed projects. Neither the findings of the company 
survey nor of the case studies indicate differences between  
the implementing organisations or between the different 
forms of development partnership with the private sector.
Box 16: Project example of the continuation of project 
innovations by the corresponding target groups
One of the projects studied in the case study set up and 
operationalised a training centre. The training on offer 
covers theoretical elements and has a strong application 
focus too. In this way, it helps redress a shortfall of experts 
in a new – but increasingly relevant – sector in the partner 
country.
All of the graduates interviewed stated that they can 
continue to fully use the content they have learned by 
applying the acquired problem-solving skills. This was also 
true for individuals who no longer work in the sector: they 
can transfer the sales and marketing skills they acquired, 
which are not industry-specific, to their new work area.
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Continuation of the innovations introduced in the projects  
by the project partners once the support period has ended is 
assessed as partially successful. Furthermore, develoPPP.de is 
rather successful in safeguarding the project impetus among 
the target groups above and beyond the project term too.  
In all, the develoPPP.de programme is rather successful at 
safeguarding the stimulus the projects generate also beyond 
the promotion period.
2.6.4 Dissemination of innovations beyond the project term
Once the project innovations have been safeguarded, it is 
planned to scale them up. This can be done by disseminating 
the innovations above and beyond the project target groups, 
and by other companies and institutions adopting them in  
the long term. The relevance of examining the latter aspect in 
particular relates to the programme’s goal of strengthening 
private sector structures in the partner country, thereby 
achieving impact above and beyond the project (Doc 11). The 
programme objective of disseminating stimuli was mapped  
in the programme theory via the cross-cutting pathway 1 
‘Dissemination of (project) lessons learned at meso and  
macro level’.
Use of innovations above and beyond the target groups  
directly involved in the project
Use of the innovations introduced above and beyond the 
original project target groups is planned in all of the case 
studies examined. Plausibly enough, since the corresponding 
project partners only continue to use the innovations to  
a minor extent, the innovations can only be sustainably 
disseminated to a limited degree beyond the original project 
target groups (see negative example in Box 15). Consequently, 
the evaluation makes clear that based on the programme’s 
stimulus logic, the projects examined tend to be unsuccessful 
in sustainably disseminating the introduced innovations above 
and beyond the original target groups, without large-scale 
restrictions.
This is due to the stronger focus on purely corporate  
objectives once the project finished. There were early 
indications during project implementation and when 
establishing the prerequisites for project continuation after 
the promotion term that successful scaling up would be 
difficult. At the overarching level, the findings show that  
the involvement of private sector actors in projects does not 
necessarily lead to development results being sustainable.  
As the criterion of sustainability by its very definition is geared 
beyond the end of the promotion period – and beyond the  
end of the contract period too – it is unclear whether a reliable 
forecast of sustainability can be made before the start of the 
project, let alone the corresponding contractual provisions 
made. There are therefore two key starting points for increasing 
sustainability. Firstly, the programme could call for and provide 
targeted support for greater corporate social responsibility, 
thus leveraging greater scope for action related to sustainable 
development following the end of the project. For this purpose, 
the programme’s function of sensitising companies to 
development issues would first need to be fleshed out (see 
Section 2.5.3). The underlying assumption would be that this 
would motivate companies to continue development activities 
and bear any resulting additional costs. In addition, or 
alternatively, project design could pay greater consideration to 
ensuring that business activities generate development results 
as a side effect. An entrepreneur interviewed in one of the case 
studies pinpointed the sequence of the causal chain from a 
company’s perspective as follows: ‘Benefits must follow profits 
– and not the other way around’ (CS 12). This option addresses 
the eligibility for promotion of projects in areas related to 
companies’ core business.
This constitutes a major decision. Given the political and  
legal implications, the evaluation cannot make appropriate 
recommendations to support decision-making. Above all,  
this decision would limit the additionality/subsidiarity of 
public funding. In terms of sustainability and broad-based 
impact, however, the findings show that develoPPP.de in its 
current form simply places too ambitious demands on projects.
Adoption of innovations by companies and institutions  
that are not directly involved in projects
In addition to innovation transfer over and above the original 
target groups, develoPPP.de can disseminate stimuli through 
the adoption of innovations by companies and public 
institutions that are not directly involved in projects. Whereas 
the public interest lies in comprehensively disseminating 
innovations as widely as possible in order to spread the 
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impetus, the unprotected dissemination of these innovations 
to some extent runs counter to companies’ commercial 
interests. For example, whereas trademark and patent law 
restricts the wide-scale dissemination of innovations on the 
one hand, it also facilitates innovation by safeguarding the 
heavy investments companies make in terms of development 
costs. While all vested interests as such are legitimate, the 
question arises how develoPPP.de can pursue dissemination  
of the lessons learned in projects at the macro and meso level 
in order to encourage systematic participation by other actors  
in the partner country in project achievements.
All implementing organisations state that the conditions 
required to enhance the sustainability and broad-based impact 
of results are created during the project design and 
implementation phases (Int 9; Int 11; Int 16; Int 17; Int 18; Int 19). 
The interviews show, however, that expectations in terms of 
disseminating innovations are limited. The organisations 
implementing the programme expect to achieve impact mainly 
at the micro level (Int 2; Int 3; Int 4; Int 7; Int 15; Int 18; Int 20; 
Int 26; Int 28; Int 31). The intention to achieve system-wide 
changes at the meso or macro level is, however, considered 
presumptuous (Int 7), or such changes are at least very rarely 
expected to be achieved (Int 2; Int 3; Int 20). Based on the 
following findings, the evaluation also draws the conclusion 
that the requirements applied to the programme in terms of 
initiating systematic change at the meso and macro level are 
too ambitious. This is due to the limited size of develoPPP.de 
projects and the unsatisfactory degree to which they have 
reconciled divergent corporate and development interests.
45 This is confirmed by the content analysis. Of all project types, GIZ projects, particularly Strategic Alliances, most frequently target public institutions and decision-makers when disseminating 
lessons learned. They are followed by sequa projects. Traditional development partnerships with the private sector usually try to reach local companies, whereas DEG strategic projects try to reach 
the (professional) public and consumers.
In eleven of the 12 case studies, the project design contains  
at least an indirect requirement to further disseminate  
lessons learned from the projects. The project in which this 
requirement had not been formulated was a strategic 
development partnership with the private sector, which set  
out to achieve outstanding development benefits. However, 
the fact that measures to disseminate lessons learned had  
not been taken into account in the project design phase was 
deemed ‘a key shortcoming in the project’ by the responsible 
project manager (CS 11). Of the 11 case studies that cater  
for the further transfer of lessons learned, the public 
dissemination of new know-how generated by the project  
is only explicitly laid down in the design of four projects  
(CS 3; CS 4; CS 8; CS 12). The fact that all of these projects, 
most of which are Strategic Alliances, are implemented by  
GIZ is noteworthy.45 This attests to the higher conceptual 
requirements of these projects in relation to broad-based 
impact, which is achieved by involving stakeholders. In this 
context, however, companies and public institutions that  
were not directly involved in the project usually (in three of  
the four projects) did not successfully adopt the innovations 
introduced in the projects. This can be attributed to the fact 
that commercial corporate interests prevented the free 
distribution of lessons learned in the project to competitors 
(Box 18). No further distinctions can be made between 
implementing organisations and forms of development 
partnership with the private sector. The country context does 
tend to shape circumstances, however (Box 17).
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Box 17: Significance of the country context for 
sustainability of a project
The case studies indicate that the business environment in 
the BRICS countries Brazil and India is more conducive to 
project sustainability than in the LDCs Uganda and 
Ethiopia. The corresponding target groups and/or project 
partners in BRICS rate the continuation of innovations 
after the project term better than in LDCs. Dissemination 
of lessons learned by the projects at the meso and macro 
level in partner countries also receives a better rating in 
the case studies in BRICS countries.
The findings of the portfolio analysis deserve another 
mention here (Lücking & Roggemann, 2016). The country-
specific factors examined there have no statistical 
influence on early termination of the project. Overall, 
companies in LDCs are presumed to move in an 
environment that is both challenging in corporate terms 
and supportive in development terms. In LDCs too, a 
project that is well designed and implemented is not only 
justified, it also has good prospects for success.
In the other cases, it cannot be assumed that innovations were 
transferred by organisations that were not directly involved  
in the project, due to the lack of conceptual enshrinement. 
Whereas the project designs provide for the use of the 
innovations introduced beyond the original target groups in 
principle – as outlined above – they rarely include activities to 
network the project results at the organisational level. This 
means that the dissemination of lessons learned is primarily 
limited to promoting the outputs that are generated and 
commercially marketed by the project, in the form of 
continuing training measures, for example (CS 1; CS 2; CS 5; CS 
6; CS 7; CS 9). The findings of the company survey depict a 
similar picture. Around two thirds of those surveyed (25 of 36 
interviewees) state that awareness-raising measures were 
carried out to disseminate project content. Just seven of the 36 
companies surveyed confirm that lessons learned by 
organisations at the macro and/or meso level were 
disseminated, however. All except one were strategic 
development partnerships with the private sector 
implemented by GIZ and DEG. 
Box 18: Project examples of dissemination of lessons 
learned 
Positive example
One project examined in the case studies aims to transfer 
know-how to smallholders to enable them to adapt their 
cultivation methods to the challenges posed by climate 
change in the region. To this end, instructions were 
devised and packaged in combinable modules, taking into 
account different regional factors. The lessons learned in 
this context are presented at local and international 
forums and can be accessed on the internet from 
practically any location around the globe. There are some 
examples of the innovations that were introduced being 
adopted by public institutions and companies that were 
not involved in the project.
Negative example
In another project, a portfolio of commercial services was 
developed for low-income groups in the partner country. 
The concept incorporates activities to disseminate at 
conferences and on the internet lessons learned and best 
practices that relate to project content and can support 
the business strategy. This will support replication of the 
project approach by other companies. However, the sector 
experts surveyed state that the project has not published 
any material so far that would facilitate replication. 
According to the same experts, this would amount to the 
equivalent of awarding a competitive advantage.
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These findings correspond with previous evaluations carried 
out by similar programmes. Here, enhanced performance 
across entire systems is only assumed where business support 
measures are carried out or linkages are established with 
ongoing development programmes. It is argued that development 
partnerships with the private sector should illustrate and 
provide information on the reforms required at the economic 
46 OECD-DAC’s criterion of sustainability (OECD, 2009) should provide an overall assessment of the extent to which the positive results of a development measure will continue beyond the end of 
assistance (BMZ, 2006). OECD-DAC’s impact criterion should provide an overall assessment of whether and to what extent a development measure contributes to the achievement of overarching 
development-policy goals. In the context of this evaluation, it is documented under the broad-based results achieved by develoPPP.de projects.
framework level and that changes to framework conditions 
need to be brought about via more comprehensive DC measures 
(DEVFIN Advisers, 2014; ICAI, 2014; IOB, 2014; Johansson de Silva 
et al., 2015). In this respect, as a stimulus programme, develoPPP.
de is assessed as being largely unsuccessful at disseminating 
and sustainably mainstreaming the stimuli generated by the 
projects beyond the partners that are directly involved.
2.6.5 Key findings and rating of sustainability based on OECD-DAC criteria 
 • Continuation of the innovations introduced in the 
projects by the project partners once the support period 
has ended is assessed as only partially successful. This is 
due to the stronger focus on purely corporate objectives 
once the project has ended, an aspect that is already 
evident during the implementation phase. The assessment 
of the continuation of innovations by the target groups is 
more positive. They tend to use the innovations introduced 
by the programme after support comes to an end.  
In all, the develoPPP.de programme is rather 
successful at safeguarding the stimuli the projects 
generate beyond the promotion period too.
 • Use of the innovations beyond the corresponding target 
groups must be assessed as rather unsuccessful. When 
compared with the objectives in the original designs of 
the projects examined, the innovations introduced were 
frequently only made available to a limited degree in 
terms of regions, content and quantity. This means that 
sustainable dissemination beyond the project boundaries 
is therefore limited.
 • In most cases, companies and public institutions that 
were not directly involved in the project usually did not 
adopt the innovations introduced in the projects, however. 
In the DEG and sequa projects examined by the case 
studies, the companies involved did not seek systematic 
interlinkage with institutions at the meso and macro level. 
Four of the five GIZ case studies, most of which were 
Strategic Alliances, provide for innovation transfer at the 
institutional level in their project designs, on the other 
hand. However, this transfer was largely unsuccessful. 
 
 • Other significant differences between the implementing 
organisations or between traditional and strategic 
development partnerships with the private sector  
cannot be distinguished. The case studies in India and  
Brazil suggest that, compared with LDCs, BRICS countries 
offer an environment that is conducive to safeguarding  
and disseminating the stimuli provided by develoPPP.de 
projects.
 
Assessment of sustainability and impact based  
on OECD-DAC criteria46:
Use of the innovations introduced in the develoPPP.de  
projects by the direct target groups once the support  
period has ended is assessed as largely successful. However, 
the programme is only partially successful in encouraging 
companies to continue the innovations once the promotion 
period has drawn to a close. The components that are  
relevant to development in particular, or cooperation 
arrangements with project partners that are relevant to 
development, are frequently scaled back to a considerable 
degree once the project comes to an end. The criterion  
of programme sustainability is therefore assessed as only 
partially fulfilled. The durable dissemination of stimuli  
above and beyond the actors and target groups directly 
involved in projects or even at the meso and macro  
level is not successful in most cases, however. Potential for 
generating overarching development results in partner 
countries via develoPPP.de projects is thus assessed as low. 
Aggregated changes that generate broad-based impact  
in partner countries, based on develoPPP.de projects, are 
presumed to be the exception rather than the rule. 
3. 
CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS
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In this section, we provide answers to the five overarching 
evaluation questions. For the first three evaluation questions, 
a summary of the key conclusions is given, and the 
recommendations for further developing the develoPPP.de 
programme that have been derived on this basis are outlined. 
The answers to the first three evaluation questions already 
contain recommendations on how to enhance the 
effectiveness and sustainability of the develoPPP.de 
programme. Therefore, no separate recommendations are 
made in the answers to evaluation questions four and five. 
Some concluding remarks are outlined at the end of the 
section.
3.1
How appropriate is the develoPPP.de programme 
for achieving relevant development objectives?
Overall, the develoPPP.de programme, and its basic approach 
of enlisting more support from private sector partners to 
achieve development objectives, is rated as relevant in both 
the German and international context. This can be seen not  
just from the global role that the private sector is considered 
to play in achieving sustainable economic growth, but also 
from the growing enshrinement of corporate social responsibility 
in companies’ business models. One outstanding feature of  
the develoPPP.de programme is that it goes beyond a dialogue 
between DC and the private sector and focuses on direct 
cooperation between partners to tackle specific development 
issues. The programme’s relevance is restricted by its current 
conceptual design which, due to its unclear strategic 
orientation is not considered appropriate for achieving the 
targeted overarching development objectives. Key aspects  
that determine the programme’s appropriateness with regard 
to the achievement of relevant development goals include  
the objectives of the programme itself, their development 
orientation and the programme’s design and structure. 
3.1.1 Objectives
The develoPPP.de programme’s objectives tie in with BMZ’s 
overarching goals for cooperation with the private sector  
due to the fact that projects implemented in tandem by the 
public and private sectors are designed to help achieve global 
development goals. The evaluation basically confirms not  
only the role of the private sector as an initiator and driver  
of development but also the programme’s basic underlying 
assumption – which ties in with this role – that cooperation 
helps work towards achieving development objectives. As 
regards orientation towards overarching development goals, 
the programme’s set of objectives is abstract, however,  
and the strategic orientation remains unclear. Among other 
things, this can be seen from the fact that there is no uniform 
understanding of the programme’s primary objectives at the 
level of the implementing organisations and of BMZ. As a 
partnership programme that strives to achieve ‘win-wins’ both 
for companies and development cooperation organisations, 
develoPPP.de is intentionally based outside of bilateral DC.  
So far, however the division of labour between develoPPP.de 
and other programmes on cooperation with the private sector 
implemented by BMZ and bilateral DC has not been sufficiently 
defined. What is more, the DC objectives need to be reconciled 
with companies’ interests, which in some cases results in a 
situation whereby the concerns and needs of relevant target 
groups in the partner countries are only taken into consideration 
to some degree. On the whole, the status of cooperation with 
companies within the programme is unclear. Does cooperation 
with the private sector and the related function of maintaining 
a dialogue with companies and sensitising them to development 
issues represent added value that in itself renders a certain 
loss of efficiency in terms of implementation acceptable?  
Or does the programme’s added value consists exclusively in 
efficiently achieving development objectives by implementing 
measures in partnership with the private sector? 
The orientation towards an abstract objectives framework  
also means that the overlaps between companies’ interests 
and DC objectives have been overestimated both at the 
programme and at the project level. As a result, any diverging 
interests that cooperation partners may have are not taken 
into account to a sufficient degree. At the project level,  
this means that the development objectives of projects are 
often too ambitious and that the results they are expected  
to achieve are unrealistic. The findings of the case studies in 
particular show that the assumption that companies wish to 
become involved in the programme out of an increased sense 
of social responsibility falls short of the mark. Any incentives 
to conduct business and achieve DC objectives in the process 
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must be motivated by entrepreneurial logic and not just by  
a desire to act in favour of the common good. This therefore 
requires strategic reflection and decision-making on the part 
of BMZ and implementing organisations regarding not just 
what changes develoPPP.de projects need to bring about 
together with the participating company in a project but also 
what changes can be initiated within the company in the 
process. Otherwise, the involvement of private sector actors  
in develoPPP.de projects will not unlock their full development 
potential. 
To sum up, direct cooperation between DC organisations  
and the private sector determines the programme’s relevance. 
Releasing the full potential of this cooperation can leverage 
opportunities for development cooperation. The programme’s 
unclear strategic orientation restricts its relevance, however. 
The evaluation comes to the conclusion that continuation of 
the programme is linked to BMZ taking a clear position vis-à-vis 
the related objectives. This is the only way of increasing the 
programme’s legitimacy and relevance. 
Recommendations
1. BMZ is advised to continue the programme. This should  
be done under the proviso that it takes a clear position 
vis-à-vis the programme’s objectives and that the 
programme be consolidated and given a corresponding 
strategic orientation. In this context, BMZ should  
make clear whether cooperation with the private sector 
and the related function of maintaining a dialogue with 
companies and sensitising them to development issues 
represents added value in itself (which must be more 
precisely defined), or whether the added value of the 
programme should be attained exclusively by achieving 
broad-based development results in the partner countries. 
Prioritisation of this added value should be explicitly 
enshrined in the programme’s set of objectives.
2. The programme theory devised for the evaluation should 
be used as a basis for consolidating the set of objectives. 
The ongoing debate on the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) should also be taken into consideration. Corporate 
objectives need to be spelled out and weighed up against 
development objectives in order recognise joint overlaps  
to a greater degree and pinpoint possible areas of conflict. 
This should be done based on dialogue between BMZ and  
the private sector. BMZ should initiate an accompanying 
dialogue process with civil society in order to improve 
acceptance and create the greatest possible degree of 
transparency. 
3. When consolidating strategic aspects of the set of 
objectives, the extent to which there is a division of labour 
with bilateral DC programmes – and particularly with other 
BMZ programmes on cooperation with the private sector –  
needs to be clearly established. This would increase the 
programme’s legitimacy externally. Internally, it would also 
improve its ability to adhere to project plans. Furthermore, 
the extent to which the programmes can be networked to a 
greater degree needs to be examined, in order to safeguard 
coherence between the programmes and to leverage  
further cooperation potential. BMZ should produce a policy 
paper on this subject that explicitly defines and regulates 
cooperation with the private sector.
3.1.2 Design 
The programme design is fundamentally geared to the 
programme’s overarching objectives, i.e. cooperation between 
DC organisations and the private sector within the framework 
of a partnership arrangement in order to achieve development 
objectives. In this context, the programme operates in a 
continuum between its orientation towards the interests of 
the private sector and its requirements in terms of 
development effectiveness in the partner countries. For the 
participating companies, the synergies generated in this 
continuum relate primarily to the minimisation of risks related 
to accessing new markets through funding and advisory 
services provided by the implementing organisations. For 
development cooperation, synergies can be leveraged through 
the transfer of technology and know-how to partner countries 
and DC organisations as well as by making measures more 
sustainable. Given the programme’s orientation towards an 
abstract objectives framework, however, it is difficult to specify 
exactly what synergies can be harnessed. If the results actually 
achieved by the programme are compared with the planned 
results outlined in the project designs, the causal relationships 
outlined there are frequently too comprehensive, the contextual 
assumptions too optimistic and the demands of the packages 
of measures too ambitious and difficult to meet. 
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The project criteria laid down in the programme guidelines are 
geared to safeguarding the relevance and effectiveness of the 
projects from a development perspective. At the same time, 
however, the criteria are intentionally flexible and open to 
interpretation so as to meet the needs of the wide array of 
companies involved in the programme. The case studies show 
that, in some cases, this flexibility and scope for interpretation 
actually restricted the degree to which projects could meet the 
requirements for development effectiveness. The programme’s 
openness in terms of themes and regional location has meant 
that the project content, project locations and the target 
groups are determined to a large degree by the companies’ 
interests. This increases the number of potential project 
partners and opens up scope for innovative project ideas 
outside of traditional DC measures. It also impacts on the 
programme’s orientation towards specific priority areas for 
development, however. So far, efforts to select projects that 
can generate particularly strong synergies in terms of 
development, based on priority areas and positive criteria, 
have been hampered by a lack of project proposals from 
participating companies. This is not in keeping with ongoing 
activities by international donors to increase the relevance of 
such programmes by focusing on poverty reduction measures 
or engagement in LDCs. The rationale for limiting programme 
funding to German and European companies has so far not 
been sufficiently justified. ‘Tying’ funding in this way also 
contravenes global agreements on partner involvement. The 
question for BMZ and implementing organisations is whether 
it is enough for projects to achieve development results or 
whether projects need to incorporate the sensitisation of 
participating companies to development issues as a mandatory 
element. This accompanying function of sensitising 
participating companies to development-policy issues and 
enabling them to learn in this area has not yet been included in 
the programme design and further thought is required on how 
it can be incorporated.
The evaluation findings allow us to draw the conclusion that 
the programme design only fulfils the aspiration of 
safeguarding the interests of all project stakeholders and 
target groups to a limited extent. In its present form, the 
programme cannot meet the implicit expectation that it will 
help raise awareness of development issues among a large 
number of companies and promote comprehensive dialogue 
between DC and the private sector too. Nor can it meet high 
expectations in terms of achieving development effectiveness 
in partner countries. As the tensions that arise within the 
continuum in which the programme operates (programme’s 
orientation towards DC objectives on the one hand and 
companies’ needs on the other) are not spelled out to a 
sufficient degree, expectations in terms of the programme’s 
development effectiveness are on the whole too high. In order 
to boost effectiveness, the programme needs a clear 
conceptual orientation that takes into consideration potential 
synergies as well as possible conflicts of interest. 
Recommendations
4. BMZ should adjust the programme design based on a 
consolidated set of objectives. Existing areas of tension 
between private sector and development-policy interests 
should be spelled out to make clear whether synergies can 
be leveraged, and where there are limits as regards 
orientation towards the intended objectives. 
5. Depending on the programme’s primary objective,  
the programme design needs to be adjusted with regard  
to two core aspects (see Box 19): 
 (1) Strengthening the programme’s function of  
 sensitising the private sector to development issues  
 and engaging in a corresponding dialogue. 
 (2) Strengthening orientation towards development  
 priorities and results in partner countries. 
The possible adjustments proposed here are not mutually 
exclusive: some of them can be made in parallel. These 
adjustments will give rise to certain areas of tension, which 
must be taken into consideration. Such areas include the 
definition of project criteria and standards and the 
identification of regional and thematic priority areas. 
Responsibility for deciding what approach needs to be taken to 
deal with tensions and whether the programme should target 
one, or both, of the core aspects at a given time, lies with BMZ.
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Box 19: Areas for adjustment in the programme design
Strengthening the programme’s function of sensitising 
the private sector to development issues and engaging 
in a corresponding dialogue through comprehensive 
cooperation with German and European companies 
At the conceptual level, the programme is already geared 
to this function. In order to consolidate these activities, 
the design needs to be adjusted in order to increase 
demand for the programme and involve more companies. 
Changes also need to be made to raise awareness of 
development issues among companies and increase 
acceptance of DC measures among as many companies as 
possible. This goes hand in hand with the expectation that 
companies will also orient their business activities more 
closely towards sustainable development outside the 
develoPPP.de programme, and that they will continue 
development-related activities and are prepared to 
assume the associated additional costs. It must be 
accepted however, that the degree to which projects can 
focus on particular development priorities and/or target 
groups in the partner country remains limited. 
Strengthening orientation towards development 
priorities and results in partner countries 
This core aspect would above all require that conceptual 
adjustments be made in terms of greater delimitation of 
and stronger programme orientation towards relevant DC 
areas and the specific needs of DC target groups in 
partner countries. It would also involve adjustments to 
help establish a greater awareness of development issues 
among participating companies. Orientation towards 
development priorities would be in line with trends in 
international programmes. Focusing on this core aspect 
would probably result in fewer cooperation arrangements, 
however, which would in turn reduce scope for innovative 
projects.
6. The conditional framework set out by the programme 
criteria appears logical and should be retained in principle. 
BMZ should adapt the programme criteria accordingly, 
depending on the programme’s orientation towards the 
two core aspects outlined above – sensitising the private 
sector to development issues and a greater orientation 
towards fostering development results in partner 
countries. 
7. In order to embed the function of sensitising companies  
to development issues more strongly in the programme 
design, BMZ should identify appropriate objectives and 
devise corresponding implementation measures together 
with the implementing organisations (such as annual 
dialogue forums with representatives from BMZ, the 
implementing organisations, civil society and the private 
sector). If a greater degree of orientation towards this  
core aspect is decided on, the following additional 
measures are also recommended: 
 • BMZ and the implementing organisations should devise 
measures that would enable develoPPP.de projects to 
be used to a greater degree at the overarching level as a 
platform for engaging in dialogue with and sensitising 
the private sector. Cooperation with other programmes 
such as the DC Scout Programme should also be taken 
into consideration in this context.
 • Where appropriate, targeted training measures to 
accompany develoPPP.de projects should be designed 
and offered to companies on topics such as the Global 
Compact.
 • In addition, project design could give greater consideration 
to ensuring that business activities generate a greater 
degree of development impact as a side effect. This 
would involve providing a greater degree of support for 
companies’ core business activities.
8. In order to ensure that activities are oriented to achieving 
development results in partner countries, the programme 
design should incorporate basic criteria to check that 
projects are aligned more closely with bilateral DC projects. 
Furthermore, BMZ should specify parameters for orienting 
activities to priority areas for development (e.g. in relation 
to target groups and key sectors) and ensure that they are 
clearly defined. The set of objectives could be strategically 
consolidated using the following options:
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 • Aiming to achieve a critical mass of develoPPP.de 
projects in certain countries and sectors in order to 
accumulate momentum for reform in the partner 
country and not just drive stand-alone measures.
 • Gearing the programme towards a division of labour 
with bilateral development cooperation by using 
develoPPP.de projects as good examples of (reform) 
strategies in policy dialogue with the partner country 
(e.g. in the area of sustainable economic development, 
agricultural value chains, etc.). In this context, BMZ’s 
thematic reference frameworks should be used to a 
greater degree as networking instruments.
 • Where appropriate, lifting (or ‘untying’) funding 
constraints and opening up the programme to local 
companies in partner countries.
9. BMZ should set clear parameters for the role that positive 
criteria play in project selection. 
3.1.3 Programme structure – implementation  
by three implementing organisations  
(DEG, GIZ and sequa) and forms of development 
partnership with the private sector
Implementation of the programme by three different 
implementing organisations offers opportunities for utilising 
the specific skills and structures of the implementing 
organisations for the benefit of the programme. DEG’s specific 
expertise lies in the area of financing and investment advice, 
while GIZ has comprehensive experience in providing 
organisational advisory and development services and has a 
wide range of structures and networks in developing countries 
and emerging economies. sequa’s core area of expertise  
is in vocational training and in cooperation with business 
associations and institutions in developing countries and 
emerging economies, where it has long-standing experience.
The evaluation’s findings allow us to conclude that the potential 
added value of this division of labour is neither transparently 
communicated in PR activities, nor is it sufficiently leveraged 
during project implementation. Although the expertise  
of these three organisations is incorporated into project 
implementation to varying degrees, the programme does not 
make systematic use of their competencies and has done  
little to raise their profiles. This is particularly the case with 
regard to the use of GIZ’s country structures, which the 
programme could leverage to a greater degree. Most of the 
companies that apply to participate in the programme are  
not aware that activities are implemented by three different 
organisations or that these organisations have different areas 
of expertise. As regards content and regional distribution,  
the differences between the implementing organisations 
project portfolios are minimal. 
At the conceptual level, the implementing organisations use 
different ‘forms’ to operationalise development partnerships 
with the private sector. The logic used to allocate these 
different forms to each implementing organisation is not very 
clear. Assigning ‘cooperation agreements’ to GIZ is the most 
logical allocation, as these require the implementing organisation 
to deliver its own inputs and to carry out projects together 
with partner companies. They are therefore particularly suited 
to GIZ’s area of expertise. However, GIZ implements traditional 
development partnerships with the private sector too, in 
addition to DEG and sequa. This form is based on service 
contracts and, as responsibility for implementation lies solely 
with the companies, it is less well suited to GIZ’s profile. 
At implementation level, the main difference between Strategic 
Projects implemented by DEG and traditional development 
partnerships is the higher amount of funding involved in 
Strategic Projects. No additional conceptual differences are 
detectable. GIZ’s Strategic Alliances are always implemented 
on the basis of cooperation agreements, and therefore  
differ in terms of implementation processes. Furthermore, 
their conceptual focus is geared to a greater extent towards 
disseminating lessons learned for use in other projects  
and programmes. In terms of effectiveness, the findings show  
that there are only minor differences between ‘traditional’  
and ‘strategic’ development partnerships with the private 
sector and between service contracts and cooperation 
agreements. Although strategic partnerships tend to fare 
better in terms of the broad-based impact achieved, this  
is primarily attributed to the higher level of funding involved  
in strategic partnerships rather than to conceptual differences. 
GIZ’s Strategic Alliances are equally as effective as Strategic 
Projects implemented by DEG. Sensitisation of partner 
companies to development issues tends to be observed 
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primarily in GIZ projects that are implemented based on 
cooperation agreements. This is attributed to the fact that 
these projects involve a greater degree of exchange between 
the implementing organisation and the company during the 
design and implementation phase. There are no differences in 
the effectiveness of traditional development partnerships with 
the private sector implemented by the different implementing 
organisations. One of the advantages of the different forms of 
development partnership with the private sector is that the 
varying needs of both companies and DC in terms of content 
and finance can be taken into consideration when implementing 
develoPPP.de projects. Overall, the added value gleaned from 
the different forms of development partnership with the private 
sector has so far been very limited, given the conceptual 
differences (which tend to be minor enough) and the challenges 
faced at implementation level. 
Apart from the different types of expertise offered by the 
individual organisations, the added value of having three 
implementing organisations also depends on efficient programme 
implementation. However, it is difficult to comment on the 
efficiency of programme implementation by DEG, GIZ and 
sequa as the financial systems of all three organisations prohibit 
project-based cost allocation in this context. The lack of a 
mechanism for rating efficiency deprives BMZ of the opportunity 
to make informed policy decisions in this context. Therefore, 
the question whether implementation by three organisations 
is expedient can only be answered using substantive arguments. 
The following conclusion can be drawn in this regard:  
retaining the ‘tripartite’ structure only appears expedient if 
the implementing organisations’ existing potential is used in 
full to generate added value for the achievement of programme 
objectives. As regards the different forms of development 
partnership with the private sector, the evaluation team 
believes that a certain degree of ‘fine-tuning’ is required at the 
conceptual level as well as programmatic assignment to the 
individual implementing organisations, against the backdrop  
of the develoPPP.de’s overarching strategy. 
Recommendations 
10. To make full use of existing potentials, it is recommended 
that project implementation and the recruitment of 
partner companies be systematically aligned with the core 
competencies of the implementing organisations.  
Within the implementing organisations, efforts should 
therefore be made to dovetail activities more closely  
with key business segments. On this basis, the following 
recommendations have been drafted for the individual 
implementing organisations.
 • GIZ: consistent use of targeted in-country expertise 
and of existing networks and structures in partner 
countries by stepping up the involvement of its  
field structure and networking develoPPP.de projects  
with TC programmes; 
 • DEG: Use of existing expertise and know-how in 
relation to country-specific investments by companies; 
provision of corresponding advisory services to 
companies within the framework of the develoPPP.de 
programme (e.g. on funding opportunities for follow-on 
investment within the framework of pilot projects);
 • sequa: develoPPP.de projects should be networked  
to a greater degree with chambers and associations  
and with the Import Promotion Desk; this applies to 
projects in the area of vocational training in particular. 
Project support should focus on projects with 
equivalent potential.
11. BMZ should review the extent to which its Agency  
for Business and Economic Development should act as  
an ‘entry portal’. Can it serve as a first port of call and  
offer interested companies initial advice? In this context, 
companies should receive specific information on the 
different forms of cooperation, the services provided by  
the various implementing organisations as well as their  
key areas of activity. The companies would then be pointed 
in the direction of the most suitable implementing 
organisation, based on their needs. 
12. Given the large-scale constraints in terms of rating  
efficiency, BMZ should examine the financial reporting and 
monitoring systems used to date and make the necessary 
adjustments. For example, it should look at introducing a 
project-based cost allocation system at the implementing 
organisations. 
13. The existing forms of development partnership with the 
private sector should be retained, but a greater distinction 
should be made between them, and they should be aligned 
with the corresponding expertise of the individual 
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implementing organisations. The following measures  
are recommended in this context:
 • GIZ should focus on cooperation agreements. 
Implementation of service contracts by GIZ should be 
gradually reduced. Cooperation agreements should 
cover both traditional and strategic development 
partnerships with the private sector.
 • DEG should concentrate on implementing traditional 
development partnerships with the private sector, 
based on service contracts. It should only implement 
strategic development partnerships with the private 
sector in cases where it would clearly generate added 
value in terms of sensitising participating companies to 
development issues and where linkages with technical 
cooperation projects and programmes are either not 
feasible or not expedient. (One such example would be 
a large company that does not need the implementing 
organisation to make specific inputs and for which a 
small develoPPP.de project is not an attractive option 
either.) The function of sensitising companies to 
development issues should be given due consideration. 
In this context, the extent to which Strategic Projects 
can follow on from traditional projects should be 
examined, in line with the rules on multiple funding.
 • sequa should continue to implement traditional 
development partnerships with the private sector, 
based on service contracts.
14. The criteria for strategic partnerships should be tightened 
in order to enhance the effectiveness of strategic develop-
ment partnerships with the private sector. A clear distinc-
tion should be made between strategic and traditional 
partnerships. Given the objective of achieving outstanding 
development benefits via strategic development partner-
ships with the private sector, this type of partnership 
should only be implemented in BMZ partner countries. 
Within the context of Strategic Alliances, which are con-
ducted by GIZ, the implementation of parallel DC support 
measures should be reviewed in addition to the linkages to 
existing DC programmes. To this end, GIZ should introduce 
binding criteria for networking with existing DC 
programmes.
3.2
What strategic, conceptual and procedural changes 
at programme level might help to increase BMZ’s 
steering capacity?
According to the evaluation’s findings, there are three areas 
where BMZ’s steering capacity could be increased and the 
related workload reduced. BMZ’s steering capacity is determined 
by the quality of the underlying policy framework on the one 
hand and by the mechanisms set down in M&E systems on the 
other. Both areas evidently pose challenges. Furthermore, 
there is also scope for improving how BMZ steers the project 
selection phase. 
3.2.1 Identifying the policy framework 
BMZ can use the following documents to set down key 
requirements for implementing the programme: the develoPPP.de 
guidelines (above all regarding company and project criteria), 
offers (DEG, GIZ) and applications and grant notifications (sequa) 
of the implementing organisations. The minutes of the resolutions 
adopted at develoPPP.de team meetings also come in useful  
in this context. Positive aspects include the develoPPP.de  
team meetings and communication between BMZ and the 
implementing organisations. They allow challenges to be 
identified early on, joint solutions to be devised and generally 
valid changes to be identified and decided on at an early  
stage via the minutes. The company criteria, which are geared 
to companies’ business strengths, are also deemed to be an 
appropriate means of establishing a balance between access  
to the programme and minimising the risk of discontinuation. 
On the negative side, the available data do not allow robust 
statements to be made on the correlation between company-
related factors and the risk of companies dropping out.
In some cases, the overarching project criteria for implementing 
the programme are not specific enough and are open to 
interpretation, which jeopardises the achievement of development 
objectives. Although the criteria cover key aspects related to 
business and to development, the criteria of complementarity 
and subsidiarity in particular are formulated very flexibly. 
Synergies are not fully leveraged as a result, which increases 
the probability of deadweight losses by the companies involved. 
The wording of additional criteria for strategic development 
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partnerships with the private sector is also not specific  
enough to ensure that a clear substantive distinction is made 
between them and traditional development partnerships with 
the private sector. Furthermore, the examination of criteria 
and documentation of review findings by the implementing 
organisations are not handled uniformly, which further 
increases the time and effort BMZ needs for checking. Offers 
submitted by DEG and GIZ and approval of applications  
by sequa have so far not been used to a sufficient degree  
to consolidate the programme’s unclear policy framework  
for individual implementing organisations. 
On a positive note, a provision related to exercising due 
diligence in relation to human rights has been added to 
develoPPP.de contracts. However, it is still unclear what 
companies’ obligations are in this context. Furthermore, 
neither BMZ nor the implementing organisations have yet 
developed a structured process to monitor compliance with 
these standards. 
BMZ should use these key adjustment mechanisms to regulate 
the framework for the implementing organisations to a greater 
degree and to consolidate its own steering role. 
Recommendations
15. BMZ should specify the project criteria of complementarity, 
subsidiarity and additional criteria for strategic 
development partnerships with the private sector and 
document compliance with these criteria. This would 
reduce leeway for interpretation on the part of the 
implementing organisations and make their activities more 
verifiable for BMZ.
 • A review of subsidiarity/additionality should adhere to 
the standards of the Donor Committee for Enterprise 
Development (DCED) on measuring additionality 
(Heinrich, 2014). In order to leverage complementarity, 
it should be spelled out how each project fulfils each of 
the requirements (cost efficiency, speed, effectiveness). 
 • The criteria for strategic development partnerships 
with the private sector should be embedded in the 
programme design to a greater degree. A high level of 
innovation and potential for replicability should be 
mapped using a plausible line of reasoning, and 
underpinned by corresponding measures. Structure-
building results should be operationalised using 
tangible indicators such as the establishment of a link 
with actors in the partner country and the use of a 
multi-stakeholder approach. Both of these elements 
need to be defined in greater detail. 
 • Documentation of the review findings should be 
improved and made available to BMZ. A uniform 
checklist of all criteria should be attached to all project 
concept papers and filled out for each project. Risks as 
regards human rights aspects should be added to the 
checklist. 
16. BMZ should provide the implementing organisations with 
clear instructions on how to deal with the issue of human 
rights within the scope of develoPPP.de, in line with the 
recently published National Action Plan on Business and 
Human Rights (currently only available in German). The 
key prerequisite here is that BMZ defines the term ‘due 
diligence in relation to human rights’ and determines how 
the implementing organisations should ensure compliance 
within the framework of the develoPPP.de programme.
17. A human rights risk analysis for all implementing 
organisations and forms of development partnership with 
the private sector – as required by BMZ’s Guidelines on 
Incorporating Human Rights Standards and Principles, 
including Gender, in Programme Proposals for Bilateral 
German Technical and Financial Cooperation – and 
monitoring of compliance via M&E systems are deemed 
expedient.
 • In order to increase transparency, selected project data 
(company name, project name, sector, type of project) 
should be published. Where applicable, the company 
should approve publication of this information in 
writing in the contract. 
 • As called for in the above-mentioned BMZ guidelines, 
BMZ should appraise the need for introducing a human 
rights complaints mechanism for actors in BMZ project 
countries. 
18. BMZ and the implementing organisations should optimise 
and compare offers/commissions and applications/grant 
notifications. This should include the following: 
 • consistent use of terminology, e.g. use of terms ‘results’ 
or ‘module objectives’. 
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 • BMZ and the implementing organisations should define 
a standard set of realistic indicators that are Specific, 
Measurable, Attainable, Relevant and Time-bound. 
 • The implementing organisations should clearly  
set out how their internal M&E systems are used for 
monitoring and inner-organisational learning. 
3.2.2 M&E systems
The design of the monitoring and evaluation systems is 
relatively unbureaucratic and company-friendly. In keeping 
with the programme’s demand orientation, the systems 
therefore do little to reduce the programme’s attractiveness. 
As a result, they only enable BMZ to fulfil its role in steering 
and monitoring content at the programme level to a very 
limited degree and make it difficult to assess the programme’s 
effectiveness (i.e. the degree to which it has achieved 
objectives). The overarching monitoring system for the 
programme is therefore evaluated as having significant scope 
for expansion, which is closely linked with the quality of the 
monitoring systems at the level of the implementing 
organisations’ portfolios. Overarching report formats/the 
underlying data basis at the portfolio level do not sufficiently 
map the achievement of objectives by develoPPP.de projects, 
further-reaching results or their sustainability. Even the 
implementing organisations therefore find it impossible to 
make a robust assessment of these aspects of the programme 
at portfolio level, which in turn can be attributed to the 
inadequate monitoring systems used by the individual 
projects. The monitoring of substantive results achieved by the 
projects is largely based on trust. It relies on self-assessment 
forms filled out by the companies. On-site monitoring visits 
are only carried out to a very limited degree. The resulting 
information asymmetries between companies and 
implementing organisations render post-adjustment by the 
implementing organisation more difficult. Although the cross-
programme ex-post evaluations that BMZ commissions and 
conducts annually represent a positive approach, their added 
value as regards steering/monitoring the develoPPP.de 
programme can be considered very limited due to their 
methodological restrictions. Overall, it is evident that there is 
a mutual interdependency between insufficient monitoring 
mechanisms, or a total lack thereof, at the project, portfolio 
and programme level. BMZ (and implementing organisations 
too) are restricted to a large degree in terms of steering the 
content of the overall programme and of the portfolios/
individual projects. At the same time, BMZ and the 
implementing organisations can only fulfil their role in the 
areas of accountability and legitimacy to a very limited extent. 
Furthermore, the function of learning from monitoring and 
evaluation is restricted to a significant degree. When 
realigning the M&E systems and the associated instruments, 
the specific partner set-up, i.e. project implementation by 
companies instead of by implementing organisations, should 
be considered. The M&E systems need to be designed in as 
unbureaucratic and company-friendly a manner as possible, 
but only so long as it is ensured that BMZ and the 
implementing organisations are able to fulfil their monitoring 
tasks in their entirety.
Recommendations
19. At the programme/portfolio/project level, BMZ and 
implementing organisations should consolidate their 
functions in terms of steering, monitoring and learning by 
expanding M&E systems in a coherent manner. To this end, 
BMZ should develop an overarching M&E system for the 
programme as a whole. Implementing organisations should 
set up M&E systems for their corresponding portfolios on 
this basis. These should contain data on the acquisition, 
design and implementation phases. DCED’s Standard for 
Measuring Results in Private Sector Development offers a 
good starting point in this context and should be taken into 
consideration in this context. The information required by 
BMZ and by implementing organisations needs to be 
identified, in line with the modified set of objectives. 
(Which actors should use which information and how?). 
Corresponding reporting formats should be further 
developed by BMZ and the implementing organisations, 
and appropriate standards introduced.
 • For M&E at the project level, the implementing 
organisations are advised to update report formats and 
align the structure and the terms used across the three 
implementing organisations. 
 • The indicators used across all three implementing 
organisations should correspond to SMART criteria and 
should be attributable (output level/intermediate 
outcome level). 
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 • Indicators should clearly operationalise public sector 
and development objectives. 
 • Standardised scales should be used to rate progress in 
the projects.
 • The implementing organisations should introduce 
project visits by project managers as a standardised 
format that serves as a random verification instrument 
for project reporting.
 • Drafting of steering mechanisms for project managers, 
e.g. review of the degree to which the disbursement of 
public project funding can be coupled with the 
achievement of project milestones.
20. In consultation with Division 105, BMZ’s Division 114 should 
carry out external evaluations every one (to two) years. 
These evaluations should comply with research standards 
to a greater degree and where possible, adhere to 
standardised requirements in order to synthesise the 
findings and track trends. Different themes – the next 
evaluation will focus on sustainability, for example – also 
appear expedient. As has already been the case for DEG, 
GIZ and sequa should also stipulate in develoPPP.de 
contracts that project evaluations may be conducted. 
Furthermore, programme evaluations should be conducted 
at routine intervals (every five years).
21. BMZ and the implementing organisations should further 
expand their knowledge management systems. Monitoring 
data and the findings of project and programme 
evaluations/ex-post evaluations should be routinely 
collected via the develoPPP.de cloud in order to improve 
the possibility of learning from previous projects. 
Indicators such as company size, number of staff, multiple 
funding (yes/no) and the achievement of project objectives 
should be included. BMZ and the implementing 
organisations should devise additional formats to step up 
experiential learning within and between the organisations. 
Both positive and negative lessons learned during project 
implementation should be collected in a targeted manner 
and exchange formats (further) developed so as to 
disseminate these lessons both within and between the 
implementing organisations.
22. BMZ should continue to draw on support from the Sector 
Project Private Sector Cooperation. Implementing organi-
sations retain responsibility for ensuring the appropriate 
use of resources for M&E at the portfolio and project level. 
They should include such activities in offers and applica-
tions and budget for them accordingly. BMZ should provide 
implementing organisations with a suitable budget for M&E.
3.2.3 Steering procedures during project selection 
During the project selection phase, the steering and 
coordination processes between BMZ Division 114 and the 
implementing organisations are very complex. Given the high 
priority of the develoPPP.de programme internally at the 
political level and the strong risks in terms of reputation 
externally, this level of complexity and detail in terms of 
programme steering by BMZ is understandable. The 
implementing organisations handle the selection criteria 
relatively flexibly and the selection decisions they make are 
only transparent to BMZ to a limited degree. The coordination 
processes required are laborious and entail high transaction 
costs and substantial resources for BMZ and the implementing 
organisations, which delays implementation of individual 
projects. This is particularly the case for strategic development 
partnerships with the private sector. The evaluation findings 
clearly show that the coordination processes in this phase 
could be structured more efficiently without curtailing BMZ’s 
scope of influence to any great degree. Firstly, the workflow 
involved in the two-step coordination process could be 
designed more efficiently. This also applies to cooperation with 
the regional divisions. Secondly, the number of individual 
discussions could be reduced. This relates both to multiple 
cooperation arrangements and to the flexible interpretation of 
the company criteria. Finally, the documentation of projects 
eligible for support in the form of the BMZ management 
information bulletin could be discontinued. It eats up a lot of 
resources and offers no discernible added value for the 
develoPPP.de programme. The evaluation team draws the 
conclusion that the current degree of complexity of steering 
during the project selection phase is justified to some degree, 
but that processes could be designed more efficiently. This 
would help cut down on resources and speed up the 
implementation of individual projects. 
Recommendations
23. BMZ is advised to reduce the complexity of steering during 
the project selection phase. Implementation tasks such as 
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the selection of projects eligible for support should be 
carried out by the implementing organisations where 
possible. BMZ should focus on steering the programme at 
the overarching level by identifying a suitable policy 
framework and appropriate monitoring mechanisms. 
24. Use of the BMZ management information bulletin should 
be discontinued in order to reduce the degree of 
coordination required. At the same time, BMZ should be 
given the opportunity to spot-check whether projects fulfil 
the specified criteria. 
25. Holding individual discussions to coordinate Strategic 
Alliances and Strategic Projects and projects in politically 
sensitive countries are expedient activities. BMZ should 
streamline the coordination processes involved, however, 
by: 
 • Eliminating the second review stage, i.e. formal 
confirmation of the decision on funding by BMZ. It 
does not provide any added value. 
 • Improving cooperation with the regional divisions by 
having BMZ’s Division 114 define the role of the 
regional divisions during the selection and design 
phase in writing and discuss and agree this document 
with the divisions. 
26. Individual discussions on exemptions regarding company 
criteria and multiple funding should be discontinued. 
 • The current design of the company criteria is endorsed 
for the most part. To streamline matters, it is proposed 
to simplify the piloted criteria and embed them in the 
programme guidelines, e.g. at least two years of 
business operations, at least eight employees, turnover 
of at least EUR 800,000. 
 • Multiple funding: BMZ is advised to establish an 
overview of the corresponding legal situation. 
Depending on the findings and on the details of the 
programme’s set of objectives, multiple funding should 
either be explicitly prohibited or clearly enshrined in 
the guidelines. Possible criteria include: only one 
develoPPP.de programme per company at any given 
time; no more than one new project every three years, 
positive criterion for initial support. 
3.3
Which conceptual and procedural changes could  
be used to adjust the processes for implementing 
the develoPPP.de portfolio of DEG, GIZ and sequa?
Conceptual and procedural changes by the implementing 
organisations could target the following areas: acquisition and 
PR, selection of the project ideas submitted by companies as 
part of the ideas competitions and structuring of the projects 
during the design phase. The following sections take a look  
at these areas.
3.3.1 Acquisition and PR
Based on its findings, the evaluation concludes that the 
programme is only known in the German private sector to a 
limited degree. However, the level of awareness alone is not  
the only factor that determines the number of applications. 
Against the backdrop of potentially limited demand and the 
issue of which companies are interested in the programme  
in the first place, a detailed target group segmentation would 
appear to be a more obvious prerequisite for identifying  
an overarching PR strategy. No cross-programme acquisition 
strategy has so far been put in place. The main added value  
to be gained from implementation by three organisations  
lies in the potential for acquiring private sector partners via  
the organisations’ wide array of decentralised networks.  
PR activities for the programme and the procedures used to 
approach and acquire private sector partners do not visibly 
highlight the organisations’ different skills, however. This 
means that the added value of a tripartite structure for the 
programme’s success is undermined as early on as the application 
stage, as companies frequently tend to apply to the implementing 
organisation with which they first happened to come into contact.
The use of proactive acquisition measures by the implementing 
organisations is controversial and is not handled consistently. 
However, embedding acquisition within the programme’s 
strategy plays a key role in reconciling the tensions between 
demand orientation and development effectiveness, and in 
clarifying existing uncertainties. Consultants can by all means 
add value within the framework of acquisition, whereas other 
forms of support they provide during the application phase  
or in the programme itself are assessed critically as they may 
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have a negative influence on project quality. The implementing 
organisations should provide advisory services during  
the application phase and should also support project 
implementation.
Furthermore, it has so far not been possible to position the 
programme in a transparent manner. As regards the diversity 
of measures BMZ offers to companies, this would not appear 
to be a problem that is specific to develoPPP.de; rather it is 
necessitated by the nature of the overall package of services 
that BMZ provides. Any solutions therefore need to be devised 
centrally, e.g. at the Agency for Business and Economic 
Development rather than at the level of the programme’s  
PR activities. 
Recommendations
27. BMZ should commission an analysis of whether the  
limited number of applications can be attributed to a lack 
of awareness or to inadequate demand for the promotional 
approach. A detailed study of target group segmentation 
and of market potentials appears expedient, as does a 
comparison with similar support programmes operated for 
example by the German Federal Ministry for Economic 
Affairs and Energy (BMWi) or the German Federal Ministry 
for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and 
Nuclear Safety (BMUB).
28. Based on this study and together with the programme-
based units responsible for PR, BMZ should tailor its  
PR strategy and draft an overarching acquisition strategy. 
Both strategies should cover all implementing organisations 
and clearly present the different profiles of each organisation 
in order to enable the transparent and justifiable assignment 
of a company to one of the organisations. BMZ should review 
whether pro-active acquisition measures by the implementing 
organisations are expedient and permissible, above all in 
order to acquire projects for DC-related areas. In this context, 
cooperation with the DC Scout Programme should be 
examined and any required conceptual changes made.
29. The implementing organisations are advised to drive 
implementing-organisation-specific PR/acquisition 
activities and to further expand them (target group 
segmentation, targeting, messaging, channels), based  
on BMZ’s strategies. Possible fields for expansion  
include participation in trade fairs, alumni networks,  
and advertising within Europe and with German Chambers 
of Commerce (AHKs). 
30. We recommend that an entry portal for companies  
that is shared by all three implementing organisations  
be developed. This will make it easier for companies to 
access the programme. The profile of the implementing 
organisations needs to be sharpened and a criteria-based 
allocation mechanism developed before such a portal  
is set up. This mechanism could run via a central help desk 
that could be located at the Agency for Business and 
Economic Development. In order to support companies  
in the decision-making process, a tool should also be  
made available on the develoPPP.de website where companies 
could enter information on their project idea. The tool 
would then recommend one or more implementing 
organisations, based on the details entered. 
31. BMZ should examine whether implementing organisations 
can fulfil companies’ needs with reasonable effort following 
advisory services provided during the application phase.  
In order to ensure that the role of the ideas competition  
is respected and to provide equal opportunities for all 
companies, equal access to advisory services during the 
application phase must be ensured. 
32. BMZ should review the targeted use of external consultants 
during project acquisition, particularly for DC-related 
countries and themes. The provision of advisory services 
during the project application phase and the assignment  
of external consultants to provide support services  
during project implementation is not recommended.  
Such assignments are only deemed expedient during  
the acquisition phase. BMZ needs to develop a financing 
mechanism that is geared solely towards acquisition.
3.3.2 The application, design and implementation phases
The ideas competition for traditional development partnerships 
with the private sector provides companies with equal access 
to the programme. However, limited demand also restricts the 
role the competition can play in picking the best project ideas, 
in steering the programme via positive criteria and in focusing 
on priority areas. The focus of PS4D programmes at the 
international level is trending towards disadvantaged groups 
and towards engagement in LDCs. However, narrowing the 
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focus in this way would result in a sharp drop in project 
applications. Such a decision can only be made by taking into 
account the final set of objectives for the programme. 
Increasing the number of applications by stepping up PR and 
acquisition activities, rather than the ideas competition itself, 
would appear to be the key lever here. Adopting a more flexible 
approach to acquiring private sector companies is assessed  
as highly expedient. Given that the additional criteria for 
strategic development partnerships with the private sector  
are frequently not fulfilled, the lack of transparency of the 
processes used is criticised.
The evaluation assesses the expectations to be met by 
develoPPP.de projects, which are outlined in the concept notes, 
as too ambitious in view of the time constraints and financial 
conditions set down by the programme. This is shown by  
the fact that the postulated causal links between results are  
not verifiable, assumptions are too optimistic for the given 
contexts, and packages of measures are too ambitious. These 
aspects are due in part to a failure to spell out areas of tension 
between business interests and development policy. While 
synergy potentials are highlighted, potential conflicts of interest 
are not sufficiently taken into account. When designing  
the projects, the implementing organisation and the company 
involved often fail to reach a shared understanding of the 
project purpose. As a result, European and local partners prioritise 
their own corporate objectives during the implementation 
phase. The projects are usually implemented by local companies 
in the partner country and, as they are not systematically 
involved in the design process, they frequently focus on the 
business objectives, rather than the development objectives,  
of development partnerships with the private sector. 
Recommendations
33. We advise BMZ to optimise the way the ideas competitions 
allocate public funds for development policy purposes.  
In order to consolidate the competition element, funding 
should either be reduced or the number of applications 
increased. Such a decision can only be made by taking into 
account the programme’s set of objectives. 
34. The implementing organisations should ensure that  
the development interests of development partnerships 
with the private sector can be more realistically asserted.  
In this context, the programme’s dual objectives structure 
(public/private sector) should be specifically taken into 
consideration for each project. Possible starting points 
include:
 • Formulation of objectives and operationalisation via 
indicators: For individual development partnerships with 
the private sector, anticipated public/private sector 
synergies should be linked with concrete project objectives 
and their nature specified (i. e. whether synergies will  
be generated for the public or private sector). In other 
words, synergies are not to be assumed on the basis  
of theoretical deduction, but should be made verifiable 
by assignment to a specific objective.
 • Target group and needs analyses should take into account 
the dual objectives structure: Synergies and conflicting 
objectives will become more transparent if an explicit 
distinction is made between target groups in the 
development context (e. g. marginalised or vulnerable 
sections of the population) and in the business context 
(e. g. producers, suppliers or consumers). Overlaps  
are possible and indeed desirable.
35. Once the project idea has been assessed, the implementing 
organisations should once again pick up on the sustainability 
criterion in the project design. Furthermore, the implementing 
organisations should incorporate objectives for disseminating 
project experience at the meso and macro levels and for 
networking with other actors on site at the design stage.  
In line with the dual objectives structure, the plan of 
operations should spell out more clearly whether realistic 
incentives exist for companies to continue/transfer project 
successes and whether it is plausible to assume that 
positive impact can be sustained. If these potentials and 
constraints are not openly dealt with, there is a risk that 
companies will discontinue measures introduced by a 
project following its completion and that there will be 
unrealistic expectations of develoPPP.de projects.
36. Where possible, implementing organisations are advised  
to involve local implementation partners in the implementing 
organisation/company design process. Alternatively, project 
sub-objectives that incorporate onboarding, e.g. joint  
kick-off workshops, could be included in the project design 
phase. To this end, design documents must be drafted in  
a local language.
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3.4 
To what extent and under which circumstances  
is the develoPPP.de programme effective in terms 
of promoting develoPPP.de projects at the level  
of the directly involved local companies, public 
institutions and target groups, and at the level of 
European partner companies?
The fact that the programme’s set of objectives has not been 
further operationalised or backed by indicators makes it difficult 
to rate develoPPP.de’s effectiveness. As a result the programme, 
as a support mechanism for development partnerships with 
the private sector, does not set (sub-)objectives for the project 
portfolios of implementing organisations and for individual  
projects. The lack of detailed goals is also determined by the 
programme’s orientation towards demand from companies and 
is therefore desired from a design point of view. As a result,  
it is only possible to give an approximate rating in this context, 
based on a reconstructed set of objectives (see Section 1.5).
3.4.1 Results achieved at the level of local companies  
and public institutions 
Based on the objectives set down in the project design phase, 
the case studies and company surveys suggest that develoPPP.de 
generates successful projects that extend over and above 
solely providing inputs. In several cases, companies contributed 
technical know-how such as financial products and technical 
applications that could not have been provided in this form by 
BMZ or by the implementing organisations. However, the 
added value generated from a corporate perspective usually 
outweighs the development benefits. In absolute terms,  
the limited achievement of development objectives reduces 
the overall added value of development partnerships with  
the private sector, which should serve development and private 
sector goals to an equal degree. Of the criteria to determine 
the eligibility of project applications for promotion, use of the 
criteria ‘complementarity’ and ‘subsidiarity’ in particular is  
only partially verifiable. It cannot therefore be convincingly 
ruled out that corporate interests could have mobilised the 
intended resources anyway at some of the projects analysed.
Based on the projects examined in the case studies and in the 
company survey, the evaluation concludes that the projects 
implemented as part of the programme make a successful 
contribution to the transfer of know-how and technology  
to the private sector in partner countries. There are some 
constraints as regards the achievement of objectives, however, 
above all in projects that have a strong product focus, where  
it is difficult to generate an overlap of interests in terms of sales 
and the widest possible dissemination of innovations. Overall, 
the develoPPP.de programme has been rather successful in 
providing stimuli in partner countries via innovation transfer. 
3.4.2 Results achieved at the level of target groups  
in partner countries
The findings indicate that limited progress has been made in 
translating the innovation transfer facilitated by develoPPP.de 
projects into income-generating and employment effects for 
the local population. Often, the projects only cover small target 
groups among the overall population, which means that large-
scale changes cannot really be expected. It also remains unclear 
how develoPPP.de intends to reconcile tensions between  
the target groups of development interventions and those  
of companies at programmatic level. While development 
cooperation is geared towards marginalised and vulnerable 
sections of the population, these are usually of little interest  
as corporate target groups (i.e. as consumers or producers). 
Against this backdrop, it cannot be presumed that develoPPP.de 
projects as such will contribute to inclusive economic growth 
in the partner countries and have poverty-reducing effects. 
3.4.3 Results achieved at the level of participating  
European companies
In addition to the development objectives of the individual 
projects, the strategic orientation, conceptual structure and 
implementation of the programme give rise to an additional 
objective that is not explicitly mentioned in the programme 
guidelines. develoPPP.de should fulfil a function of sensitising 
the private sector to development issues and mainstream 
development cooperation in a wider section of society, in 
addition to the state and civil society. The evaluation’s findings 
show that the participating companies have only been sensitised 
to development issues to a limited degree. Little has been 
achieved in terms of sparking organisational change above and 
beyond sensitising individuals. On the other hand, however, 
the lessons learned from projects have indeed been used at 
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corporate level insofar as they are deemed to broaden companies’ 
experience in doing business at the international level. Many 
companies reported an awareness of development issues 
before they participated in the programme, which indicates 
that they chose to become involved of their own volition. 
Programme participation rarely brought about a ‘sensitisation 
effect’ among companies that reported a very limited 
development awareness before project implementation. 
Consequently, develoPPP.de seems to have been more 
successful in supporting and consolidating existing development 
activities than actually initiating such engagement in the first 
place. Overall, develoPPP.de is only assessed as being partially 
successful in terms of its ability to sensitise companies to 
development issues.
3.5
To what extent can the results achieved  
by the develoPPP.de programme’s  
promotion of projects be considered durable  
and broad-based?
In keeping with the view that the develoPPP.de programme 
acts as a stimulus, this evaluation uses a functional definition 
of sustainability as a basis (‘What is set in motion?’, Caspari, 
2004). develoPPP.de projects stimulate innovation transfer  
to partner countries. They are assessed as being sustainable 
when the project results are perpetuated beyond the support 
period (safeguarding of stimulus). Similarly, a project is deemed 
to generate broad impact when the project results are used 
above and beyond the actors and target groups directly involved 
in the project (dissemination of stimulus).
3.5.1 Sustainability of results
Continuation of the innovations introduced in the projects  
by the corresponding partner companies and institutions once 
the support period has ended is assessed as partially successful. 
The fact that project activities that are designed to generate 
added development value tend to be scaled back leads to 
greater constraints. There was therefore a (renewed) focus on 
the core business of participating companies. The assessment 
of the corresponding project target groups is more positive. 
They tend to go on using the innovations introduced by the 
programme after the programme ends. In all, the develoPPP.de 
programme is fairly successful at safeguarding the project 
impetus it has provided beyond the promotion period. 
Given the broad range of themes, regions and funding 
mechanisms involved in the projects, the evaluation can only 
provide entry points as regards the risks and potentials for  
the sustainability of develoPPP.de. Projects by larger companies 
(annual turnover of more than EUR 50 million) are assessed 
more favourably in terms of creating conditions conducive to 
sustainability, as activities to sustainably anchor the projects 
have greater traction. This is likely to be primarily due to the 
fact that these companies have better project management 
capacities. 
3.5.2 Broad-based impact
As a stimulus programme, develoPPP.de is rather unsuccessful 
at disseminating and sustainably mainstreaming the stimuli 
provided by the projects beyond the partners that are directly 
involved. Only a few of the projects assessed incorporated 
innovation transfer into their designs at the institutional level, 
and those that did were GIZ projects, most of them Strategic 
Alliances. In this context, companies and public institutions that 
were not directly involved in the project usually did not adopt 
the innovations introduced in the projects, however. The same 
applies to the transfer of project innovations above and beyond 
the corresponding target groups. When compared with the 
original objectives, the innovations introduced were frequently 
only made available to a limited degree in terms of regions, 
content and quantity. Sustainable dissemination of the stimuli 
generated by the projects must be assessed as largely 
unsuccessful. 
Consequently, the evaluation gave no indication that the 
innovations introduced by the projects enhanced performance 
across entire systems in the corresponding industrial sector  
or development priority area. Only in specific cases, and taking 
into account additional plausibility considerations, can it be 
assumed that the projects have the potential to contribute to 
overarching development results at the aggregated level; 
considerable reservations exist in this respect, however. On 
the whole, the programme in its present form is not suitable 
for generating projects with broad impact and structure-
building results.
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3.6 
Concluding remarks
The develoPPP.de programme is rated as relevant thanks  
to its basic approach of enlisting greater support from private 
sector partners through cooperation arrangements in order  
to achieve development objectives and ultimately attain further 
overarching development goals. However, given its unclear 
strategic orientation and current conceptual design, the 
programme has so far not succeeded in achieving these objectives 
to a satisfactory degree. Although develoPPP.de does help 
introduce innovative ideas in partner countries through 
cooperation with private sector actors, its projects usually  
do not succeed in generating results above and beyond the 
project level. Thus, the programme promotes a large number 
of stand-alone projects, despite its original intention of 
providing impetus to enhance performance across entire 
systems. Its ability to sensitise the private sector to development 
issues, which goes hand-in-hand with mainstreaming 
development cooperation within society, above and beyond 
the level of state and civil society, is also only fulfilled to a 
limited degree. The findings of this evaluation correspond  
with the key statements of national and international evaluations 
and studies on the develoPPP.de programme and similar 
programmes implemented by other donors. This illustrates the 
need for the programme’s decision makers to take on the 
identified challenges and to initiate corresponding adjustments 
and innovations. The recommendations outlined above are 
intentionally formulated in a comprehensive, action-oriented 
and at times complex manner in order to address this issue  
as constructively as possible. 
The prominent position of develoPPP.de as BMZ’s major 
programme for promoting development partnerships with the 
private sector offers potential for effectively enlisting support 
from private companies in implementing BMZ’s Sustainable 
Development Strategy (‘One World – Our Responsibility’), in 
addition to the traditional stakeholders at state and civil-society 
level. This potential needs to be leveraged to a greater degree  
in order to address the numerous unresolved challenges that 
exist on the path to attaining these goals. 
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5.1 
Evaluation matrix
Evaluation questions Judgement criteria Focus of the analysis Method DAC criterion
Evaluation question 1: How appropriate is the develoPPP.de programme for achieving relevant development objectives?
1.1 To what extent are the 
objectives of the develoPPP.de 
programme geared to BMZ’s 
guidelines, strategies and 
development objectives?
Judgement criterion 1.1.1  
The programme’s objectives 
match the key objectives of 
BMZ’s overarching development 
strategies
Comparison of programme objectives  
with the objectives of BMZ’s strategies on 
poverty reduction, the establishment of 
global development partnerships with the 
private sector (MDG 8, the Global Compact, 
Charter for the Future) and the post-2015 
development agenda
Document analysis, 
expert 
consultations 
Relevance
Judgement criterion 1.1.2  
The programme’s objectives 
match the key objectives of 
relevant BMZ sector strategies 
and guidelines
Comparison of programme objectives with the 
objectives of BMZ’s Sector Strategy on Private 
Sector Development, the objectives of other 
(sector) strategies and position papers (e. g. on 
vocational training, the development of rural 
areas etc., depending on the sectors where the 
case studies are conducted) and guidelines on 
develoPPP.de
Judgement criterion 1.1.3  
The programme’s short-term 
priorities match BMZ’s  
strategic priority areas
Comparison of the programme’s short-term 
priorities with BMZ’s current priority areas; 
implementation of short-term programme 
priorities in develoPPP.de projects
1.2 To what extent do the 
objectives of the develoPPP.de 
programme correspond to 
relevant strategies and objectives 
pursued by the partner countries?
Judgement criterion 1.2.1  
The objectives of develoPPP.de 
projects take into account 
development needs in the 
corresponding sectors and/or 
regions in the partner countries
Compatibility of project objectives with the 
goals set out in partner countries’ strategy 
papers and development plans; consideration 
of specific needs of relevant target groups in 
partner countries
Document analysis, 
case studies 
Relevance
1.3 To what extent is the 
programme’s design geared to 
generating synergies by 
encouraging cooperation between 
DC and the private sector?
Judgement criterion 1.3.1 
Compatibility of private sector 
objectives with the programme’s 
development-policy objectives
Comparison of the programme’s  
objectives with those of the private sector; 
recognisable conflicting objectives; acceptance 
of cooperation between the private sector  
and DC
Document analysis, 
content analysis, 
expert 
consultations, 
company survey
Relevance
Judgement criterion 1.3.2 Design 
helps shape innovative projects 
that would otherwise not have 
been implemented in this form
Innovative potential of the projects 
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1.4 To what extent is the 
programme’s fundamental design 
and structure geared to achieving 
the programme’s development 
objectives through support for 
develoPPP.de projects?
Judgement criterion 1.4.1 The 
objectives of the develoPPP.de 
projects are geared to the 
programme’s objectives
Comparison of project objectives with 
programme objectives
Document analysis, 
portfolio analysis, 
content analysis, 
expert 
consultations, 
company survey
Relevance
Judgement criterion 1.4.2 The 
programme’s design takes 
account of the specific value that 
the different implementing 
organisations can add to the 
programme
Specific expertise of the three implementing 
organisations; demand among the private 
sector for expertise that is specific to the 
implementing organisation; orientation of 
project support towards the expertise offered 
by the corresponding implementing 
organisation
1.4.3 Orientation of the different 
forms of development 
partnerships with the private 
sector towards the achievement 
of specific development 
objectives by the programme
Specific development objectives pursued by 
different forms of development partnerships 
with the private sector (traditional, strategic, 
consulting contract, cooperation agreement); 
demand from the private sector for the 
different forms of cooperation
1.4.4 The criteria and standards 
laid down by BMZ are used to 
design and implement 
development-related projects
Suitability of project criteria for safeguarding 
relevance in terms of development; positive 
criteria (above all inclusion and focus on LDCs) 
and the setting of short-term priorities as part of 
the ideas competitions (above all BMZ’s One 
World – No Hunger and the Partnership for 
Sustainable Textiles) ensure that projects are 
focused on BMZ’s strategic priority areas; 
safeguarding of implementability thanks to 
application of company criteria; compliance with 
social, environmental and human rights 
standards during project development; 
compatibility of criteria and standards with 
private sector interests
Evaluation question 2: What strategic, conceptual and procedural changes at programme level might help to increase BMZ’s steering capacity?
2.1 To what extent are BMZ’s 
internal prerequisites for 
appropriate programme steering 
met?
Judgement criterion 2.1.1 
Appropriateness of BMZ’s 
internal structures, processes, 
capacities and resources for 
programme steering
BMZ-internal organisational structure; 
processes; acceptance of objectives; human 
resource capacities; communication structures 
(internal and external); finances
Document analysis, 
expert 
consultations
Effectiveness/
efficiency
2.2 In terms of programme 
implementation, how can BMZ’s 
steering capacity be improved via 
the three implementing 
organisations?
Judgement criterion 2.2.1  
Steering resources required due 
to programme implementation  
by three different implementing 
organisations
Joint consultation processes particularly 
during project selection, project completion 
and focusing of the programme; budget 
management; potential conflicting objectives; 
need for three implementing organisations 
(advantages/disadvantages, added value)
Document analysis, 
content analysis, 
expert 
consultations, 
portfolio analysis 
Effectiveness/
efficiency
Judgement criterion 2.2.2  
Quality of monitoring and 
reporting at the programme level
Orientation of M&E system towards 
verification of the achievement of programme 
objectives; use of M&E system for programme 
steering
Judgement criterion 2.2.3  
Steering by BMZ of programme 
implementation based on  
positive criteria and the setting  
of short-term priorities
Consideration of positive criteria in project 
support; consideration of BMZ’s short-term 
priorities by implementing organisations
2.3 To what extent are BMZ’s 
needs in terms of steering 
development policy compatible 
with the programme’s demand 
orientation?
Judgement criterion 2.3.1 
Harmonisation of BMZ’s 
development-policy requirements 
with the basic needs of the 
private sector
Communication/harmonisation processes 
with the private sector; compatibility of BMZ’s 
priority areas with companies’ interests; 
comparison of company/project criteria with 
company interests; conflicting objectives; 
areas of conflict
Expert 
consultations, 
company survey
Effectiveness/
relevance
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Evaluation question 3: What conceptual and procedural changes could be used to adjust the processes for implementing  
the develoPPP.de portfolio of DEG, GIZ and sequa?
3.1 To what extent are conditions 
within the implementing 
organisations conducive to the 
programme being implemented in 
line with BMZ’s requirements?
Judgement criterion 3.1.1  
Within the implementing 
organisations: appropriateness  
of the corresponding objectives, 
structures, processes, capacities 
and resources for programme 
implementation
Within the implementing organisations: 
organisational structures; processes; 
acceptance of objectives; conflicting 
objectives; indicators for measuring 
objectives; human resource capacities; 
communication structures (internal and 
external); finances/administrative costs
Document analysis, 
expert 
consultations 
Effectiveness/
efficiency
3.2 What procedural and 
administrative changes can be 
introduced to improve project 
initiation and design? 
Judgement criterion 3.2.1  
Quality of project acquisition  
by the relevant implementing 
organisation
Formal and informal acquisition measures  
(PR and communication measures) by the 
implementing organisations; accessibility and 
clarity of the application procedure; differences 
between the forms of development partnership 
with the private sector/implementing 
organisations
Document analysis, 
expert 
consultations, 
company survey, 
case studies 
Effectiveness/
efficiency
Judgement criterion 3.2.2  
Quality of Judgement and 
selection processes used  
by the relevant implementing 
organisation
Application of company and project criteria: 
transparency, assessment systems, 
standardisation, quality assurance. Differences 
between the forms of development partnership 
with the private sector/implementing 
organisations
Judgement criterion 3.2.3  
Quality of the processes and 
procedures used by the relevant 
implementing organisation  
to design projects and prepare 
contracts
Integration of development objectives in 
planning; leveraging of the implementing 
organisation’s specific expertise in designing 
the project; development of indicators; duration; 
harmonisation processes; differences between 
the forms of development partnership with the 
private sector/implementing organisations
Judgement criterion 3.2.4 
Appropriateness of the 
involvement of additional 
partners by the relevant 
implementing organisation 
during the project design phase
Involvement of third parties (international 
NGOs, foundations, associations), local partners 
(public institutions, local non-governmental 
organisations), local business (local partner 
companies, associations, cooperatives), field 
structure of implementing organisations; 
differences between the forms of development 
partnership with the private sector/
implementing organisations
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3.3 What procedural and 
administrative changes can be 
introduced to improve project 
implementation? 
Judgement criterion 3.3.1  
Quality of cooperation between 
the implementing organisations 
and companies within  
the framework of project 
implementation
Inputs by the implementing organisation to 
project implementation (e. g. administrative/
technical/content-related, contact 
management, etc.); coordination and 
communication between the stakeholders; 
development of joint values and norms; trust-
building; transparency. Differences between 
the forms of development partnership with 
the private sector/implementing organisations
Document analysis, 
expert 
consultations, 
company survey, 
case studies 
Effectiveness/
efficiency
Judgement criterion 3.3.2 
Appropriateness of the 
involvement of additional 
partners by the relevant 
implementing organisation 
during the project 
implementation phase
Involvement of third parties (international 
NGOs, foundations, associations),  
local partners (public institutions,  
local non-governmental organisations),  
local business (local partner companies, 
associations, cooperatives), field structure of 
implementing organisations where 
appropriate; differences between the forms of 
development partnership with the  
private sector/implementing organisations
Judgement criterion 3.3.3  
Quality of project monitoring and 
reporting systems of the relevant 
implementing organisation
Human resources; content, transparency and 
use of M&E system and of reports  
for project steering/verification of objectives 
(by companies, partners, implementing 
organisations and BMZ); differences between 
the forms of development partnership with 
the private sector/implementing 
organisations
Evaluation question 4: To what extent and under which circumstances is the develoPPP.de programme effective in terms of promoting develoPPP.de 
projects at the level of the directly involved local companies, public institutions and target groups, and at the level of European partner companies?
4.1 To what extent do develoPPP.
de projects achieve the objectives 
set down in their plans of 
operations? 
Judgement criterion 4.1.1 
Achievement of the objectives 
laid down in project plans
Comparison of the objectives achieved with 
targets, based on indicators
Content analysis, 
case studies, 
company survey
Effectiveness
Judgement criterion 4.1.2 
Compliance with project criteria 
during project implementation
Compatibility with development goals, 
complementarity, subsidiarity, competitive 
neutrality, contribution of the private sector; 
commercial interest, sustainability; additional 
focal areas for strategic development 
partnerships with the private sector:  
level of innovation, potential for replicability, 
structure-building, broad impact,  
multi-stakeholder approach
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4.2 To what extent do develoPPP.
de projects contribute to 
achievement of the programme’s 
results?
Judgement criterion 4.2.1: 
Contributions develoPPP.de 
projects make to developing 
innovative products and  
services at the local company
Use of innovative technologies and/or  
of appropriate new technical expertise in  
the companies involved; services offered  
by companies correspond to the needs of  
the target group/customers; increase in the 
competitiveness of local companies; increase 
in sales of products and/or increase in 
incomes/profits of local companies
Case studies,  
expert consultations, 
company survey, 
portfolio analysis, 
content analysis
Effectiveness/
impact
Judgement criterion 4.2.2 
Contributions develoPPP.de 
projects make to developing 
standards
Improved standards governing production  
and processes; better environmental and/or 
labour and social standards in companies; 
introduction of set quality standards for 
companies’ products
Judgement criterion 4.2.3 
Contributions develoPPP.de 
projects make to the use  
of innovative products and 
services at public institutions
Use of new technologies and/or of appropriate 
new technical expertise in public institutions; 
introduction of set quality standards  
for services provided by public institutions, 
services meet the needs of target groups/
customers
Judgement criterion 4.2.4 
Contributions develoPPP.de 
projects make to increasing/
safeguarding income and 
employment among the direct 
target groups
Increase in the employability of target groups 
(increased technical, social, personal skills of 
training course graduates, the skills acquired 
correspond to local labour market requirements); 
improvement of the quality of employment 
(duration/scope/type of employment, work 
conditions) for participating target groups 
(women and men); safeguarding/boosting of 
incomes earned by participating target groups 
(women and men)
Judgement criterion 4.2.5 
Contributions develoPPP.de 
projects make to other  
socio-economic/sociocultural/legal 
improvements for target groups
Consolidation of rights, improvements in  
the areas of health, food security, education
Judgement criterion 4.2.6 Other 
unintended positive or negative 
effects of develoPPP.de projects
Exploratory, e. g. distortion of competition in 
the partner country, discrimination of certain 
sections of the population, environmental 
impacts
4.3 To what extent does 
participation in the develoPPP.de 
programme initiate change 
among participating European 
companies? 
Judgement criterion 4.3.1 
Increased awareness of 
development issues within 
companies
Raising awareness of development issues  
in companies
Company survey, 
case studies 
Effectiveness/
impact
Judgement criterion 4.3.2 
Contribution projects make to 
development of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) measures  
by companies
Influence exerted by projects on CSR 
strategies, participation in international 
debates and/or cooperation arrangements
Judgement criterion 4.3.3 Other 
changes in participating companies
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Evaluation questions Judgement criteria Focus of the analysis Method DAC criterion
4.4 What synergies are generated 
by cooperation between DC and 
the private sector?
Judgement criterion 4.4.1  
Added development benefits  
of cooperation were achieved
Leveraging the private sector’s additional 
financial and material resources and/or 
technical/sectoral know-how; level of 
innovation of projects; additionality; cooperation 
in partnership provides added impetus
Case studies, 
company survey
Effectiveness/
impact
Judgement criterion 4.4.2  
Added entrepreneurial benefits  
of cooperation were achieved
DC contributions generate added value for 
private sector: financial contributions increase 
efficiency/minimise risks; access to new markets 
using the implementing organisations’ DC-specific 
expertise; enhanced profile; other aspects
4.5 What differences can  
be identified regarding the 
effectiveness of different  
forms of development partnership 
with the private sector?
Judgement criterion 4.5.1 
Effectiveness of traditional 
development partnerships with 
the private sector and strategic 
development partnerships with 
the private sector
e. g. differences regarding structure-building 
results, broad impact and sustainability
Case studies, 
company survey
Effectiveness/
impact
Judgement criterion 4.5.2 
Effectiveness of development 
partnerships with the private 
sector based on a consulting 
contract/cooperation agreement
e. g. differences with respect to effectiveness, 
results at companies
Judgement criterion 4.5.3 
Differences between the 
implementing organisations
Exploratory
4.6 What other key factors shape 
the effectiveness of projects?
Judgement criterion 4.6.1: 
Adherence to implementation 
plans
Coverage of target group(s), changes in 
scheduling; changes to activities and/or 
objectives; deviations from financial plan
Case studies, 
company survey, 
portfolio analysis
Effectiveness/
impact
Judgement criterion 4.6.2 
Corporate goals/business case
Economic and strategic objectives; 
implementation of business case as planned
Judgement criterion 4.6.3 
Company-specific factors of 
European partners
Size; turnover; family-run; international 
experience; company structures in partner 
countries
Judgement criterion 4.6.4 
Company-specific/organisation-
specific factors of local partners
Size; international experience; corporate/
organisational culture
Judgement criterion 4.6.5 
Economic/political/social 
contextual factors in the partner 
countries
Exploratory
Judgement criterion 4.6.6  
Other possible factors
Exploratory
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Evaluation questions Judgement criteria Focus of the analysis Method DAC criterion
Evaluation question 5: To what extent can the results achieved by the develoPPP.de programme’s promotion of projects be considered  
durable and broad-based?
5.1 To what extent are the  
required conditions created to 
enhance the sustainability and 
broad-based impact of results 
during the project design  
and implementation phases?
Judgement criterion 5.1.1  
Phasing-out/handover strategies 
used by develoPPP.de projects
Capacities in the partner country to continue 
implementing the changes; follow-up 
measures; linkages to TC projects, etc.
Case studies, 
company survey, 
expert 
consultations
Sustainability
Judgement criterion 5.1.2 
Appropriateness of executing 
agency/partner structures on site
Organisational, economic, financial and human 
resources of partners/executing agencies
Judgement criterion 5.1.3 
Dissemination of lessons learned 
and/or innovations at the macro 
and/or meso level in the partner 
country 
Networks that include companies/institutions/
authorities/organisation¬s at the meso and 
macro level; awareness-raising among policy-
makers/companies/the general public in 
partner countries
Judgement criterion 5.1.4  
Long-term cooperation agreements 
between European companies 
and local partners
Existing cooperation agreements/supply 
contracts; duration and scope of cooperation 
arrangements between local and European 
partners
5.2 To what extent are the 
innovations introduced by the 
projects used/continued by the 
relevant target groups and/or 
project partners even after the 
develoPPP.de project has 
finished?
Judgement criterion 5.2.1 
Continued implementation by  
the project partners/direct target 
groups of the processes, standards, 
products and/or services introduced 
by the develoPPP.de projects
Comparison of innovations introduced  
by the projects and further development of 
these innovations by partners and target 
groups after project completion; economic 
sustainability of project results
Case studies, 
company survey
Sustainability
Judgement criterion 5.2.2  
Once the projects have finished, 
continued use by the project 
partners/direct target groups of the 
products and services developed  
by the develoPPP.de projects
Comparison of the use of products and 
services during implementation and once  
the projects have finished
Judgement criterion 5.2.3 
Problem-solving capacities of 
target groups and project partners 
to respond appropriately and 
flexibly to changed framework 
conditions
Solutions to problems that occur in relation to 
the continued use/development of innovations 
against the backdrop of changes to framework 
conditions
5.3 To what extent are the 
innovations introduced by the 
projects adopted/used above  
and beyond the corresponding 
target groups and/or project 
partners? 
Judgement criterion 5.3.1 
Innovations (technologies, 
processes, standards, etc.) are 
adopted by public institutions and 
companies that were not involved 
in the project
Extent to which new technologies are adapted 
in the relevant sector
Case studies, 
company survey
Impact
Judgement criterion 5.3.2 Services 
and products developed within 
the scope of projects are used by 
other groups in the partner country
Access by companies, public institutions  
and/or sections of the population  
to high-quality products and services
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Evaluation questions Judgement criteria Focus of the analysis Method DAC criterion
5.4 To what extent are the 
innovations introduced by the 
projects implemented on a 
broader scale, thereby boosting 
performance throughout the 
entire system?
Judgement criterion 5.4.1 
Contribution that develoPPP.de 
projects make to the consolidation 
of private sector structures  
within the relevant sector
Establishment of interest groups at the 
regional/national level; (sector-specific) 
standards and processes are adopted/
introduced throughout the entire system
Case studies, 
company survey
Impact/
sustainability
Judgement criterion 5.4.2 
Contribution that develoPPP.de 
projects make to improving  
the situation of the population 
and/or addressing broader 
development policy challenges
Boosting of income and employment  
above and beyond the direct target group, 
consolidation of rights, improvements  
in health care, food security and education  
for different groups; social sustainability; 
environmental sustainability
5.5 What differences can be 
identified regarding the different 
forms of development partnership 
with the private sector?
Judgement criterion 5.5.1 
Durability and broad-based 
impact of the different forms  
of development partnership  
with the private sector
Impact/
sustainability
5.6 What other key factors shape 
the durability and broad-based 
impact of the results achieved?
Exploratory Impact/
sustainability
5.2
Methodology
This annex picks up on and fleshes out the information 
contained in Section 1.6 (Evaluation approach and 
methodology). It provides a detailed overview of the content 
analysis, company surveys, expert consultations and case 
studies. Details of the portfolio analysis (Lücking & 
Roggemann, 2016) are available to the general public in a 
separate publication at www.deval.org. This method is 
therefore not examined in greater depth here. Finally, this 
section explains the assessment system and quality assurance 
procedures used by the evaluators. 
5.2.1 Data collection methods
As outlined in Section 1.5, the evaluation pursues a theory-
based approach. The programme theory developed in this 
context forms the basis for determining and delineating the 
programme areas to be examined and for identifying the key, 
cross-project assumptions that give the support approach used 
its programmatic character. A combination of data collection 
methods was used and these were applied to varying degrees 
to answer the five evaluation questions. Table 3 lists the 
methodological process steps (data collection methods) and 
shows the evaluation questions and corresponding DAC 
criteria to which they contribute. As we can see in the table, 
several methods are assigned to each question, illustrating  
the scope for triangulation that emerges from the mix of 
methods used in this evaluation.
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Table 3: Overview of the evaluation questions, the corresponding DAC criteria and the methodological process steps  
(data collection methods)
Methodological process steps 
Evaluation question and corresponding DAC criteria
1 2 3 4 5
Relevance
Relevance, 
effectiveness, 
efficiency
Effectiveness, 
efficiency
Effectiveness, 
impact
Impact, 
sustainability
Company surveys X X X X X
Expert consultations X X X
Content analysis X X X
Portfolio analysis X X X X
Case studies X X X
Source: authors’ own
 
Content analysis 
Purpose
During the evaluation’s inception phase, an analysis of the 
content of the project reports was used to identify recurring 
activities and objectives in order to establish the programme 
theory. For all project documents, generalisable findings were 
also generated regarding the degree to which projects adhered 
to implementation plans and to which objectives were 
achieved. 
Object of evaluation
The population consists of all projects supported by develoPPP.de 
that were completed or were still ongoing between the date 
the ideas competition was introduced (1 January 2009) and  
29 June 2016. Projects that were rejected or discontinued were 
not examined. In more technical terms, the population consists 
of all projects that fulfil the following characteristics:
1. Support from BMZ’s develoPPP.de programme for 
development partnerships with the private sector;
2. Project start date after introduction of the ideas 
competitions (1 January 2009 – 29 June 2015);
3. Project status in 2015 (as at 29 June 2015): completed  
or ongoing;
4. Negative criterion: projects with the status ‘in preparation’, 
‘discontinued’ or ‘rejected’ were excluded.
In terms of content analysis, the following reporting  
formats were analysed for each project:
37. Project designs, i.e. in the case of
a. DEG: Annexes 1–3 of service contracts;
b. GIZ: Annexes 1–3 of consulting contracts 
 implementation agreements and annexes 1 and 2  
 of cooperation agreements;
c.  sequa: Annexes A3 – A5 of transfer agreements.
38. Project information provided at the outset (e. g. GIZ’s brief 
project descriptions or DEG’s and sequa’s cover sheets).
39. Final report for each project (not applicable to ongoing 
projects; instead, the latest interim report was used);
40. In the case of Strategic Alliances (GIZ): mid-term reviews 
(where available).
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47 Technically speaking, the sample is stratified into forms of development partnership with the private sector. As the number of cases in the random sample in each of these forms differs from the 
proportion in the total population, this random sample is disproportionately stratified.
48 Originally, DEval deemed a precision rating of ± 10 percentage points to be sufficient provided that, from a feasibility perspective, the total maximum limit for both the implementing organisations 
and for DEval is approximately 250 projects.
Procedure
As the different forms of development partnership with the 
private sector occur at varying frequencies, a random sample 
was taken for each of these forms (for example, there are 
comparatively few DEG strategic development partnerships 
with the private sector).47 Viewing just a sample rather than 
the entire population of develoPPP.de projects generates  
a sampling error, which can be defined using probabilities.  
The sample is constructed so that there is a 95% guarantee  
(i.e. probability) that the precision of the random sample and 
its findings deviates by no more than a maximum of ± 20 
percentage points. In other words, if it is found during the desk 
check that an interesting characteristic occurs in 75% of all of 
the projects examined in the sample, there is a 95% probability 
that it occurs in between 55% and 95% of the population as a 
whole.48 
The projects to be analysed were selected using a sampling 
frame based on a data set from the develoPPP.de Cloud  
as at 29 June 2015. The frame was checked for duplicates and 
any surplus records were removed. On 2 July 2015, RANDOM.
ORG’s random sequence generator (www.random.org) was 
used to determine which projects would be included in the 
sample. The breakdown is documented in Table 4. MAXQDA’s 
qualitative data analysis software was used to analyse  
the content of the project documents. The findings were 
summarised in a synthesis table based on the judgement 
criteria. 
Figure 12: Population of develoPPP.de projects based on type of project/contract/agreement 
and implementing organisation
Development Partnerships (DP) (685)
Traditional DP (629) Strategic DP (56)
Strategic Projects
Service contractService contract
DEG (21)DEG (357) GIZ (129) sequa (87) GIZ (55)
Strategic Alliances
Cooperation agreementCooperation agreement
GIZ (35)
Source: authors’ own, based on develoPPP.de Cloud as at 29 June 2015; list with types of contracts provided by GIZ on 7 July 2015
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Table 4: Sample used for content analysis
Form of development partnership with the private sector
Sample Population
Target Actual
Traditional development partnership with the private sector, DEG 78 73 357
Traditional development partnership with the private sector, GIZ (consulting contract) 58 36 129
Traditional development partnership with the private sector, sequa 48 46 87
Traditional development partnership with the private sector, GIZ (cooperation agreement) 38 24 55
Strategic dev. partnership with the private sector, DEG 20 18 21
Strategic dev. partnership with the private sector, GIZ 28 19 35
Total 270 216 684
Source: Authors’ own based on develoPPP.de Cloud of 29 June 2015; list of agreement/contract types provided by GIZ on 7 July 2015. In some cases, the reports were no longer available,  
which gave rise to certain discrepancies.
49 The first survey focused on companies based in Germany because BMZ expressed a keen interest in documenting the motivating factors for German companies as well as the lessons they had 
learned. The second survey included both German and European companies.
50 With the exception of DEG projects, for which a cut-off date of 30 June 2014 was chosen for completion of development partnerships with the private sector projects. DEG had fewer strategic 
development partnerships with the private sector than GIZ. If the date had not been changed then the number of DEG strategic development partnerships with the private sector that could have 
been included in the second company survey would have been very low indeed.
Only 216 of the planned 270 projects could be taken into 
account. The random sample for GIZ projects had to be reduced 
in order to avoid delays that would have resulted from complying 
with GIZ’s internal administrative requirements for the 
provision of documents. Furthermore, an examination of 104 
final reports that were suitable for evaluation as part of 
content analysis showed that in the vast majority of completed 
projects (100 of the 104 projects = 96%), the planned target 
was deemed to be achieved or achieved to a significant degree. 
Only in one project was the target deemed to have not been 
fulfilled. In addition to the fact that the evaluation shows 
 a positive project reporting bias, the low variance rate in the 
project ratings severely restricts the informative value of 
project reports in terms of the programme’s effectiveness. 
Company survey 
Purpose
The company survey was carried out in two phases and was 
used to document the perspectives of and the lessons learned 
by the companies involved in the develoPPP.de programme.  
An initial survey conducted during the inception phase at the 
start of the evaluation delivered information on the key 
objectives of the private sector and on positive and negative 
aspects of cooperation with the three implementing 
organisations. In so doing, it helped reconstruct the programme 
theory and its underlying assumptions, analyse areas where 
the programme could improve and helped develop judgement 
criteria. A second survey was conducted at the end of the data 
collection phase and focused on an empirical assessment of 
specific aspects of results, sustainability and the triangulation 
of findings from the case studies and from other data 
collection methods. 
Object of evaluation
The population for the first survey consisted of all companies 
based in Germany with which a develoPPP.de measure was 
carried out or started since 1 January 2009.49 The population 
for the second survey was made up of all companies  
with which projects were started after 1 January 2009 and 
completed by 31 December 2013. The data were checked  
for multiple funding and any surplus entries removed. The 
population for the first company survey came to 418 projects 
(cut-off date 29 June 2015), with 220 projects included in the 
second (cut-off date 31 December 2013). The sampling frame 
for the second company survey was subsequently limited to 
projects that had already been selected for the content 
analysis (90 projects, cut-off date 31 December 2013).50 Data 
were taken from the develoPPP.de Cloud as at 29 June 2015  
for analysis.
5.  |  Annex109
Table 5: Selection criteria for determining the population for the first and second company survey
Criterion First company survey Second company survey
Time frame Companies with which at least one project was started 
between 1 January 2009 and 29 June 2015
Companies with which at least one project  
was completed between 1 January 2009 and  
31 December 2013
Project status Companies that carried out projects ‘as normal’  
were taken into account first and foremost; companies 
that carried out projects that were subsequently 
discontinued were also taken into consideration.
Companies that carried out projects ‘as normal’
Nationality Companies based in Germany Companies based in Europe
Additional selection criteria – Projects already selected for the content analysis
Source: authors’ own
Procedure
A criteria-based approach based on the principle of maximum 
variation sampling was used to select the companies from the 
total population that were to be included in the survey. This 
helped cover as wide as possible a range of different perspectives 
on the object of the evaluation. For the first survey, BMZ 
(Division 114) also provided a list of companies that it regarded 
as particularly relevant for the develoPPP.de programme. Five 
of these companies were interviewed during the first company 
survey. For both surveys, it was ensured that projects of the 
three implementing organisations (DEG, GIZ and sequa) and 
all forms of development partnership with the private sector 
(Strategic Alliances, Strategic Projects and traditional 
partnerships based on service contracts and cooperation 
agreements) were taken into consideration to an adequate 
degree. In addition to these key selection criteria, every effort 
was made to take into account projects with large and small 
companies and with companies receiving multiple funding.
The sampling procedure was based on the assumption that 
about 80% of the companies surveyed were prepared to 
participate in the interview. Overall, interviews were 
conducted with representatives of 16 companies in the first 
and 20 companies in the second round of surveys  
(as summarised in Table 6). The interviews were conducted 
with the project manager in the relevant company, either  
face-to-face or by phone. Each interview ran for between  
60 and 90 minutes. The interview guide used as a basis was 
tailored to the specific conditions in each project in the run-up 
to the interview. The MAXQDA software application was then 
used to code the content in line with the evaluation matrix  
and judgement criteria before being summarised in a synthesis 
table and evaluated. 
The company surveys ran smoothly for the most part. 
However, the process of arranging the surveys was made  
more difficult, and in some cases delayed, by the fact that –  
for data-protection reasons – the relevant implementing 
organisations, and not DEval, had to make initial contact with 
the companies. The overall response rate was lower than 
anticipated, but at 60%, was satisfactory on the whole, with 
the exception of interviews with companies whose projects 
were discontinued. It was not possible to conduct these 
interviews for a number of reasons. For example, the contact 
persons could no longer be reached or the company was  
not willing to participate. 
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Table 6: Company surveys 1 and 2: surveyed companies based on region and size
Form of dev. part. with the 
private sector
Quantity Project status
Multiple 
funding Size of company Region
Ongoing
Comp-
leted
> EUR 50 
million
< EUR 50 
million Asia Africa LA* Europe
Traditional dev. partnership 
with the private sector, DEG
9 2 7 4 5 4 5 1 2 1
Traditional dev. partnership 
with the private sector, GIZ 
(consulting contract)
5 5 2 5 1 2 1 1
Traditional dev. partnership 
with the private sector, 
sequa
9 1 8 4 1 8 2 2 3 2
Traditional dev. partnership 
with the private sector, GIZ 
(coop. agreement)
4 1 3 3 3 1 2 1 1
Strategic dev. partnership 
with the private sector, DEG
5 5 3 5 3 1 1
Strategic dev. partnership 
with the private sector, GIZ
4 2 2 4 4 2 1 1
Total 36 6 30 20 23 13 15 8 8 5
Source: authors’ own; *LA = Latin America
Expert consultations 
Purpose
This data collection method documented lessons learned, 
know-how and assessments of the procedures used for 
programme steering (at BMZ level), programme implementation 
(at implementing organisation level), project implementation 
(at implementing organisation and company level) and of 
harmonisation processes between the stakeholders. The 
consultations aimed to examine the procedures used, identify 
weaknesses and potential improvements, explore innovative 
ideas and take critical perspectives into consideration.
Object of evaluation
The expert consultations were based on a stakeholder map, 
which identified the most important organisations and 
individuals involved in or affected by the programme.  
The aim was to include all relevant interest groups (see Table 7). 
In addition to staff members in the responsible BMZ division, 
interviews were also conducted with the relevant sectoral and 
regional divisions and with economic cooperation officers at 
BMZ. On the implementing organisation side, the responsible 
programme and project managers were surveyed as well as field 
staff and staff at the Sector Project Private Sector Cooperation. 
International experts were also interviewed, along with 
representatives of NGOs, who were asked to assess the 
develoPPP.de programme. In order to obtain the views  
of private sector stakeholders who were not involved in the 
company surveys, representatives of business associations 
were interviewed, as were consultants, i.e. external service 
providers that support companies in implementing develoPPP.de 
projects. 
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Table 7: Overview of the interviewed experts broken down by organisation and position held by the interviewees
Organisation Position held by interviewee Number of interviews
BMZ Head of Division and officers from  Division 114 3
Officers from the regional and sectoral divisions 6
Economic cooperation officers 3
GIZ Programme managers and develoPPP.de staff members 5
Field staff 3
DEG Programme managers and develoPPP.de staff members 4
sequa Programme managers and develoPPP.de staff members 3
Sector Project Private Sector Cooperation Project managers and staff members 4
NGOs/civil society Expert advisors 4
Research institutions and academia Researchers and academics 3
Business associations Association representatives 5
developPPP.de consulting firms Senior managers and staff members 3
Total 46
Source: authors’ own
Procedure
During the expert consultations, interviews that ran for 
between one and two hours were conducted with 46 
individuals after completion of the case studies. Specific 
interview guides were used and discussions were held either 
face-to-face or by phone in order to explore certain 
perspectives and validate the information obtained in the 
studies. The interviewees were systematically selected by 
DEval based on suggestions by BMZ, the implementing 
organisations and other stakeholders – such as VENRO, the 
umbrella organisation of development non-governmental 
organisations in Germany – and, to some extent, on a 
stakeholder map developed by DEval. Data were evaluated 
using structured content analysis steps (Mayring, 2015), in line 
with the evaluation matrix’s category system and the interview 
content that had been coded using the MAXQDA software 
application. The evaluation findings of all interviews were 
summarised in a synthesis table, which contained comparative 
data on similar and contrasting cases. 
On the whole, the expert consultations ran smoothly and it 
was possible to conduct interviews with key experts from all 
areas. It was not possible to involve staff members from similar 
programmes implemented by other international donors to 
validate key evaluation statements as planned. They were not 
available for interview, probably due to a lack of time.
Case studies 
Purpose
The case studies served first and foremost to review whether, 
from an empirical perspective, the key assumptions underlying 
the programme theory are tenable for specific develoPPP.de 
projects (= cases). They may be viewed as a series of project 
evaluations that examine the extent to which the develoPPP.de 
promotional approach generates and safeguards stimuli in the 
projects, in accordance with the programme’s set of objectives.
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Object of evaluation
The case studies examined develoPPP.de projects that were 
started after the ideas competition was introduced (i.e. after 
2009). GIZ development partnerships with the private sector 
that were carried out based on cooperation agreements (form 
4) were not evaluated, as strategic development partnerships 
with the private sector (form 6) are also based on this type of 
contract. As an analysis of projects on site requires that 
activities have progressed to a certain stage, only projects that 
had already been completed or had less than six months to go 
(cut-off date for planned completion of the project: 31 July 
2016) were visited. 
Procedure 
A typology-based selection process (see Fig. 13) was used to 
identify twelve projects (see Table 8). The cases were selected 
sequentially in three stages, and specific criteria were applied 
at each stage to further restrict the selection (see Fig. 13). The 
data collected during the case studies were based on the 
systematic questions and criteria used in the evaluation 
matrix, which were subsequently tailored to the situation in 
each project. The case studies examined the design of the 
projects, adherence to implementation plans, the project 
results achieved and the contributions made to the targeted 
programme results, in line with the programme theory. In 
order to review the achievement of objectives based on the 
dual objectives structure (public and private sector) for each 
case study/project, a project theory was reconstructed from 
the information outlined in the project designs and plans of 
operation, based on the programme theory. The company’s 
interests in the project and the core problems to be addressed 
from a development perspective, as outlined in the above-
mentioned designs and plans, were also included. A 
preliminary case study involving the entire DEval team was 
conducted up front to pilot the procedure and the data 
collection instruments used and to lay down a joint 
understanding of the implementation process.
Figure 13: Selection of the project case studies
Stage 1
Preselection of countries
Stage 2
Diff erentiation of countries
Stage 3
Selection of projects
•  Critical mass: 
number of develoPPP.de project 
per country
•  Intersection: 
all forms of development partnership 
with the private sector per country
•  Macro context: 
emerging economy and LDC
•  Typicity: 
Project targets (1) innovation transfer 
and (2) dissemination of lessons learned 
at projects
•  Ability to evaluate project: 
end of promotion term between 
December 2013 and July 2016
Source: authors’ own
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Table 8: Case studies implemented within the evaluation framework
Implementing 
organisation
Form of dev. partnership
with private sector
Emerging economy LDC
TotalIndia Brazil Uganda Ethiopia
DEG 1 (DEG, trad.) 1 0 1 0 2
5 (DEG, strat.) 1 1 1 0 3
GIZ 2 (GIZ, trad.) cons. cont. 1 0 1 0 2
6 (GIZ, strat.) 1 1 0 1 3
sequa 3 (sequa, trad.) 1 1 No project met the criteria 2
Total 5 3 3 1 12
Source: authors’ own
Where possible, the following groups were surveyed in each 
case study: company representatives, the responsible project 
managers and managers of the implementing organisations, 
representatives of other project partners, project staff and 
representatives of the different target groups. Individuals, 
other companies/market players, experts from the corresponding 
project sector and staff members from important NGOs in  
the partner country – all of whom were comparable with the 
target groups – were also surveyed in order to assess the 
extent to which changes could be plausibly attributed to the 
projects and unintended negative effects were generated. 
Where relevant, interviews were also conducted with individuals 
from the field structures of BMZ and the implementing 
organisations. Data were primarily collected in face-to-face, 
semi-structured interviews with individuals. Group interviews 
were also conducted when surveying the target groups  
and comparison groups in particular. The group size varied 
(between five and 15 people), depending on the case study.  
The MAXQDA software application was used to analyse data. 
A DEval-internal case study report was drafted for each project, 
and these reports were also entered in MAXQDA. A cross-case 
evaluation was used to generate a final synthesis table.
Selection of the case studies was impeded by the fact that  
only a few LDCs have a sufficient number of development 
partnerships with the private sector that fulfil the aspects of 
critical mass and overlaps. This was particularly true in the 
case of sequa, which implements by far the lowest number of 
projects. It was not possible to examine a sequa project in  
an LDC. Instead, a second development partnership with the 
private sector was selected in an emerging economy. Strategic 
development partnerships with the private sector that were 
implemented in more than one country presented a particular 
challenge when implementing the case studies (i.e. one case 
study for DEG and two for GIZ). It was not possible to visit all 
of the project countries due to restrictions in terms of resources 
and time. Instead, empirical surveys were carried out in the  
key country where a strategic development partnership with 
the private sector was being conducted, i.e. the country in 
which project implementation was most advanced. Once the 
case studies had been completed, telephone interviews were 
conducted with key project partners in other countries in which 
strategic development partnerships with the private sector 
were implemented as well as with other European partners 
involved in the programme. In one case, it was possible to 
conduct an additional visit in a second project country as the 
DEval team visited two countries (India and Brazil). 
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Table 9: Overview of interviewees by case study
Interviewees Type of interview CS* 1 CS 2 CS 3 CS 4 CS 5 CS 6 CS 7 CS 8 CS 9 CS 10 CS 11 CS 12
Project partners (implementing 
organisations, European and local 
partner company, third parties, etc.)
Individual interviews 5 6 10 14 10 11 7 16 5 13 10 11
Group interviews 2 1 2 2 1 1 4
Target groups and comparison 
groups (smallholders, trainees, etc.)
Individual interviews 7 6 12 15 2 8 2 7 8 11
Group interviews 3 4 1 4 6 1 7 1 8 3
Other actors (companies in  
the market), political actors, 
sector experts, NGOs, etc.)
Individual interviews 2 6 10 4 6 8 2 3 5 7 5 8
Group interviews 1 1 1 2
Total Individual interviews 14 18 20 30 31 21 17 21 17 28 26 19
Group interviews 3 3 4 2 7 8 2 8 2 8 0 9
Source: authors’ own; * CS = case study 
5.2.2 Evaluation system and quality assurance
The evaluation matrix (see Section 5.1) provided the basis  
for evaluating and synthesising the information gathered using 
the mix of different data collection methods. The matrix 
assigns judgement criteria to the evaluation questions (Table 10). 
For each criterion, the data collected using each (relevant) 
method were assessed and the findings documented in a 
synthesis table. 
 
Table 10: Diagram illustrating the breakdown of evaluation questions into sub-questions and judgement criteria  
for operational purposes
Evaluation question 1: 
How appropriate is the develoPPP.de programme for achieving relevant development objectives?
Sub-question 1.1:
To what extent are the objectives of the develoPPP.de 
programme geared to BMZ’s guidelines, strategies and 
development objectives?
Judgement criterion 1.1.1
The programme’s objectives match the key objectives of  
BMZ’s overarching development strategies.
Judgement criterion 1.1.2
The programme’s objectives match the key objectives of  
relevant BMZ sector strategies and guidelines.
Judgement criterion 1.1.3   
…
Sub-question 1.2:
…
Judgement criterion 1.2.1  
…
Judgement criterion 1.2.2  
…
Source: authors’ own
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The criteria for the individual data collection methods and  
for the overall synthesis were rated using five categories: 
 • ‘largely fulfilled’/‘largely successful‘ 
 • ‘fulfilled to a significant degree’/‘rather successful‘ 
 • ‘partially (not) fulfilled’/’partially (not) successful’ 
(indifferent ‘middle’ category)
 • ‘not fulfilled to a significant degree’/‘rather unsuccessful‘ 
 • ‘largely unfulfilled‘/‘largely unsuccessful’ 
The rating system varied, depending on the data collection 
method used. Whereas frequencies (of the individual case 
studies/companies surveyed) could be used for rating in case 
studies51 and company surveys52, the information collected in 
expert consultations and the findings of the content analysis, 
portfolio analysis and literature and document analysis were 
also used for qualitative ratings. The overall findings were 
summarised in a final synthesis table for all data collection 
methods before undergoing a process of triangulation in terms 
of methods (cross-method synthesis), data (e.g. verification of 
case study findings with sector experts and comparable groups 
that were not involved) and team members (cross-check principle 
within the team for case-study summaries and syntheses). 
All evaluation products (the concept paper, inception report, 
portfolio analysis and final report) underwent a peer-review 
process both within DEval and externally. As part of internal 
quality assurance, the evaluation team made every effort to 
ensure that data collection and reporting fulfilled DEval’s 
evaluation guidelines. This involved ensuring that relevant 
stakeholders were involved, that the data collected were of 
51 Median rating across all case studies. Please note: The ‘median’ of a list of ratings is the ‘middle’ value when you list the ratings in ascending/descending order (in this case, based on success).
52 Comprises two stages: (1) rating based on the frequency of responses in support of the matter in hand. Please remember: ‘largely fulfilled’: 100 – 66% of interviewees; ‘fulfilled to a significant degree’: 
65 – 54 %; ‘partially fulfilled’: 53 – 47 %; ‘not fulfilled to a significant degree’: 46 – 33 %; ‘largely unfulfilled’: 32 – 0 %. (2) analysis of the first rating based on the qualitatively differentiated responses 
provided by interviewees and modification where appropriate.
high quality and that due care was taken during their analysis. 
The guidelines also cover development of an appropriate 
evaluation design and ensuring that reports are drafted in an 
independent and unbiased manner without any influence 
being exerted by stakeholders. DEval’s Competence Centre  
for Evaluation Methodology supported the entire evaluation 
process. Support included providing advice on the methodological 
approach and commenting on key evaluation documents such 
as the concept paper, the inception report and the evaluation 
report itself.
A consultant and two external peer reviewers were responsible 
for external quality assurance. The consultant was responsible 
for providing expert advice during all phases of the evaluation, 
for drafting technical background documents and commenting 
on key evaluation documents. The external peer reviewers also 
contributed valuable technical and methodological input to 
the design and implementation phases of the evaluation and 
to the analysis and publication of the evaluation findings.
Key stakeholders were involved in the evaluation in the form  
of the reference group. This group acted as an external advisory 
committee and was involved sporadically in all of the relevant 
phases of the evaluation. During the design phase, the members 
of the reference group advised the evaluation team on issues 
related to delimiting the object of the evaluation, the key areas 
and the purpose of the evaluation. The members of the reference 
group also commented on the key evaluation products in 
verbal and written form. Finally, they were also involved in 
formatting, distributing and making use of the findings. 
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5.3
Overview of BMZ programmes on cooperation with the private sector
Programme Description Cooperation partners/Who is eligible for support?
develoPPP.de Support for private sector engagement in developing 
countries and emerging economies
German and European companies
Global Business Exchange Programme 
(GloBus)
Training, exchange and networking programme  
for managers of SMEs from developing countries; 
implemented by GIZ
Managers of SMEs from Germany and from the partner 
countries  Morocco, Colombia and Peru
Import Promotion Desk (IPD) Initiative to facilitate and sustainably increase imports 
by Germany and Europe from developing countries and 
emerging economies 
German importers, exporters from selected developing 
countries/emerging economies
ExperTS Advisory services provided by German Chambers of 
Industry, delegations and bilateral business associations 
in developing countries/emerging economies
Local and German companies
Development cooperation scouts Advisory services in chambers of industry and 
commerce, chambers of trade, Länder associations and 
business/trade associations
German companies
Digital Africa Strategic Partnership Development measures to support and step up private 
investment in information and communications 
technology (ICT) in Africa (including develoPPP.de)
German and European companies
Senior Experten Service (SES) Secondment of retired experts particularly to SMEs  
in developing countries and emerging economies
(German) experts
Practice-oriented partnerships Cooperation arrangements between universities, 
companies and the German Academic Exchange Service 
(DAAD) to improve university education in developing 
countries
Universities and companies from Germany  
and developing countries
Partnerships with chambers and 
associations
Strengthening of the institutional capacities of local 
institutions that provide business-related services and 
represent the interests of SMEs vis-à-vis political bodies 
in the target countries
Local and German SMEs
Vocational training partnerships Use of expertise of the organised business community in 
Germany in the area of initial and continuing vocational 
education and training in order to promote DC and 
directly transfer knowledge
German and local vocational education  
and training bodies 
Training initiative for refugees  
in Germany
Preparation of a dual vocational education and training 
course through provision of finance for the courses 
required and support from cooperation partners of the 
German Confederation of Skilled Crafts (ZdH)
German companies
Partnership with the Savings Banks 
Foundation for International 
Cooperation
Capacity-building for local partner institutions in 
developing countries/emerging economies and support 
for financial institutions through the provision of needs-
based banking services
Local companies
Foundation for Entrepreneurial 
Development Cooperation (AFOS)
Improvement of savings and credit sectors via support 
for the LAPO Microfinance Bank and building of their 
capacities in order to improve the services provided in 
the area of needs-based financial services
Micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs)  
in the (semi-) informal sector in Nigeria
Support for direct investment Support for direct investment via DEG German medium-sized enterprises
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Programme Description Cooperation partners/Who is eligible for support?
DEG, business support measures Boosting of the development benefits of finance projects German and European companies
Implementation of feasibility studies Support and advice on development-related investment 
projects in BMZ partner countries via DEG
German medium-sized enterprises
Scaling-up programme* Finance for innovative investments in particular; in  
this way, expansion of innovative business models that 
generate positive development results via DEG
Local, German and European SMEs
Innovation vouchers Provision of access to advice from research and 
development institutions
MSMEs
Innovative cooperation strategies  
by the private sector
Identification, uptake and pro-motion of particularly 
innovative strategies by the private sector that promote 
development but for which there has so far been no 
support
German companies in particular
Sector initiatives Identification and implementation of projects to provide 
support for development-oriented cooperation within 
individual sectors
German and European companies
Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory 
Facility (PPIAF)
Participation in multi-donor trust fund to advise on 
facilitating private sector involvement in infrastructure 
projects in developing countries
Corresponding ministries in the partner country
Employment for Sustainable 
Development in Africa (E4D)* 
GIZ projects that assist development partnerships  
with the private sector in eight countries. Objective:  
to improve employment situation
Local companies and German/European companies  
with local subsidiaries 
Integrated development partnerships 
with the private sector (iDPPs)*
Financing of partnerships that are incorporated into 
existing GIZ projects in partner countries
German and international SMEs
German Desk* A German ‘desk’ at banks in partner countries  
Centre for International Migration and 
Development (CIM)*
Placement of international experts and managers  
with employers in partner countries of international 
cooperation
German and European experts, returning local experts 
who have trained or worked in Germany
MakeIT* Joint initiative by German DC and the digital economy  
to strengthen technical entrepreneurship in developing 
countries by establishing cooperation arrangements
German and European companies in particular
Competitive African Cotton Initiative 
Phase II/Coffee Partnership for Tanzania*
Second phase of the programme to boost incomes  
of African cotton and coffee growers
German and European companies in particular
lab of tomorrow* Support for companies that wish to develop business 
ideas into potential projects in developing countries
European companies
PPP Fund for Fragile States of West 
Africa*
Initiation by GIZ of development partnerships with the 
private sector in Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra 
Leone.
International and local companies
Structured funds and large-scale 
infrastructure and financial sector 
projects* 
Mobilisation and combination of private and public 
capital through the participation of private sector 
companies, investors, foundations and commercial  
banks in cofinancing  arrangements 
German and European companies
More export credit guarantees  
for Africa* 
Expansion of the scope of the ‘Hermes’ programme  
in five countries so that goods and services for public 
purchasers can be covered by German government 
export credit guarantees. 
German exporters
Source: authors’ own; * indicates that the programme/initiative does not appear in the list of current measures to promote cooperation with the private sector provided by Division 114.
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5.4
Financial data on the develoPPP.de programme 
DEG – Use of funds and administrative costs
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Ø 2009 – 2015 Ø 2013 – 2015
Use of funds, total 12,233,945 € 15,660,000 € 14,433,885 € 16,360,000 € 15,175,000 € 15,640,985 € 14,683,000 € 14,883,831 € 15,166,328 €
Administrative/
management costs 
(total)
3,118,442 € 2,781,134 € 2,775,298 € 3,034,010 € 2,984,789 € 2,894,643 € 2,837,508 € 2,917,975 € 2,905,647 €
Travel expenses 104,570 € 162,418 € 165,363 € 222,265 € 172,855 € 115,840 € 107,352 € 150,095 € 132,016 €
Personnel costs 975,832 € 896,659 € 997,648 € 1,145,222 € 1,009,827 € 1,035,370 € 1,234,740 € 1,042,185 € 1,093,312 €
Other administrative 
costs 
2,038,040 € 1,722,058 € 1,612,287 € 1,666,523 € 1,802,107 € 1,743,433 € 1,495,416 € 1,725,695 € 1,680,319 €
Use of funds less 
administrative costs
9,115,503 € 12,878,866 € 11,658,587 € 13,325,990 € 12,190,211 € 12,746,342 € 11,845,492 € 11,965,856 € 12,260,682 €
Administrative costs  
as % of use of funds
25.5 % 17.8 % 19.2 % 18.5 % 19.7 % 18.5 % 19.3 % 19.6 % 19.2 %
Source: Information disclosed by DEG
GIZ – Use of funds and administrative costs
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Ø 2009 – 2015 Ø 2013 – 2015
Use of funds, total 12,268,473 € 15,703,904 € 14,268,940 € 16,808,514 € 14,170,284 € 14,425,443 € 15,950,832 € 14,799,484. 14,848,853 €
Administrative/
management costs 
(total)
n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 2,146,323 € 2,429,533 € 2,685,133 € n. a. 2,420,330 €
Travel expenses n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 35,869 € 43,392 € 61,862 € n. a. 47,041 €
Personnel costs n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 1,476,544 € 1,703,645 € 1,885,388 € n. a. 1,688,526 €
Other administrative 
costs
n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 633,910 € 682,497 € 737,883 € n. a. 684,763 €
Use of funds less 
administrative costs
n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 12,023,961 € 11,995,910 € 13,265,699 € n. a. 12,428,523 €
Administrative costs  
as % of use of funds
n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 15.2 % 16.8 % 16.8 % n. a. 16.3 %
Source: Information disclosed by GIZ
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sequa – Use of funds and administrative costs
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Ø 2009 – 2015 Ø 2013 – 2015
Use of funds, total 1,739,635 € 2,007,969 € 2,530,171 € 2,671,530 € 2,954,412 € 2,869,339 € 2,623,283 € 2,485,191 € 2,815,678 €
Administrative/
management costs 
(total)
289,939 € 334,662 € 421,695 € 445,255 € 492,402 € 478,223 € 437,214 € 414,199 € 469,280 €
Travel expenses53 2,037 € 1,991 € 4,245 € 3,003 € 4,978 € 5,073 € n. a. 3,555 €* 5,026 €*
Personnel costs 262,931 € 324,662 € 357,631 € 402,041 € 306,315 € 331,051 € n. a. 330,772 €* 318,683 €*
Other administrative 
costs
45,872 € 61,171 € 68,758 € 62,567 € 72,492 € 82,134 € n. a. 65,499 €* 77,313 €*
Use of funds less 
administrative costs
1,449,696 € 1,673,308 € 2,108,476 € 2,226,275 € 2,462,010 € 2,391,116 € 2,186,069 € 2,070,993 € 2,346,398 €
Administrative costs  
as % of use of funds
16.7 % 16.7 % 16.7 % 16.7 % 16.7 % 16.7 % 16.7 % 16.7 % 16.7 %
Source: Information disclosed by sequa 
5.5
Overview of programme objectives and criteria set down in the develoPPP.de guidelines
Objectives of the develoPPP.de programme  • Strengthening of private sector structures in partner countries
 • Mobilisation of additional financial, HR, tangible and intangible contributions by the private 
sector to addressing development challenges
 • Transfer of private sector know-how and technologies to developing countries
 • Boosting of private sector investment in order to drive the development process in developing 
countries
 • Increase in the sustainability of development results through long-term, private sector 
engagement in the target country
Overarching objective: Contribution to the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of eradicating 
extreme poverty everywhere. Direct contribution to fulfilling the MDGs by driving the 
development of a global partnership for development (MDG 8).
Possible objectives of develoPPP.de projects  • Creation of jobs and training places
 • Improvement of labour and social standards 
 • Integration of environmental and climate protection aspects in value chains
 • Improvement of the range of courses offered by training institutions
 • Improvement of water and energy utilities and of access to water and energy
 • Improvement of health care systems and of access to medical care
 • Strengthening of microfinance systems
 • Improvement of access by smallholders to markets and value chains
 • Reduction in the discrimination of women and disadvantaged sections of the population
 • Inclusion of persons with disabilities
 • Reduction of corruption
 • Design and introduction of new products, technologies and services that are related to 
development (pilot measures)
53 sequa charges lump-sum administrative costs of 20 % of the project costs up-front. It settles accounts for the actual administrative costs incurred at the end of each year. Any surpluses or  
deficits are first offset against the administrative costs incurred for other sequa programmes that receive BMZ support. If the overall actual costs are lower than anticipated, then the difference  
is repaid to BMZ (no additional payments are made to sequa if administrative costs were higher than planned). This means that the sum of the individual items does NOT reflect the overall  
actual administrative costs incurred.
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Company criteria  • The following companies are eligible to apply: German and European companies and companies 
in developing countries in which European citizens or companies that are registered in the EU 
hold a stake of at least 25 %. 
Minimum requirements for companies:
 • Annual turnover of EUR 1 million
 • 10 employees
 • Three years of business operations
Project criteria  • Compatibility with development goals: Relevance to development, protection of the 
environment and social responsibility must be clear; positive criteria: projects in LDCs, and/or 
projects whose targets groups include disadvantaged sections of the population
 • Complementarity: Public and private contributions should complement each other in such a way 
that cooperation enables both partners to achieve their respective objectives more quickly, more 
effectively and more cost-efficiently.
 • Subsidiarity: A public-sector contribution will only be made to the develoPPP.de programme if: 
(1) the private sector partner would not otherwise implement the develoPPP.de project without 
the public partner; (2) the develoPPP.de project is not required by law; (3) the develoPPP.de 
project gives rise to an appropriate economic development benefit for the developing country 
that exceeds any commercial benefits to the private partner.
 • Competitive neutrality: The terms and conditions of entry to the programme are the same for all 
companies; competition is not distorted and there is a clear and transparent selection process.
 • Contribution of the private sector of at least 50 % of the project’s overall costs.
 • The company’s commercial interests are clearly recognisable.
 • Sustainability: A develoPPP.de project must be embedded in the company’s long-term 
sustainable involvement in the developing or emerging country. Sustainability beyond the end  
of the project term plays a major role.
Qualitative criteria for strategic development partnerships 
with the private sector
 • high level of innovation and replicability
 • above-average structure-building results
 • broad-based impact
 • multi-stakeholder approach
Other criteria for strategic development partnerships  
with the private sector
 • Strategic Projects (DEG): one or more partner countries in one or several developing countries; 
total project funding of at least EUR 750,000
 • Strategic Alliances (GIZ): at least two partner countries in a minimum of two developing 
countries (in 2015 the additional criteria for Strategic Alliances were dropped); total project 
funding of at least EUR 750,000
Source: authors’ own, based on develoPPP.de guidelines 
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5.6
Overview of differences between the various forms of development partnerships with the private sector
Development partnerships with the private sector
Traditional Strategic
Form of 
development 
partnership with 
the private 
sector
1 2 3 4 5 6
Imp.org. DEG sequa GIZ GIZ DEG GIZ
Amount Public funding of up to 200,000 € Total project funding of at least 750,000 €
Project criteria Compatibility with development goals, complementarity, subsidiarity, competitive neutrality, contribution of the private sector;  
commercial interest, sustainability
In addition:
 • high level of innovation and replicability
 • above-average structure-building results
 • broad-based impact
 • multi-stakeholder approach
 • optional:  
several partner 
companies
 • optional: 
implemented in 
several countries
 • at least two  
partner companies  
(up to 2015)
 • at least two 
countries  
(up to 2015)
Type of contract Service contract Transfer
agreement
Consulting contract/
implementation 
agreement
Cooperation 
agreement
Service contract Cooperation 
agreement
Role of the  
imp. org.
Finance and advisory 
services
Finance and  
advisory services
Finance and  
advisory services
Finance,  
advisory services 
and implementation
Finance and  
advisory services
Finance,  
advisory services 
and implementation
Source: authors’ own  
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5.7
Team members
Core team 
Dr Stefanie Krapp Head of Department 
Mr Christoph Hartmann Senior Evaluator, Team Leader
Mr Felix Gaisbauer Evaluator
Ms Kirsten Vorwerk Evaluator
Ms Rebecca Maicher Project administrator
 
Team members Role and field of activity
Ms Elke Caroline Demtschück Sectoral advisor 
Dr Tillmann Altenburg External peer reviewer
Dr Markus Palenberg External peer reviewer
Prof Jörg Faust Internal review at DEval
Dr Martin Noltze Internal review at DEval
Dr Kim Lücking develoPPP.de portfolio analysis
Dr Hanne Roggemann develoPPP.de portfolio analysis
Mr Lennart Raetzell Consultant (Syspons GmbH), case studies
Ms Anne Kruse Consultant (Syspons GmbH), case studies
Dr Chala Erko Evaluator, Ethiopia
Mr Ricardo Rose Evaluator, Brazil
Dr Milind Bokil Evaluator, India
Mr Keerthi Laal Kala Evaluator, India
Mr Max Anyuru Evaluator, Uganda
Mr Ivan Ssenkubuge Evaluator, Uganda
Ms Franziska Hoefler Intern/undergraduate assistant
Ms Ferike Thom Intern
Ms Christina Reitz Intern
Ms Frida Salge Intern
Ms Andrea Stein Undergraduate, research assistant
Mr. Benjamin Thull Undergraduate assistant
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5.8
Schedule
C
on
ce
pt
 p
ha
se
Preparatory phase and identification of the object of the evaluation
03 – 04/2015 Clarification talks with representatives of BMZ and implementing organisations 
04 – 06/2015 Drafting of concept paper
06/2015 Meetings of reference group to discuss the concept paper
06/2015 Finalisation of concept paper
In
ce
pt
io
n 
ph
as
e
Elaboration of programme theory and methodology
07 – 09/2015 Drafting of the programme theory, analysis of literature and documents, portfolio analysis, the first company survey, 
content analysis
07/2015 Workshop on reconstructing the programme theory
10/2015 Meeting of reference group to discuss the inception report
D
at
a 
co
lle
ct
io
n 
ph
as
e
Data Collection
07 – 12/2015 Portfolio analysis
10 – 11/2015 Further evaluation of the content analysis and of the literature and document analysis
11 – 12/2015 Development of the data collection tools
11/2015 – 03/2016 Expert consultations
10 – 12/2015 Preparation of the case studies: planning of content and logistics
12/2015 – 01/2016 Implementation and evaluation of the pilot case study
01/2016 Meeting of the reference group to discuss the portfolio analysis
01 – 03/2016 Implementation of the case studies in the selected partner countries
02 – 04/2016 Implementation of the second company survey
Sy
nt
he
si
s 
ph
as
e
Data analysis
01 – 03/2016 Elaboration of the case study reports
03 – 04/2016 Analysis of the findings of the individual data collection methods
04 – 06/2016 Elaboration of synthesis table for the individual data collection methods
06/2016 Meeting of reference group to discuss specific findings, preliminary conclusions and recommendations
R
ep
or
ti
ng
Writing of evaluation report and dissemination
07 – 09/2016 Elaboration of draft report
09/2016 Meeting of reference group to discuss the draft evaluation report
09/2016 Submission of final version of report
3/2017 Publication of the evaluation report
2017 Dissemination
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